UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4044
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
RODERICK LAMAR WILLIAMS, a/k/a Rox,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Statesville. Richard L. Voorhees,
District Judge. (5:03-cr-00004-8)
Submitted: March 7, 2007 Decided: April 17, 2007
Before WILLIAMS, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
James B. Craven, III, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant.
Gretchen C. F. Shappert, United States Attorney, Charlotte, North
Carolina, Amy E. Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Roderick Lamar Williams appeals his conviction by jury
and sentence on charges of conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute at least five kilograms of cocaine and at least fifty
grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846
(Count One); possession with intent to distribute at least 500
grams of cocaine and aiding and abetting that possession, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841 and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count Six); and two
counts of possession of a firearm during and in relation to a drug
trafficking crime and aiding and abetting the same, in violation of
18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1) and 2 (Counts Seven and Nine). The district
court sentenced Williams to life imprisonment on Counts One and
Six, to be served concurrently, and to consecutive terms of sixty
months’ imprisonment on Count Seven, and 300 months’ imprisonment
on Count Nine, for a total term of imprisonment of life plus 360
months. The district court also sentenced Williams to a ten-year
term of supervised release on Count One, an eight-year term of
supervised release on Count Six, and five-year terms of supervised
release on each of Counts Seven and Nine, all such terms to be
served concurrently, and ordered payment of a $400 special
statutory assessment. On appeal, Williams contends that the
judge’s application during sentencing of the murder cross-reference
for complicity in an uncharged murder, pursuant to U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Manual (“USSG”) § 2D1.1(d) (2004), violated his right to
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a jury trial.1 He also challenges generally the sufficiency of the
evidence to support his conviction.2
This court reviews the imposition of a sentence for
reasonableness. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 260-61
(2005); United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546-47 (4th Cir.
2005). After Booker, courts must calculate the appropriate
guideline range, making any appropriate factual findings. United
States v. Davenport, 445 F.3d 366, 370 (4th Cir. 2006). The court
then should consider the resulting advisory guideline range in
conjunction with the factors under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000
& Supp. 2006), and determine an appropriate sentence that is
“sufficient, but not greater than necessary,” to achieve the goals
of § 3553(a). Davenport, 445 F.3d at 370. If a court imposes a
sentence outside the guideline range, the district court must state
its reasons for doing so. Hughes, 401 F.3d at 546.
Here, Williams contends that his sentence is unlawful
because the district court made findings that increased his
sentence beyond what it would be based only on facts found by the
jury. He objects to the enhancement because no evidence was
1
USSG § 2D1.1(d) provides that the offense level set forth in
USSG § 2A1.1(a) is to be used “[i]f the victim was killed under
circumstances that would constitute murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1111
had such killing taken place within the territorial or maritime
jurisdiction of the United States.”
2
Because Williams is represented by counsel on appeal, we
decline to review the numerous issues Williams seeks to raise pro
se, except for those asserted by counsel.
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presented at trial relative to the enhancement and the murder was
not charged in the indictment in his present case, nor had he been
tried on the murder in any other case, as of the date of his
sentencing. However, this general argument was rejected in Booker.
After Booker, the sentencing court is authorized to make factual
findings in order to appropriately determine the defendant’s
advisory range under the guidelines. See Davenport, 445 F.3d at
370; see also United States v. Martinez, 136 F.3d 972, 979 (4th
Cir. 1998) (holding that a sentencing court may enhance defendant’s
sentence based on its findings of conduct by a preponderance of the
evidence, even where jury acquitted defendant of that conduct).
Under our now advisory sentencing guidelines, these authorized
factual findings would include a finding as to whether "a victim
was killed under circumstances that would constitute murder under
18 U.S.C.A. § 1111" which would call for application of the murder
guideline, USSG § 2A1.1 (First Degree Murder). See USSG
§ 2D1.1(d)(1).
We specifically find that the evidence presented at the
sentencing hearing supported the district court’s conclusion, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that Williams was involved in the
drug-related homicide of Houston, a confidential government
informant. Agent David Ramsey testified that Houston, who was
cooperating in an investigation into drug trafficking, was murdered
in January 2003, following Williams’ indictment on drug conspiracy
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charges. Following the trial at which Williams and Morrison, a co-
conspirator, were convicted, Morrison told Agent Ramsey that
Williams offered to pay him $10,000 to kill Houston. Agent Ramsey
further testified that Morrison related specific conversations
during which Williams warned Houston that he would kill him if he
learned that Houston had informed on him and discussed with
Morrison the possibilities of killing Houston. Morrison also told
Agent Ramsey that he ultimately agreed to kill Houston and that he
went with Williams to Houston’s house with the intention of killing
Houston, but Morrison was unable to go through with the murder.
Morrison told Agent Ramsey that Williams later told him that
Williams had offered another person $5000 to do the killing but
that Williams finally decided that “he would handle the situation
himself.” Agent Ramsey further testified that during Williams’ and
Morrison’s trial, Williams described in more detail to Morrison the
murder of Houston and admitted shooting Houston.
The Government also presented testimony of two other
witnesses that support the conclusion that Williams murdered
Houston. One witness housed with Williams in jail in 2003 related
that Williams had confessed to him that Williams had murdered
Houston, and further attested that Williams had provided him with
details regarding the murder. Another witness testified that
Williams had confessed to having killed a “snitch.”
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This evidence fully supports the district court’s
determination, by a preponderance of the evidence, that "a victim
was killed under circumstances that would constitute murder under
18 U.S.C. § 1111," and therefore we find that the district court
properly applied the murder guideline, USSG § 2A1.1. See USSG
§ 2D1.1(d)(1). Because the district court adequately explained the
basis for its sentencing decision and considered Williams’
arguments and the § 3553(a) factors, as well as the cross-reference
for murder enhancement, and because the sentence was within the
properly calculated advisory guidelines range, we find that the
resulting sentence is reasonable. See United States v.
Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d 375, 380 (4th Cir. 2006), petition for
cert. filed, U.S.L.W. (U.S. July 21, 2006) (No. 06-5439);
United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
126 S. Ct. 2309 (2006).
In addition, we have reviewed Williams’ sufficiency of
the evidence claim, and conclude that the claim is without merit.
In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal
conviction on direct review, “[t]he verdict of the jury must be
sustained if there is substantial evidence, taking the view most
favorable to the Government, to support it.” Glasser v. United
States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). Substantial evidence is evidence
“that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate and
sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt beyond a
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reasonable doubt.” United States v. Alerre, 430 F.3d 681, 693 (4th
Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1925 (2006) (internal
quotation and citation omitted). We consider circumstantial and
direct evidence, and allow the Government the benefit of all
reasonable inferences from the facts proven to those sought to be
established. Id. at 858; United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018,
1021 (4th Cir. 1982). In resolving issues of substantial evidence,
we do not weigh evidence or review witness credibility. United
States v. Lomax, 293 F.3d 701, 705 (4th Cir. 2002). Rather, it is
the role of the factfinder to judge the credibility of witnesses,
resolve conflicts in testimony, and weigh the evidence. United
States v. Manbeck, 744 F.2d 360, 392 (4th Cir. 1984).
Ample evidence was presented at trial in this case to
support the jury’s findings that Williams was involved with others
in an established conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
significant amounts of cocaine and cocaine base, that he possessed
firearms during and in relation to drug trafficking crimes, and
that he aided and abetted the same. Several witnesses, including
co-conspirators and Government agents, attested to Williams’ trips
out-of-state and out-of-the-country with others to purchase large
amounts of cocaine and cocaine base and transport it back to North
Carolina where it was prepared, packaged, and distributed.
Williams was identified as a member of “The Cream Team,” an
established narcotics trafficking organization operating in and out
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of North Carolina. A number of such witnesses also testified that
Williams often carried a firearm on or immediately near his person
while he conducted drug trafficking transactions. The evidence
introduced at the trial of this matter clearly supports the jury’s
determinations with regard to the offenses charged, and we reject
Williams’ claim that the evidence was insufficient. See Burgos, 94
F.3d at 857.
Accordingly, we affirm Williams’ conviction and sentence.
We further deny Williams’ motion for writ of mandamus, as well as
his motions to proceed pro se on appeal, to relieve his attorney
from representation, to file pro se briefs, supplemental and
oversized pro se briefs, supplemental and oversized appendix, and
pro se reply brief. We dispense with oral argument because the
facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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