UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-1315
HILB ROGAL & HOBBS COMPANY,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
RISK STRATEGY PARTNERS, INCORPORATED, now
known as Beecher Carlson Holdings,
Incorporated; BEECHER CARLSON HOLDINGS,
INCORPORATED, formerly known as Risk Strategy
Partners, Incorporated; BEECHER CARLSON RISK
MANAGEMENT, INCORPORATED; BEECHER CARLSON
INSURANCE SERVICES, INCORPORATED,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. Robert E. Payne, District
Judge. (3:05-cv-00355-REP)
Argued: February 1, 2007 Decided: April 24, 2007
Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Samuel Walter Hixon, III, WILLIAMS MULLEN, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellant. Benjamin Alexander Stone, MUNGER & STONE,
L.L.P., Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Steven D.
Brown, E. Livingston B. Haskell, WILLIAMS MULLEN, Richmond,
Virginia, for Appellant. Bernard J. DiMuro, DIMURO, GINSBERG,
P.C., Alexandria, Virginia; Warren R. Hall, Jr., ALSTON & BIRD,
Atlanta, Georgia, for Appellees.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Hilb Rogal & Hobbs Company (“Hilb Rogal”) brought this suit
against Risk Strategy Partners, Inc.; Beecher Carlson Holdings,
Inc.; Beecher Carlson Risk Management, Inc.; and Beecher Carlson
Insurance Services, Inc. (“Defendants”), alleging, inter alia, a
breach of Virginia’s business conspiracy statute, Va. Code § 18.2-
499 et seq.* Shortly before trial, Defendants filed a motion in
limine seeking a ruling that, under Virginia’s doctrine of lex loci
delicti, Georgia law governs Hilb Rogal’s claim. Initially, Hilb
Rogal agreed that lex loci delicti governs but argued that it
requires the application of Virginia law. The district court held
that Georgia law governs Hilb Rogal’s claim. Hilb Rogal then filed
a motion to reconsider in which it argued that lex loci delicti
does not, after all, apply and that the relevant inquiry is whether
its claim is governed by Virginia law pursuant to the doctrine of
legislative jurisdiction. Holding that Hilb Rogal had wholly
misconstrued the doctrine of legislative jurisdiction, the district
court declined to reverse its prior ruling. Further, the district
court noted that both parties agreed that Hilb Rogal’s claim would
fail under Georgia law; therefore, it granted summary judgment in
favor of Defendants. Hilb Rogal now appeals.
*
Counts I, II, and IV of the Complaint, setting forth the
remaining claims, were dismissed without prejudice and are not at
issue on this appeal.
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“We review the district court’s order granting summary
judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to,
and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving
party.” Garofolo v. Donald B. Heslep Assocs., Inc., 405 F.3d 194,
198 (4th Cir. 2005). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is
no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
56(c). The relevant inquiry in a summary judgment analysis is
“whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require
submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party
must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).
In determining which state’s law governs Hilb Rogal’s claim,
the district court noted that Virginia’s version of lex loci
delicti provides for the application of “the law of the state in
which the wrongful act took place, wherever the effects of that act
are felt.” J.A. 1339-40 (quoting Milton v. IIT Research Institute,
138 F.3d 519, 522 (4th Cir. 1998)). The court further noted that
Virginia’s business conspiracy statute requires that a plaintiff
show that (1) two or more persons combine, associate, agree, or
mutually undertake together, to (2) willfully and maliciously
injure the plaintiff in his reputation, trade, business, or
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profession, and (3) that the conspiratorial actions of the
defendants cause the plaintiff to suffer damages. J.A. 1340
(citing Va. Code. § 18.2-499). The court then held that, under
this statute, both the wrong alleged by Hilb Rogal and the first
causally related injury occurred in Georgia. Therefore, Georgia
law would govern Hilb Rogal’s claim.
Next, in rejecting Hilb Rogal’s motion to reconsider, the
district court found that the doctrine of legislative jurisdiction
has no bearing on the choice-of-law analysis contained in its
earlier ruling. Rather, it noted that legislative jurisdiction
governs constitutional challenges to state choice-of-law rules.
Thus, because Hilb Rogal had advanced no constitutional challenge
to the application of Virginia’s choice-of-law rules, the court
concluded that those rules must be applied to determine which
state’s substantive law would govern. As those rules lead to the
result the district court had already reached -- that Georgia’s
substantive law applied -- the court did not alter or amend its
prior ruling.
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district
court did not err. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated
by the district court. Hilb Rogal & Hobbs Co. v. Risk Strategy
Partners, Inc., No. 3:05-cv-355-REP (E.D. Va. Feb. 10, 2006).
AFFIRMED
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