UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-5216
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
CHRISTIAN WOMACK, a/k/a Kilo,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (CR-97-142-FO)
Submitted: March 28, 2007 Decided: April 25, 2007
Before WILLIAMS, MICHAEL, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, G. Alan DuBois,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Frank D. Whitney, United States Attorney, Anne M.
Hayes, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Christian Womack appeals the district court’s order
revoking his supervised release for using controlled substances and
sentencing him to twenty-four months’ imprisonment. Womack
contends the district court did not sufficiently explain why
incarceration was necessary and unreasonably imposed the maximum
sentence permitted by statute. Finding no error, we affirm.
We will affirm a sentence imposed after revocation of
supervised release if it is within the prescribed statutory range
and not “plainly unreasonable.” United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d
433, 437 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 2007 WL 789123 (U.S. Mar. 19,
2007) (No. 06-7631). While the district court must consider the
policy statements contained in U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
(“USSG”) Ch. 7 (2000) and the statutory requirements and factors
applicable to revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3553(a),
3583 (West 2000 & Supp. 2006), the district court ultimately has
broad discretion to revoke the previous sentence and to impose a
term of imprisonment up to the statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d
at 439.
Womack’s sentence exceeded the range of eight to fourteen
months’ imprisonment set forth in USSG § 7B1.4(a). However, the
twenty-four month sentence is within the statutory maximum of two
years’ imprisonment. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3) (2000).
Furthermore, although Womack contends the district court failed to
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provide an adequate statement of reasons supporting the sentence,
we conclude the district court’s imposition of sentence was not
plainly unreasonable.
At the revocation hearing, Womack contended he had a
minor drug problem and treatment in a halfway house was
appropriate. These contentions understated the seriousness of his
drug use and his inability to control it while on supervised
release. Pursuant to 18 U.S.C.A. § 3583(g)(4) (West 2000 & Supp.
2006), mandatory revocation of supervised release results when an
individual tests positive for illegal substances more than three
times within one year. The probation officer reported Womack
failed six drug tests between April and July 2005, far exceeding
the threshold provided in § 3583(g)(4).
Womack admitted these violations at the revocation
hearing but claimed his substance abuse could be treated without
incarceration. However, the evidence before the district court
indicated community treatment had already proven ineffective.
After the first of Womack’s positive tests, the probation officer
arranged weekly group substance abuse counseling for Womack.
Nevertheless, he tested positive for cocaine, marijuana, and
Ecstasy on several additional occasions. Furthermore, Womack
acknowledged he had not been fully truthful with the probation
officer concerning the extent of his drug use.
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Other than stating Womack required intensive drug
treatment, the district court explicitly noted only that it had
considered the Chapter 7 policy statements on revocation. Even if
the district court failed to adequately explain its reasons for
imposing the maximum permissible sentence, we conclude the sentence
is not plainly unreasonable. The district court was fully aware of
Womack’s numerous positive drug tests, the failure of the group
drug abuse counseling, and Womack’s untruthfulness to the probation
officer concerning the extent of his drug use. In light of this
record, and the “substantial latitude” and “broad discretion”
accorded district courts in devising appropriate revocation
sentences, Crudup, 461 F.3d at 439, we are confident the court
properly took all relevant factors into account in devising its
revocation sentence.
Accordingly, we affirm Womack’s sentence. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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