UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4256
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
STACSON MAURICE PAGE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. Malcolm J. Howard, Senior
District Judge. (5:05-cr-00230-H-1)
Submitted: March 5, 2007 Decided: March 16, 2007
Before WILLIAMS and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Frank DeArmon Whitney, United States Attorney, Anne
Margaret Hayes, Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Stacson Maurice Page pled guilty, pursuant to a written
plea agreement, to possession of firearms during and in relation to
a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)
(2000). On appeal, Page’s counsel filed a brief in accordance with
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting that there are
no meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning whether the
waiver of appellate rights in Page’s plea agreement was valid and
enforceable. Page has filed a pro se supplemental brief
questioning whether he was properly sentenced as a career offender.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
A defendant may waive the right to appeal if that waiver
is knowing and intelligent. United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162,
169 (4th Cir. 2005). To determine whether a waiver is knowing and
intelligent, we examine the background, experience, and conduct of
the defendant. United States v. Broughton-Jones, 71 F.3d 1143,
1146 (4th Cir. 1995). Generally, if the district court fully
questions a defendant regarding the waiver of his right to appeal
during the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 colloquy, the waiver is both valid
and enforceable. United States v. Johnson, 410 F.3d 137, 151 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 461 (2005). The issue, however,
ultimately is “evaluated by reference to the totality of the
circumstances.” United States v. General, 278 F.3d 389, 400 (4th
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Cir. 2002). We review the question of whether a defendant validly
waived his right to appeal de novo. Blick, 408 F.3d at 168.
We conclude Page knowingly and voluntarily waived his
right to appeal in a valid plea agreement and the district court
complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in conducting Page’s guilty plea
hearing. The court informed Page that any waiver of his appeal
rights would be binding on him. The language of the waiver and
plea agreement is clear and unmistakable. Page represented by his
statements at the plea hearing and signature on the plea agreement
that he had been fully advised about, and understood, the terms of
the plea agreement. As part of the plea agreement, Page
specifically agreed to waive any appeal of his conviction and
sentence. Thus, we find the waiver valid and enforceable.
However, because the Government has not asserted that the waiver
provision precludes review of Page’s conviction or sentence on
appeal and because his attorney has filed an Anders brief, we
consider the merits of Page’s appeal despite his appellate waiver.
See United States v. Brock, 211 F.3d 88, 90 n.1 (4th Cir. 2000).
Our review of the record confirms there are no meritorious grounds
for appeal.
We find the claim raised in Page’s pro se supplemental
brief to be without merit. As required by Anders, we have examined
the entire record and find no other meritorious issues for appeal.
Therefore, finding no error, we affirm Page’s conviction and
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sentence. This court requires that counsel inform his client, in
writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United
States for further review. If the client requests that a petition
be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a
copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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