UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4835
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
LECHIA LYNN MOODY,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Beckley. Thomas E. Johnston,
District Judge. (5:00-cr-00163-ALL)
Submitted: January 31, 2007 Decided: March 13, 2007
Before WILLIAMS and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Deirdre H. Purdy, BAILEY & GLASSER, LLP, Charleston, West Virginia,
for Appellant. Charles T. Miller, United States Attorney, John K.
Webb, Assistant United States Attorney, Charleston, West Virginia,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Lechia Lynn Moody appeals the district court’s order
revoking her term of supervised release and imposing a 24-month
term of imprisonment. Moody claims: (1) the court’s statement of
its basis for revoking her supervised release was insufficient;
(2) the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that she
violated a condition of release by possessing a controlled
substance; and (3) the court abused its discretion by admitting and
relying on hearsay evidence. We affirm.
Moody was convicted of distribution of oxycodone in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(2000). On July 7, 2004, she began
serving a three-year term of supervised release. On January 19,
2006, Moody’s probation officer filed a petition for revocation of
Moody’s supervised release. Following a hearing, the conditions of
Moody’s supervised release were modified to require that Moody
complete a 28-day inpatient drug rehabilitation program, and upon
completion, that she participate in a six-month outpatient program.
On April 26, 2006, the probation officer filed a second
petition for revocation, alleging that Moody possessed a controlled
substance as evidenced by a positive drug screen on February 21,
2006; and that according to treatment providers at the drug
rehabilitation facility, Moody told staff upon completion of the
28-day program she did not want to participate in the six-month
program. According to the petition, Moody asked the staff to
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falsely report to the court that she was in need of no further
treatment. Based on her resistance to the six-month program, she
was denied admission.
The district court held a hearing on the petition. The
government presented the testimony of the probation officer and the
laboratory report showing Moody’s positive drug screen. Moody did
not testify or present any evidence. The district court concluded
that Moody violated both conditions of release as alleged in the
petition, revoked the supervised release and imposed a 24-month
term of imprisonment.
Moody argues that the district court failed to
sufficiently articulate its basis for revoking supervised release.
A defendant is entitled to a written statement by the factfinder as
to the evidence relied upon and the grounds for revoking supervised
release. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972). This
requirement may be satisfied by a transcript of an oral finding
“when the transcript and record compiled before the trial judge
enable the reviewing court to determine the basis of the trial
court’s decision.” United States v. Copely, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th
Cir. 1992). In this case, while the trial court’s recitation in
its written and oral findings that it relied upon the information
stated in the petition and the evidence presented at the hearing to
conclude Moody violated both conditions of release as alleged in
the petition “might have been more specific,” it requires “no great
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leap of faith” to understand the grounds for revocation. Id. at
832. We conclude the court’s statement satisfies Moody’s right to
due process, and is sufficient.
Moody also challenges the district court’s conclusion
that she violated the terms of release by possessing a controlled
substance. We review the district court’s decision to revoke a
defendant’s supervised release for an abuse of discretion. Id. at
831. The district court need only find a violation of a condition
of supervised release by a preponderance of the evidence. 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3)(2000).
Moody asserts that the evidence did not establish that
her possession was knowing. She claims that because she resided
with a felon, that person could have been responsible for her
unknowingly ingesting drugs. However, there is no evidence in the
record supporting this inference. Instead, the evidence in the
record supports that Moody knowingly possessed a controlled
substance. We conclude the district court did not abuse its
discretion in finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
Moody violated a condition of her supervised release by possessing
a controlled substance.
Finally, Moody contends that the district abused its
discretion by admitting hearsay evidence without conducting an
inquiry into the reliability of the evidence. Supervised release
revocation hearings are informal proceedings in which the rules of
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evidence need not be strictly observed. Fed. R. Evid. 1101(d)(3)
(excluding probation revocation hearings from proceedings governed
by Federal Rules of Evidence). Hearsay evidence is admissible in
revocation proceedings if it is “demonstrably reliable.” United
States v. McCallum, 677 F.2d 1024, 1026 (4th Cir. 1982).
Even assuming the probation officer’s testimony
recounting Moody’s statements to the treatment provider was not
“demonstrably reliable,” any error was harmless. Moody did not
actually contest that fact that she violated a condition of release
by not participating in a six-month treatment program. She merely
offered an alternative explanation for her noncompliance.
Moreover, under the U. S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (“USSG”)
§ 7B1.1, violations of supervised release are classified into three
grades--Grades A, B and C. Simple possession is a Grade B
violation. USSG §§ 7B1.1, 4B1.2(b). Once a Grade B violation has
been established, the court must revoke supervised release. See
USSG §§ 7B1.1, 7B1.3; 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2000). Because
revocation of supervised release was mandatory based on the court’s
finding that Moody possessed a controlled substance, any arguable
error in connection with the evidence admitted in support of the
other violation was harmless.
For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s order
revoking supervised release and sentencing Moody to twenty-four
months of imprisonment. We dispense with oral argument because the
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facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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