UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-4853
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
TOMMY LEE YANCEY, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. James A. Beaty, Jr.,
District Judge. (CR-04-503)
Submitted: April 5, 2007 Decided: April 17, 2007
Before WILKINS, Chief Judge, and WIDENER and WILKINSON, Circuit
Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, Federal Public Defender, William C. Ingram, First
Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
DEFENDER, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna Mills
Wagoner, United States Attorney, Michael A. DeFranco, Assistant
United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Tommy Lee Yancey, Jr., appeals his conviction and sentence for
possession with the intent to distribute nine grams of cocaine
base, see 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1) (West 1999). Finding no error,
we affirm.
I.
On the morning of July 15, 2004, Janice Matthews observed an
individual in a bright green shirt walking down the street holding
a firearm. Her husband alerted law enforcement officers, who later
apprehended Yancey. Yancey fit Ms. Matthews’ description and was
located near her residence. During a pat-down search (the
legitimacy of which Yancey does not challenge), officers discovered
a single piece of cocaine base weighing nine grams and $680 in
cash. Yancey subsequently informed officers where they could find
the weapon he had been carrying when Ms. Matthews saw him.
Yancey was charged with possession of cocaine base with the
intent to distribute, see id., and possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon, see 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(g)(1) (West 2000). At
trial, the Government presented expert testimony from Detective
J. J. Strum of the Greensboro (North Carolina) Police Department.
Detective Strum testified that the typical dosage unit of cocaine
base is .1 gram and that the value of the nine grams of cocaine
base found in Yancey’s possession was between $800 and $1,000. He
further stated that, in his expert opinion, nine grams of cocaine
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base was inconsistent with personal use. On cross-examination,
however, Detective Strum acknowledged that it was “possible” for an
addict to ingest nine grams of cocaine base over a two- to three-
day period. J.A. 164.
In his defense, Yancey presented testimony from his sister and
his cousin, both of whom testified that Yancey was addicted to
cocaine base. Yancey’s sister further stated that Yancey did not
deal drugs. Yancey testified in his own defense, claiming that on
the day before his arrest he had discovered a large amount of cash
in a vehicle he was repairing for a drug dealer. He then used $400
to purchase cocaine base and spent the evening in a hotel room,
smoking it. According to Yancey, the nine grams in his possession
at the time of his arrest was part of this purchase.
After considering the evidence, the jury acquitted Yancey of
being a felon in possession of a firearm but convicted him of
possession with the intent to distribute. Yancey now appeals.
II.
Yancey first argues that the evidence is insufficient to
support his conviction because the Government did not establish an
intent to distribute the cocaine base. We disagree.
When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,
we consider whether the evidence, taken in the light most favorable
to the Government, was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
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doubt. See Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942);
United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862-63 (4th Cir. 1996)
(en banc). Thus, a defendant challenging his conviction based upon
the sufficiency of the evidence “bears a heavy burden,” United
States v. Beidler, 110 F.3d 1064, 1067 (4th Cir. 1997) (internal
quotation marks omitted), as “a decision [to reverse for
insufficient evidence] will be confined to cases where the
prosecution’s failure is clear.” Burks v. United States, 437 U.S.
1, 17 (1978).
Having examined the record in light of these principles, we
conclude that the evidence was sufficient to support Yancey’s
convictions. In this circuit, “[i]ntent to distribute may be
inferred from possession of ... a quantity of drugs larger than
needed for personal use.” United States v. Fisher, 912 F.2d 728,
730 (4th Cir. 1990). Here, Yancey possessed an amount
substantially more than the standard dosage unit of .1 gram and was
simultaneously in possession of a large amount of cash. See United
States v. Collins, 412 F.3d 515, 519 (4th Cir. 2005) (noting that
intent to distribute can be inferred from, inter alia, “the amount
of cash seized with the drugs”). Additionally, the jury was
entitled to discredit Yancey’s testimony and consider his lack of
credibility against him. See Burgos, 94 F.3d at 868.
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III.
Yancey raises two challenges to the calculation of his
sentence, both of which are foreclosed by circuit precedent.
First, Yancey maintains that the district court violated his Fifth
and Sixth Amendment rights by imposing a mandatory minimum sentence
on the basis of a prior felony conviction. This ruling is
foreclosed by United States v. Chase, 466 F.3d 310, 315-16 (4th
Cir. 2006). Yancey also contends that his prior conviction is not
a felony under North Carolina law, a claim he concedes is
foreclosed by United States v. Harp, 406 F.3d 242, 246-47 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 297 (2005).
IV.
For the reasons set forth above, we affirm Yancey’s conviction
and sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
us and oral argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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