UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-5144
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
CHRISTOPHER REGINALD HINES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Graham C. Mullen, Chief
District Judge. (CR-03-218)
Submitted: February 21, 2007 Decided: April 2, 2007
Before TRAXLER, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
R. Andrew Murray, GOODMAN, CARR, LAUGHRUN, LEVINE & MURRAY, P.A.,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen C. F. Shappert,
United States Attorney, Amy E. Ray, Michael E. Savage, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Christopher Reginald Hines pled guilty to conspiracy to
defraud the United States and conspiracy to commit money laundering
and was sentenced to 188 months imprisonment. On appeal, he
challenges the district court’s denial of his motion to withdraw
his guilty plea, and he contends that the district court failed to
make an independent determination of a factual basis to support the
plea. We affirm Hines’ conviction.
The district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a
guilty plea is reviewed for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Ubakanma, 215 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2000). A defendant does not
have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea, even before
sentencing. United States v. Moore, 931 F.2d 245, 248 (4th Cir.
1991). Rather, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating
that a “fair and just reason” supports his request to withdraw his
plea. Id. The central question is whether the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11
hearing was properly conducted. United States v. Puckett, 61 F.3d
1092, 1099 (4th Cir. 1995). This court closely scrutinizes the
Rule 11 colloquy and attaches a strong presumption that the plea is
final and binding if the Rule 11 proceeding is adequate. United
States v. Lambey, 974 F.2d 1389, 1394 (4th Cir. 1992).
Hines contends that he is innocent, but that he pled
guilty on the belief that his attorney did not fully investigate
his case and was not prepared to defend him at trial. The district
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court denied the motion, finding that the relevant factors all
weighed against withdrawing the plea. See Moore, 931 F.2d at 248.
We have reviewed the record and find no clear error in the district
court’s determination of the factors, and no abuse of discretion by
the district court in denying Hines’ motion to withdraw his guilty
plea. See Ubakanma, 215 F.3d at 424.
Hines also challenges the validity of his plea, asserting
that the district court failed to make an independent assessment of
the adequacy of the factual basis for the plea, as required by Fed.
R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). The finding of a factual basis may be based
on “anything that appears in the record.” United States v.
DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 120 (4th Cir. 1991). We find that the
record contains sufficient factual support for Hines’ plea.
Hines signed a “Stipulation to Factual Basis” in which he
acknowledged that he knew that material misrepresentations were
made in real estate closing statements that his company sent to
potential lenders for the purpose of acquiring financing, and that
he knew that his company received proceeds from these closings and
that a portion of these proceeds were used to facilitate additional
financial transactions to further or promote the conspiracy. A
stipulation by the defendant waives the requirement that evidence
be presented to establish the facts that were stipulated. See
United States v. Muse, 83 F.3d 672, 678 (4th Cir. 1996). Thus,
Hines cannot argue that the evidence was insufficient to prove the
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facts to which he stipulated. United States v. Reedy, 990 F.2d
167, 169 (4th Cir. 1993).
Moreover, details of the offense conduct and Hines’
participation in the offense were set forth in the presentence
report. The district court properly relied upon those facts, as
well. See United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 531 (4th Cir.
2002). We find that, based on the summary of the investigation
described in the presentence report and the statements in the
stipulation of a factual basis that Hines signed, the district
court’s determination of an adequate factual basis was not an abuse
of discretion. See United States v. Carr, 271 F.3d 172, 179 (4th
Cir. 2001).
Accordingly, we affirm Hines’ conviction. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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