UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-5011
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
OMAR RENTERIA,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for District of South
Carolina, at Columbia. Cameron McGowan Currie, District Judge.
(3:05-cr-00548-CMC-4)
Submitted: May 31, 2007 Decided: June 4, 2007
Before WILKINSON, TRAXLER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Douglas N. Truslow, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant.
Reginald I. Lloyd, United States Attorney, Jane Barrett Taylor,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Columbia, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Omar Renteria pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea
agreement, to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five
kilograms or more of cocaine and fifty grams or more of crack
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846 (2000).
Because Renteria was previously convicted of two felony drug
offenses, the Government filed an information to seek enhanced
penalties in accordance with 21 U.S.C. § 851 (2000). In compliance
with the statutory mandatory minimum, the district court sentenced
Renteria to life in prison. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2000).
Renteria’s counsel has filed a brief in accordance with Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), concluding there are no
meritorious issues for appeal, but questioning whether the district
court erred in imposing a life sentence. Renteria was advised of
his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but has not done so.
Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Pursuant to 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A), any person
convicted of conspiracy to distribute the amount of cocaine to
which Renteria pled guilty, and who has “two or more prior
convictions for a felony drug offense,” must receive a “mandatory
term of life imprisonment without release.” 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(A)(viii) (2000). While a district court may depart
below the sentencing range established by the Sentencing
Guidelines, such a departure may result in a sentence below the
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minimum term specified in the offense of conviction only if
permitted by law. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(e) (2000) (limiting authority of
district court to depart below statutory minimum to cases in which
the government has moved for such a departure on the basis of
substantial assistance); United States v. Patterson, 38 F.3d 139,
146 n.8 (4th Cir. 1994) (observing that “[t]he district court could
have sentenced below the statutory minimum only if this departure
was based on the Government’s motion for downward departure due to
Defendant's substantial assistance”); cf. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)
(2000) (safety valve provision) (limiting applicability of
statutory minimum penalties for certain drug offenses when
specified criteria are met); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 5C1.2 (2005) (same).
In this case, there was no permissible basis for the
district court to depart from the mandatory life sentence. The
Government exercised the discretion reserved to it in the plea
agreement and refused to withdraw the § 851 enhancement because
Renteria failed to adhere to all the terms of his plea agreement;
specifically, he failed a polygraph test. In accordance with
Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
found no meritorious issues for review. We therefore affirm
Renteria’s conviction and sentence. This court requires that
counsel inform his client in writing of his right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the
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client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that
such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this
court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion
must state that a copy thereof was served on the client.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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