UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4346
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
ANGELO DEMONTE DAVIS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Richard L. Voorhees,
District Judge. (3:04-cr-00030)
Submitted: June 15, 2007 Decided: June 19, 2007
Before WIDENER, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Peter Crane Anderson, William R. Terpening, SHUMAKER, LOOP &
KENDRICK, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen C.F.
Shappert, United States Attorney, Charlotte, North, Carolina; Amy
E. Ray, Assistant United States Attorney, Asheville, North
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Angelo Demonte Davis pled guilty to failure to surrender
for service of his sentence. On appeal, he challenges the
voluntariness of his plea and contends that his conviction violated
the Speedy Trial Act. We affirm.
First, Davis contends that his plea was implicitly
conditional on the Government’s agreement to file a motion for a
reduction of sentence in another case based on his substantial
assistance. He also asserts that, to the extent the agreement was
not implicit, he labored under a misunderstanding at his plea
hearing. A guilty plea must be “a voluntary and intelligent choice
among the alternative courses of action open to the defendant,”
North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970), and may be
invalid if it was induced by threats or misrepresentations,
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 755 (1970). A defendant’s
statements at the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing are presumed to be
true. Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 73-74 (1977).
Unsupported allegations on appeal are insufficient to overcome
representations at the Rule 11 hearing. See United States v.
DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 117 (4th Cir. 1991) (stating that
defendant’s statement at Rule 11 hearing that he was neither
coerced or threatened was “strong evidence of the voluntariness of
his plea”).
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Here, Davis pled guilty without a plea agreement and
testified at his Rule 11 hearing that his plea was unconditional.
He stated that nobody had threatened or coerced him and that he was
satisfied with his attorney. In addition, at his sentencing, Davis
reiterated that he was pleading freely and voluntarily, and he
admitted his guilt. While Davis clearly wanted to address his
substantial assistance as well as other issues while in the
courtroom for his Rule 11 hearing and subsequent sentencing, our
review of the record shows that Davis understood that his guilty
plea was separate and not conditioned on the outstanding issues in
other cases. Thus, we find insufficient evidence to overcome
Davis’ sworn testimony at his Rule 11 hearing that he was pleading
guilty knowingly and voluntarily.
Second, Davis claims that his indictment and prosecution
violated the Speedy Trial Act. However, both the constitutional
and the statutory right to a speedy trial are non-jurisdictional
and are, therefore, waived by an unconditional and voluntary guilty
plea. Washington v. Sobina, 475 F.3d 162, 165 (3d Cir. 2007);
United States v. Coffin, 76 F.3d 494, 496 (2d Cir. 1996). Thus, we
find that Davis’ guilty plea bars his claim.
Accordingly, we affirm Davis’ conviction. We dispense
with oral argument, because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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