UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 04-7196
JOHN A. SCHIFFERLI,
Petitioner - Appellant,
versus
STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA; HENRY DARGAN
MCMASTER, Attorney General of the State of
South Carolina,
Respondents - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Beaufort. Terry L. Wooten, District Judge.
(CA-03-2933-25-9)
Submitted: March 2, 2007 Decided: March 19, 2007
Before WILLIAMS, KING, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John A. Schifferli, Appellant Pro Se. Donald John Zelenka, John
William McIntosh, Assistant Attorneys General, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
John A. Schifferli appeals the district court’s order
adopting the magistrate judge’s recommendation and denying relief
on his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (2000) petition in which he raised the
following claims: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) his
guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary; (3) he was denied due
process because he was not given a preliminary hearing; and (4) his
arrest was illegal in that he was never given his Miranda*
warnings. By order, we granted a certificate of appealability as
to claims (1) and (2). The Respondent has filed an informal reply
brief as to those claims and Schifferli has filed a reply brief.
Although the district court improperly concluded that
Schifferli failed to exhaust his state court remedies, his claims
nevertheless fail on the merits. When a state court has addressed
an issue that is subsequently raised in a § 2254 proceeding, habeas
relief is available only if the state court’s decision “was
contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly
established Federal law” or “resulted in a decision that was based
upon an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C. §
2254(d); see Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000); see
also Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333 n.7 (1997) (characterizing
§ 2254(d) as a “highly deferential standard for evaluating
*
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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state-court rulings”). Factual determinations made by a state
court are presumed correct, and the petitioner bears the burden of
rebutting the presumption by “clear and convincing evidence.” 28
U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1); see Tucker v. Ozmint, 350 F.3d 433, 439 (4th
Cir. 2003).
To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel, Schifferli must show that: (1) counsel’s performance fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness; and (2) counsel’s
deficient performance was prejudicial. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984). Strickland’s first prong measures
counsel’s performance under prevailing professional norms. Id. at
688. In order to satisfy the second prong, that counsel’s alleged
incompetence prejudiced his case, the petitioner must prove there
is a reasonable probability his trial would have had a different
outcome absent such errors by counsel. Id. at 694. In the guilty
plea context, a prisoner must show that “but for counsel’s errors,
he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going
to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
Schifferli claims that his attorney failed to inform him
that a confession he made was subject to suppression at trial or of
the consequences of pleading guilty--specifically, the “85% rule”
that requires that eighty-five percent of a sentence be served
before an inmate is eligible for parole. At the state court
hearing on these claims, Schifferli’s trial counsel testified that
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she fully explained the issues regarding a Jackson v. Denno, 378
U.S. 368 (1964), voluntariness hearing and told Schifferli that she
did not believe he would prevail on the issue. Counsel also
testified that she fully informed Schifferli of the consequences of
his plea, including the “85% rule.” The state court found
counsel’s testimony credible and, applying Strickland v.
Washington, concluded that counsel’s performance was neither
deficient nor prejudicial to Schifferli. We find that the state
court’s conclusions were neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable
application of, federal law.
Schifferli also challenges the voluntariness of his
guilty plea. A guilty plea must represent “a voluntary and
intelligent choice among the alternative courses of action open to
the defendant.” North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970),
and may be invalid if it was induced by threats or
misrepresentations. See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755
(1970). A defendant’s statements at the guilty plea hearing are
presumed to be true. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74
(1977). Unsupported allegations on appeal are insufficient to
overcome representations made during the guilty plea hearing. See
Via v. Superintendent, Powhatan Correctional Ctr., 643 F.2d 167,
171 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that statements at plea hearing that
facially demonstrate plea’s validity are conclusive absent
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compelling reason why they should not be, such as ineffective
assistance of counsel).
Schifferli maintains that his plea was involuntary
because he did not understand the nature of the charges or the
consequences of his plea. Schifferli also claims that he was
misled into believing that he would be charged with second degree
burglary if he pled guilty. The transcript of his guilty plea
proceeding belies these claims.
On these facts, we find that the state court’s resolution
of these issues was not contrary to, or an unreasonable application
of, federal constitutional law. Accordingly, we affirm the denial
of relief. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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