UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-5083
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
THOMAS WILLIAM FIELDER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Graham C. Mullen, Chief
District Judge. (CR-02-152)
Submitted: January 12, 2007 Decided: February 20, 2007
Before WILLIAMS and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Kevin A. Tate, FEDERAL DEFENDERS OF WESTERN NORTH CAROLINA, INC.,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Douglas Scott Broyles,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Thomas William Fielder pleaded guilty, pursuant to a plea
agreement, to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute and to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine and
fifty grams or more of crack cocaine within 1000 feet of a school
or playground, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846, 860
(2000) (Count One); and one count of using and carrying a firearm
during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime and possessing
a firearm in furtherance of such crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) (2000) (Count Eleven). The plea agreement included
stipulations related to the determination of Fielder’s sentence
that included the quantity of crack cocaine attributable to Fielder
and the validity of a specific prior felony drug conviction.
In determining the sentencing range for Count One, the
probation officer recommended a base offense level of thirty-six
pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guideline Manual (USSG) § 2D1.1(c)(2)
(2002), based on the plea agreement stipulation of drug quantity.
This was enhanced by two levels pursuant to USSG § 2D1.2(a)(1)
because the drugs were stored, possessed, and/or distributed within
1000 feet of a protected location. After a three-level reduction
for acceptance of responsibility, Fielder’s total offense level was
thirty-five. Fielder’s prior criminal record and the fact that the
instant offenses were committed while Fielder was under a criminal
justice sentence for a prior conviction resulted in the assessment
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of six points, placing him in criminal history category III. The
resulting sentencing range for Count One was 210 to 262 months, but
because the statutory minimum was twenty years, the Guideline range
was 240 to 262 months, plus a mandatory consecutive five years on
Count Eleven. Fielder did not object to the presentence report
(PSR).
Prior to sentencing, the Government moved for a downward
departure from both the Guideline range and the statutory minimum
pursuant to USSG § 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2000), based on
Fielder’s substantial assistance to the Government. The Government
requested a total sentence of 240 months. At sentencing, the
district court adopted the factual findings and Guideline
calculations in the PSR, granted the Government’s departure motion,
and sentenced Fielder to 240 months of imprisonment, ten years of
supervised release, and a $200 special assessment. Fielder now
appeals.
On appeal, counsel filed an Anders brief, in which he
states there are no meritorious issues for appeal, but questions
whether Fielder’s trial counsel was ineffective in allowing him to
enter into a plea agreement in which he admitted a prior conviction
that was not listed in the PSR. In a pro se supplemental brief,
Fielder repeats the argument raised by counsel, and asserts other
claims of ineffective assistance of counsel and sentencing error.
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Counsel suggests that trial counsel was ineffective in
that he “should have investigated [Fielder’s] criminal record and
should have advised him not to admit the prior conviction which he
admitted in his plea agreement.” In his pro se brief, Fielder
likewise asserts counsel was ineffective in failing to investigate
the validity of the prior conviction listed in the plea agreement.
An allegation of ineffective assistance should not proceed on
direct appeal unless it appears conclusively from the record that
counsel’s performance was ineffective. United States v.
Richardson, 195 F.3d 192, 198 (4th Cir. 1999). Our review of the
record leads us to conclude that deficient performance is not
conclusively shown, and Fielder is not entitled to any relief on
this claim.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in
this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We have
considered the arguments asserted in Fielder’s pro se supplemental
brief and find them to be without merit. We therefore affirm
Fielder’s conviction and sentence.* This court requires that
counsel inform Fielder, in writing, of the right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Fielder
requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such
a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court
*
We have reviewed the district court’s determination of
Fielder’s sentence and conclude that Fielder is not entitled to any
relief based on United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Fielder.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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