UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4120
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DANIEL JOSEPH MOFFITT,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. N. Carlton Tilley, Jr.,
District Judge. (1:06-cr-00179)
Submitted: May 31, 2007 Decided: June 6, 2007
Before WILKINSON, TRAXLER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Louis C. Allen, III, Federal Public Defender, William S. Trivette,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner, United States Attorney, Greensboro,
North Carolina; Robert Albert Jamison Lang, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Daniel J. Moffitt appeals from his 110-month sentence
following his guilty plea to possession of a firearm by a person
previously convicted of a felony. Moffitt’s attorney filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting
that the sentence was unreasonable in light of Moffitt’s health
issues. Moffitt filed motion to strike the Anders brief and a pro
se supplemental brief in which he challenges the increase in his
offense level for possession of the firearm in connection with
another felony offense, USSG § 2K2.1(b)(5).* Our review of the
record discloses no reversible error; accordingly, we deny
Moffitt’s motion to strike the Anders brief, and affirm Moffitt’s
conviction and sentence.
We find that Moffitt’s guilty plea was knowingly and
voluntarily entered after a thorough hearing pursuant to Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11. Moffitt was properly advised of his rights, the
offense charged, and the mandatory minimum and maximum sentences
for the offense. The court also determined that there was an
independent factual basis for the plea and that the plea was not
coerced or influenced by any promises. See United States v.
DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1991).
Moffitt argues that the sentence is unreasonable because
the district court increased his offense level by four for
*
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2K2.1(b)(5) (2005).
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possession of the firearm in connection with another felony
offense, which he contends is prohibited by Amendment 599 of the
Guidelines, which became effective in November 2000, and prohibits
application of the increase where the defendant is also convicted
of the other felony offense. Because Moffitt pled guilty and was
convicted only of the possession of a firearm charge, Amendment 599
is inapplicable.
Counsel challenges the reasonableness of the sentence in
light of Moffitt’s chronic back pain and the existence of a lump in
Moffitt’s throat, which he asserts may become cancerous. We find
that the district court properly applied the Sentencing Guidelines
and considered the relevant sentencing factors before imposing the
110-month sentence. 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp.
2006); see United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546-47 (4th Cir.
2005). Additionally, we find that the sentence imposed—which was
at the lowest point in the properly calculated guideline range—was
reasonable. See United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th
Cir.) (“[A] sentence imposed within the properly calculated
[g]uidelines range . . . is presumptively reasonable.”) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct.
2309 (2006). Accordingly, we affirm Moffitt’s sentence.
As required by Anders, we have reviewed the entire record
and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore deny
Moffitt’s motion to strike the brief filed by counsel and affirm
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Moffitt’s conviction and sentence. This court requires that
counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the
client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that
such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this
court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion
must state that a copy thereof was served on the client. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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