UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 05-5240
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
TIMOTHY ASHLEY PADGETT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Bryson City. Lacy H. Thornburg,
District Judge. (CR-05-14)
Argued: November 30, 2006 Decided: May 10, 2007
Before MOTZ and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and Gerald Bruce LEE,
United States District Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia,
sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: John Charles Hunter, Asheville, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina,
for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Gretchen C. F. Shappert, United States
Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Defendant Timothy Ashley Padgett appeals his conviction. This
case concerns the use of Defendant Padgett’s prior convictions to
enhance his sentence for possession of 100 grams or more of a
substance containing a detectable amount of pseudoephedrine with
the intent to manufacture methamphetamine and conspiracy to
manufacture methamphetamine. First, the Court must determine
whether the District Court improperly sentenced Defendant Padgett
as a career offender when: (1) he disputed that one of his prior
convictions was not a crime of violence but rather a non-violent
theft crime and the judge considered the prior conviction; (2) one
of the predicate prior convictions for a crime of violence used to
establish career offender status was not “counted” in the
calculation of the Defendant’s criminal history points; (3) two
prior felony convictions that were crimes of violence or controlled
substance offenses were not admitted by the Defendant, included in
the indictment, nor submitted to a jury and found beyond a
reasonable doubt; and (4) Defendant failed to receive notice prior
to any enhancement of his sentence based on prior convictions in
accord with 21 U.S.C. § 851. Second, the Court must determine
whether the District Court abused its discretion when it admitted
testimony related to prior bad acts of the Defendant under Federal
Rules of Evidence 403 or 404(b).
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The Court holds that (1) the face of the Judgment gave the
District Court sufficient information to determine that the
Defendant was convicted of a felony, not a non-violent theft crime;
(2) simply because a predicate conviction was not “counted” in the
criminal history points does not mean that it cannot be used to
establish career offender status; (3) there is no need under
current precedent to submit prior convictions in an indictment or
to a jury to be found beyond a reasonable doubt; and (4) there is
no need to receive notice under current precedent for enhancement
of a sentence based on prior convictions. As to the evidentiary
issue, the Court holds that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion when it admitted testimony related to prior bad acts
because the admission of the evidence was not arbitrary or
irrational. Therefore, the District Court’s rulings are affirmed.
I. BACKGROUND
Timothy Ashley Padgett, Laura Lee Dryman, and Melody Suzette
Nelson were jointly indicted on February 8, 2005. Defendant
Padgett was charged with possession of 100 grams or more of a
substance containing a detectable amount of pseudoephedrine with
the intent to manufacture methamphetamine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. 841(a)(1) and (c); and for conspiracy to attempt to
manufacture methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841 and
846. J.A. 7-8. After a jury trial, the jury found Defendant
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guilty of both counts. The Pre-sentence Report (“PSR”) noted an
aggravated burglary in Humphreys County, Tennessee and a
residential burglary in Cross County, Arkansas - these qualified
the defendant for career offender status pursuant to United States
Sentencing Guidelines § 4B1.1 with a resulting offense level of 34.
J.A. 328-29. The Probation office counted four criminal history
points for Defendant’s nine prior convictions, and a total of 16
criminal history points. The final criminal history category of
VI, matched with an offense level of 34, produced a Guideline
sentence range between 262 and 327 months. J.A. 342.
Defendant objected to the PSR, arguing (1) that the aggravated
burglary conviction from Tennessee was not a qualifying predicate
conviction because the Code section referenced referred to theft of
property and not burglary (J.A. 345); (2) the Arkansas conviction
should not be considered a predicate conviction because it was not
counted in the criminal history points (J.A. 345, 346); and (3)
there was no notice by the government that it would rely upon prior
convictions for sentencing enhancements pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851
(J.A. 345).
At trial, the Government presented the testimony of several
witnesses: Detective Kenneth Cope of the Macon County Sheriff’s
Department (J.A. 21), Detective Don Willis (J.A. 49-50), Ms.
Nelson, Ms. Dryman, Mr. Johnny Fortner (a fellow prisoner of Mr.
Padgett in Macon County Jail) (J.A. 176, 178-79), Jennifer Johnson
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of Lowe’s (J.A. 189), and several law enforcement witnesses (a
chemist, a Special Agent with the North Carolina State Bureau of
Investigation, and a Special Agent with the Drug Enforcement
Administration). Defendant objected to Ms. Nelson’s testimony
about car theft, shoplifting, casual drug use and a previous charge
of manufacturing methamphetamine - Defendant argued this was
prejudicial and not relevant. The Court issued a limiting
instruction to the jury at the close of Ms. Nelson’s testimony; the
Court instructed the jury to disregard any testimony relating to
any prior offense committed by Mr. Padgett during their
deliberations.
On December 8, 2005, the Defendant was sentenced to 240 months
for Count I and 262 months for Count II (to run concurrently).
J.A. 316. Defendant’s appeal is now before this Court.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
This Court reviews de novo appeals arguing that a sentence was
unconstitutionally imposed as a matter of law. United States v.
Thompson, 421 F.3d 278, 280-81 (4th Cir. 2005). Under the
Sentencing Guidelines, a criminal defendant qualifies as a career
offender if
(1) the defendant was at least eighteen years old at the
time the defendant committed the instant offense of
conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is a
felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled
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substance offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two
prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or
a controlled substance offense.
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1(a) (2002). A “crime of
violence” constitutes
any offense under federal or state law, punishable by
imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, that – (1)
has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened
use of physical force against the person of another, or
(2) is burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion,
involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct
that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury
to another.
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1(a).
The Court of Appeals reviews evidentiary rulings under the
abuse of discretion standard. United States v. Queen, 132 F.3d
991, 995 (4th Cir. 1997). A decision by a district court judge to
admit evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) will not be
overturned on appeal unless it was “‘arbitrary or irrational.’”
United States v. Haney, 914 F.2d 602, 607 (4th Cir. 1990).
B. Analysis
1. Aggravated Burglary Charge
The Court affirms the District Court’s ruling that the
Defendant’s aggravated burglary charge was a crime of violence
because the face of the Judgment gave the District Court sufficient
information to determine that the Defendant was convicted of a
felony, not a non-violent theft crime. As detailed above, crimes
of violence are one of the categories of crime that contribute to
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a Defendant being labeled a “career offender.” Burglary of a
dwelling is considered a crime of violence under the United States
Sentencing Guidelines. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1
app. 1.
“Any fact (other than a prior conviction) which is necessary
to support a sentence exceeding the maximum authorized by the facts
established by a plea of guilty or a jury verdict must be admitted
by the defendant or proved to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.”
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005); Almendarez-
Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 226-27 (1998); United States
v. Thompson, 421 F.3d 278, 281 (4th Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court
did not give judges the power to resolve “disputed fact[s]” about
prior convictions if they needed to use data that was “not inherent
in that prior conviction.” Thompson, 421 F.3d at 281-82 (citing
Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 24-25 (2005)). The Supreme
Court “authorized judges to rely on a variety of conclusive court
documents when determining the nature of a prior conviction.” Id.
at 281. The Court in Thompson stated: “Approved sources include,
for instance, the prior court’s jury instructions or the ‘charging
documents filed in the court of conviction.’” Id. at 281-82 (citing
Shepard, 544 U.S. at 1259). For prior guilty pleas, courts may
look to “‘the terms of the charging document, the terms of a plea
agreement or transcript of colloquy between judge and defendant in
which the factual basis for the plea was confirmed by the
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defendant, or [ ] some comparable judicial record of this
information.’” Id. at 282 (citing Shepard, 544 U.S. at 1263).
Defendant argues that the District Court committed an error
when it relied on a “prior conviction” for an alleged “crime of
violence” about which there was a factual dispute which could not
be resolved by the Court through simple reference to the charging
document or the Judgment. Defendant argues that he had entered a
plea agreement for theft of property, not a violent burglary felony
offense. Defendant also argues that there was a clearly disputed
factual issue here, and that the sentencing Court went far beyond
the documents to which it should have looked when inquiring about
the factual dispute. Also, argues Defendant, the Court applied a
preponderance of the evidence standard here, when really the Court
should have used a beyond a reasonable doubt standard. The
Government responds that while there was a typographical error on
the Tennessee aggravated burglary judgment of conviction, the other
facts stated on that judgment all lead to the conclusion that Mr.
Padgett was convicted of a violent felony.
We affirm the District Court judgment that the Defendant
qualifies as a career offender because the judgment at issue
indicates a crime of violence, not a non-violent crime. Even
though Defendant argues that he entered a plea agreement for theft
of property, not a violent burglary felony offense, examining the
Judgment as a whole reveals that the theft of property citation was
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a typographical error--all other indicators of the offense on the
face of the Judgment point to a felony. J.A. 375; Appendix 1. The
box for “felony” (as opposed to “misdemeanor”) is checked in two
different places on the Judgment. Id. The offense is listed as
“Aggravated Burglary.” Id. The sentence length and probation
length are each four years. Id. Therefore, it is appropriate for
this Court (and was appropriate for the District Court) to find
that Defendant qualifies as a career offender because he was at
least eighteen years of age at the time of the controlled substance
offenses at issue here and had two prior felony convictions for
crimes of violence (aggravated burglary and residential burglary).
2. Predicate Conviction
The Court affirms the District Court’s decision that one of
the predicate prior convictions for a crime of violence used to
establish career offender status did not need to be “counted” in
the calculation of the Defendant’s criminal history points; simply
because a predicate conviction was not “counted” in the criminal
history points does not mean that it cannot be used to establish
career offender status. Under United States Sentencing Guidelines
§ 4A1.2(c), “[s]entences for all felony offenses are counted” when
determining career offender status. Under United States Sentencing
Guidelines § 4A1.1, one criminal history point is assigned, up to
a total of four (4) points, for prior sentences not falling into
§ 4A1.1(a) or (b).
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The Defendant argues that one of the two convictions upon
which his career offender sentence enhancement was predicated was
not among those convictions “counted” in the calculation of his
criminal history points total; therefore, he argues, it should not
have qualified as a “prior conviction” for purposes of a career
offender enhancement. The Government argues that the District
Court did not err in relying on Defendant’s prior felony conviction
from Arkansas, even though that conviction could not count when
calculating the Defendant’s criminal history point total; sentences
for all felony offenses are counted when determining career
offender status under § 4A1.2(c).
The District Court properly used the Defendant’s prior
conviction for Residential Burglary on June 11, 2002 to establish
career offender status because all violent and controlled substance
felonies should be considered when deciding whether to assign a
Defendant career offender status. The Sentencing Guidelines
instruct that all felony offenses should be counted when
determining if a Defendant qualifies for career offender status.
Simply because one of the Defendant’s prior convictions was not
included in his four criminal history points under § 4A1.1 does not
mean that it cannot be considered when determining if Defendant is
a career offender for purposes of the Guidelines--under 4A.1.2(c),
all felony offenses relating to violence and controlled substances
are considered when determining if a person qualifies as a career
offender. Thus, the Court properly used the Defendant’s
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residential burglary conviction to establish career offender
status.
3. Prior Convictions Not Listed in Indictment
This Court affirms the District Court’s holding that the prior
felony convictions of the Defendant could be used to enhance his
sentence because there is no need under current precedent to submit
prior convictions in an indictment or to a jury to be found beyond
a reasonable doubt. Under current precedent, the Sixth Amendment
to the United States Constitution (as the Defendant acknowledges)
does not require that a prior conviction used as a basis for a
sentencing enhancement be pled in an indictment and submitted to a
jury for proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Even if this Court
thought otherwise, as this Court stated in United States v. Cheek,
415 F.3d 349 (4th Cir. 2005), we may not overrule or ignore the
Supreme Court’s existing precedents. In Cheek, the Defendant
argued that prior convictions used to enhance a sentence must be
pled in an indictment and submitted to a jury for proof beyond a
reasonable doubt if it would increase his sentence above the
statutory maximum. Id. at 351. The Defendant in Cheek argued, as
does Mr. Padgett, that Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000)
and Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), “called into
question” the holding of Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523
U.S. 224 (1998) (holding that the Constitution does not require the
Government to plead a prior conviction in an indictment in order
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for it to be used to enhance a defendant’s sentence). Cheek, 415
F.3d at 351. The Fourth Circuit found in Cheek that the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the holding that there is an exception for
recidivism-based enhancements in sentencing in United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). Id. at 352.
It is thus clear that the Supreme Court continues to hold
that the Sixth Amendment (as well as due process) does
not demand that the mere fact of a prior conviction used
as a basis for a sentencing enhancement be pleaded in an
indictment and submitted to a jury for proof beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Id. at 352. The Court added that even if it were to agree with
Defendant’s forecast that the Supreme Court will overrule
Almendarez-Torres, “we are not free to overrule or ignore the
Supreme Court’s precedents.” Id. at 352-53 (citation omitted).
Defendant argues that the Court should not use the two prior
convictions to impose an enhanced sentence when they were not in
the indictment, found by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, nor
admitted by the Defendant. The caselaw, argues Defendant, as it
stands now, does not support the idea that a prior conviction must
be pled in an indictment and submitted to a jury for proof beyond
a reasonable doubt before it can be used as a basis for a sentence
enhancement. However, Mr. Padgett argues that the Court should
reconsider the precedent and not apply the current Supreme Court
precedent.
The Government argues that the District Court did not violate
Defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial by not submitting
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the fact of Defendant’s prior convictions to a jury. The Government
points out that the Supreme Court held in United States v. Booker,
543 U.S. 220, 224 (2005): “Any fact (other than a prior
conviction) which is necessary to support a sentence exceeding the
maximum authorized by the facts established by a plea of guilty or
a jury verdict must be admitted by the defendant or proved to a
jury beyond a reasonable doubt.” Booker, 543 U.S. at 244; see
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301 (2004) (quoting Apprendi
v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000).
The Court affirms the District Court’s holding because the
precedent is clear - there is no requirement that prior convictions
used to enhance a sentence be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt or included in an indictment. Under Booker, the Government
did not need to include prior convictions in an indictment and have
them proven beyond a reasonable doubt in order for them to be used
to enhance the Defendant Padgett’s (a recidivist) sentence. Booker,
543 U.S. at 224.
4. Prior Notice
The Court affirms the District Court’s holding that the
Defendant did not need to receive notice prior to any enhancement
of his sentence based on prior convictions because there is no need
to receive notice under current precedent. This Court held in
United States v. Foster, 68 F.3d 86 (4th Cir. 1995), that it would
join its “sister circuits” in holding that “section 851 was never
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intended to extend to enhancements under the Guidelines.” Id. at 89
(referring to 21 U.S.C. § 851). This Court further noted that the
“Sentencing Guidelines were promulgated well after section 851 was
enacted and include no relevant reference to section 851.” Id.
Defendant argues that he was entitled to notice prior to the
District Court’s use of one or more prior convictions to increase
his punishment pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 851. While United States v.
Foster, 68 F.3d 86 (4th Cir. 1995), supports the District Court’s
decision, the Defendant asks the Court to reconsider its holding in
Foster. Defendant notes that the Supreme Court has not taken up
this issue yet. The Government argues that the District Court did
not err in holding that an § 851 notice was not required for the
application of the career offender Guidelines enhancement. The
Government points out that even the Defendant understands that his
argument on this point is directly contradicted by this Court’s
precedent--United States v. Foster, 68 F.3d 86 (4th Cir. 1995).
This Court affirms the District Court holding that no notice
was required to use prior convictions to enhance a sentence because
21 U.S.C. 851 does not apply to sentencing enhancements. In keeping
with Foster, this Court holds that the Defendant was not entitled
to notice under § 851 that his sentence would be enhanced by his
prior convictions.
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5. Evidentiary Issues
The Court holds that the District Court did not abuse its
discretion when it admitted testimony related to prior bad acts
because the admission of the evidence was not arbitrary or
irrational. As mentioned above, decisions by district court judges
to admit evidence under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) will not be
overturned on appeal unless those decisions were “‘arbitrary or
irrational.’” Haney, 914 F.2d at 607. Under Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b), evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is
admissible for purposes of proving “motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or
accident.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). If probative value will be
substantially outweighed by the danger of “unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,” then the evidence
should be excluded. Fed. R. Evid. 403. In the Fourth Circuit,
“[w]hether prejudicial error has been committed must be determined
on the basis of the record in its entirety and the result will
generally turn on the facts of each case.” United States v.
Johnson, 610 F.2d 194, 196 (4th Cir. 1979). Absent purposeful
introduction of prejudicial material by the prosecution, this Court
usually does not reverse a conviction. Id. at 197. In addition, as
long as the evidence is relevant to an issue other than the
defendant’s character and Rule 403 is not violated, evidence of
other crimes or acts can be admitted even if there is no clear and
15
convincing proof of such crimes or acts. Morgan v. Foretich, 846
F.2d 941, 944 (4th Cir. 1988).
Defendant Padgett argues that the District Court committed
reversible error when it allowed a co-defendant to testify
extensively about other criminal activities in which the Defendant
allegedly participated. Defendant argues that all of the testimony
should have been excluded pursuant to Rules 404 or 403 of the
Federal Rules of Evidence because it was highly prejudicial and
served only to a show a general criminal disposition. Defendant
argues that Ms. Nelson’s testimony regarding the Defendant’s
alleged criminal activity was not related to the charges on which
the Defendant was being tried and did not relate to a motive,
opportunity, plan or design (under Federal Rule of Evidence 404).
Also, Defendant argues that there were three major problems with
Ms. Nelson’s testimony: (1) she could have been asked about the
Lowe’s store credit cards without eliciting details about the
criminal activity involved in obtaining the cards; (2) no evidence
was introduced to show that the Defendant had been charged or
convicted of the manufacturing of methamphetamine charge of which
Ms. Nelson spoke; and (3) Ms. Nelson should not have been allowed
to testify about Defendant’s use of illegal drugs and attempts to
buy such drugs because it was not shown to be related to the
charges in the indictment.
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In sum, the Government argues that all of the testimony of Ms.
Nelson was relevant to issues other than the Defendant’s character
and the probativeness outweighed any possible prejudice. The
Government argues that the Defendant’s use and attempted purchase
of drugs is admissible to establish absence of mistake,
preparation, knowledge, or plan and was not admitted solely to show
Defendant’s bad character. The Government further argues that Ms.
Nelson’s testimony explained why she stayed at the Dryman’s home
and attempted to manufacture methamphetamine at that location, how
the Lowe’s hardware store scam related to tools and cash for
producing methamphetamine, and explained a prior conversation
between the co-conspirators concerning manufacturing the drug
during which the prior manufacturing charge of the Defendant arose.
The District Court did not abuse its discretion when it
admitted Ms. Nelson’s testimony related to Defendant Padgett’s
prior bad acts because admission of the evidence was not arbitrary
or irrational. First, when Ms. Nelson mentioned that she thought
that Mr. Padgett had a prior charge of manufacturing
methamphetamine, it was in the context of a discussion about
whether or not she had previously “discussed the technicalities” of
making the drug with him and whether they had “discussed knowledge
of manufacture of methamphetamine.” J.A. 81-82. When asked by the
attorney if she had discussed the technicalities of making
methamphetamine with Mr. Padgett, she did not respond “yes” or
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“no.” Rather, she responded with information that she seemed to
think would demonstrate that she had discussed the process with him
because he was knowledgeable about it--she mentioned a prior
manufacturing charge she thought Mr. Padgett had. Under Rule
404(b), evidence of crimes, wrongs or acts that would not be
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
action in conformity with that character can be admitted in order
to prove knowledge and absence of mistake, among other things.
Here, Ms. Nelson’s testimony established her understanding of just
how knowledgeable Mr. Padgett was about methamphetamine
manufacturing (i.e. she thought he was so knowledgeable that she
believed that he even had been charged with methamphetamine
manufacturing before).
Ms. Nelson’s comment about a stolen car (J.A. 76) explained
how Mr. Padgett and she arrived in North Carolina to do the
“hustle” (J.A. 77) in order to get materials to manufacture the
drug. Thus, in a sense, it related to the plan. The record in its
entirety supports the conviction, and given the absence of any
purposeful introduction of the material (the “stolen” car comment
was off-handedly mentioned by Ms. Nelson in response to the
question of how Ms. Nelson arrived in North Carolina), under
Johnson the conviction will be affirmed. In addition, any ill
effects of allowing such testimony were cured by two blanket
statements by the Judge when instructing the jury after direct
examination of Ms. Nelson and at the close of the evidence. After
direct examination, the Judge advised that
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if there was any evidence relating to any charge of this
defendant relating to any prior offense, the court
instructs you that such evidence is stricken and you are
not to consider it at any point in your deliberations.
The defendant is not on trial for anything not alleged in
this bill of indictment, if such other evidence is
related.
J.A. 100. At the close of evidence, the Judge advised the jury to
“not draw any inference concerning guilt or lack of guilt of the
crimes charged in this case based on evidence, if there was any, of
the defendant’s involvement with any offense not charged in the
indictment here.” J.A. 270.
Second, Ms. Nelson’s description of the “hustle” (J.A. 77-78,
85) that occurred in the Lowe’s store showed intent, plan, and
motive on the part of Mr. Padgett relating to the crime at issue.
Further, Ms. Nelson’s testimony about Ms. Dryman helps to show that
the Government was interested in establishing through its questions
who knew about manufacturing methamphetamine, the plan and intent.
J.A. 91. All of these are appropriate considerations under Rule
404(b). Even if the description was a bit more than Mr. Padgett
may have thought necessary, it was not arbitrary or irrational on
the Judge’s part to allow such testimony.
Third, while Ms. Nelson’s discussion of Mr. Padgett’s drug use
did not clearly establish any of the proper purposes under Rule
404(b), it was not arbitrary or irrational to allow it. Given that
it had already been established that Mr. Padgett was familiar with
methamphetamine manufacturing, the discussion of Mr. Padgett’s drug
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use only really served to confirm Ms. Nelson’s relationship with
Padgett. J.A. 84, 96. Establishing that Mr. Padgett was a drug
user does not necessarily establish that he had knowledge of the
drug conspiracy or a plan to manufacture (in fact many drug dealers
are not drug users); however, it is possible to argue this way (as
the Government does). Thus, this Court holds that the admission of
such testimony was not arbitrary or irrational.
III. CONCLUSION
This Court affirms the District Court’s determination that the
Defendant qualifies as a career offender under the United States
Sentencing Guidelines, and affirms the District Court’s decision to
admit the testimony of Ms. Nelson with a limiting instruction.
First, the District Court did not err in sentencing the Defendant
as a career offender when the face of the Judgment gave the
District Court Judge sufficient information to determine that the
Defendant was convicted of a felony, not a non-violent theft crime.
Second, even though a predicate conviction was not “counted” in the
criminal history points does not mean that it cannot be used to
establish career offender status. Third, there is no need under
current precedent to submit prior convictions in an indictment or
to a jury to be found beyond a reasonable doubt. Fourth,
Defendants do not need to receive notice under current precedent
for enhancement of a sentence based on prior convictions. Finally,
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the District Court did not abuse its discretion when it admitted
the testimony of Ms. Nelson because her testimony was relevant to
issues other than the Defendant’s character and the probativeness
outweighed any possible prejudice because the admission was not
arbitrary or irrational. Therefore, the District court’s holdings
are
AFFIRMED.
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APPENDIX 1
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