UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-5219
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
CHARLES TILGHMAN,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Peter J. Messitte, District Judge. (8:03-
cr-00073-PJM)
Submitted: July 25, 2007 Decided: August 3, 2007
Before WILKINSON and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Steven G. Berry, Rockville, Maryland, for Appellant. Emily Noel
Glatfelter, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenbelt,
Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Charles Tilghman pled guilty to one count of wire fraud,
in violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1343 (West Supp. 2007). The district
court originally sentenced him to an eighty-seven-month term of
imprisonment to be followed by three years of supervised release
and ordered him to pay $1,076,797.63 in restitution. We granted
the parties’ joint motion to remand for resentencing in light of
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). See United States v.
Tilghman, No. 04-4495 (4th Cir. Nov. 18, 2005) (unpublished order).
On remand, the district court adopted the parties’ recommendation
to reduce the offense level by one level as a result of Tilghman’s
cooperation, which resulted in an advisory guideline range of
seventy-eight to ninety-seven months. The district court sentenced
Tilghman to seventy-eight months and reimposed the remainder of the
original judgment.* Tilghman appeals the sentence imposed on
remand.
Counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), suggesting that Tilghman’s
sentence is unreasonable and that counsel provided ineffective
assistance during the resentencing proceedings. Counsel states,
however, that there are no meritorious issues for appeal. Tilghman
*
The district court noted that Tilghman already had paid the
$100 special assessment.
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was advised of his right to file a pro se supplemental brief, but
he did not file one. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Counsel suggests that Tilghman’s sentence is
unreasonable. After Booker, a district court is no longer bound by
the range prescribed by the sentencing guidelines. However, in
imposing a sentence post-Booker, courts still must calculate the
applicable guideline range after making the appropriate findings of
fact and consider the range in conjunction with other relevant
factors under the guidelines and 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000
& Supp. 2007). United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 432 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2054 (2006). This Court will
affirm a post-Booker sentence if it “is within the statutorily
prescribed range and is reasonable.” Id. at 433 (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A] sentence within the
proper advisory Guidelines range is presumptively reasonable.”
United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 341 (4th Cir. 2006); see
Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462-69 (2007).
Here, on remand, the district court appropriately treated the
guidelines as advisory and sentenced Tilghman after considering and
examining the sentencing guidelines and the § 3553(a) factors, as
instructed by Booker. Tilghman’s seventy-eight-month prison term
is the bottom of the guideline range and is well below the twenty-
year statutory maximum. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 1343. Finally, neither
Tilghman nor the record suggests any information so compelling that
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it rebuts the presumption that a sentence within the properly
calculated guideline range is reasonable. We therefore find that
the sentence is eminently reasonable.
Tilghman also asserts on appeal that counsel provided
ineffective assistance by negotiating a lower sentence on remand.
This court “may address [claims of ineffective assistance] on
direct appeal only if the lawyer’s ineffectiveness conclusively
appears from the record.” United States v. Baldovinos, 434 F.3d
233, 239 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1407 (2006). Because
counsel’s ineffectiveness does not conclusively appear from the
record, we decline to review Tilghman’s ineffective assistance
claim on direct appeal.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record
and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. Accordingly, we
affirm the amended judgment of the district court. This court
requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right
to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
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materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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