UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4129
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
RENNIE OTIS PRICE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.
(1:03-cr-00056-CCB-2)
Submitted: July 25, 2007 Decided: August 2, 2007
Before WILKINSON, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Gerald C. Ruter, THE LAW OFFICES OF GERALD C. RUTER, P.C., Towson,
Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United States
Attorney, Christopher J. Romano, Assistant United States Attorney,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Rennie Otis Price appeals from his 168-month sentence
imposed following our remand for resentencing in accordance with
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). On appeal, he
contends that his sentence is unreasonable. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
At Price’s original sentence, which took place prior to
the decision in Booker, the district court announced two sentences.
The first sentence of 151 months was calculated under the mandatory
Guidelines scheme. A second sentence, 120 months, which was the
statutory minimum, was announced in the event the Supreme Court
declared the sentencing guidelines unconstitutional.
At re-sentencing, the district court, without objection,
adopted the original findings and calculations of the probation
officer, resulting in a Guidelines range of 151 to 188 months in
prison. The Government argued for a variance sentence above the
Guidelines range, proffering new evidence that Price had convinced
another inmate (Jimmie Troutman) to commit perjury at Price’s
co-defendant’s (Dexter Tyson) trial in order to convict Tyson and
exculpate Price’s common law wife, another co-defendant (Sagrario
Estevez).
The parties agreed that Troutman had written a letter in
which he stated that a “NY nigga” who had a “beef with his rap
buddy, which was his cousin” gave Troutman information in order to
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fabricate trial testimony. Specifically, Troutman stated that
“[t]he play was for me to get on there case, against the cousin,
and in return free the wife.” While Troutman’s letter did not
directly refer to Price or Tyson, it is undisputed that Troutman
testified at Tyson’s trial, that Troutman and Price were housed
together in prison, that Price was from New York, that the charges
against Sagrario were dismissed, and that Price and Tyson were
cousins.
Over Price’s objection, the district court found that
Troutman’s letter presented “overwhelming” evidence that Price had
suborned perjury and imposed a sentence of 168 months in prison.
The court noted that, were it not for the additional conduct of
suborning Troutman’s perjury, the court would have sentenced Price
to 120 months based on his relative lack of culpability, the lack
of violence, and the lack of any significant criminal record.
Price’s sentence, which was within the correctly
calculated guideline range, is presumptively reasonable. See
Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462 (2007); United
States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S.
Ct. 2309 (2006). We review the sentence for “reasonableness”. See
United States v. Davenport, 445 F.3d 366, 370 (4th Cir. 2006).
Price alleges that his sentence was unreasonable for
several reasons. First, he contends that there was insufficient
evidence for the court to find that Price suborned Troutman’s
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perjury. However, since the finding did not support either the
Guideline calculation or a variance, Price’s sentence was not
enhanced based on the district court’s finding. Thus, any error
was harmless. In any event, we find that the district court’s
conclusion that Price convinced Troutman to perjure himself was not
clearly erroneous, given Troutman’s letter.
Second, Price states that the district court improperly
attempted to impose a “reasonable” sentence. Id. (holding that
reasonableness is the appellate standard of review, while the
district court must instead impose a sentence sufficient, but not
greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes of 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007)). However, a review of the
sentencing transcript shows that the district court properly
considered the Guidelines and the statutory factors in crafting the
sentence. There is no indication in the record, aside from the
court’s isolated statement that the sentence was “reasonable,” to
support Price’s argument that the court applied the wrong standard.
Finally, Price contends that the district court should
have started with a sentence of 120 months before considering the
new evidence of obstruction of justice. This is the sentence that
the court stated it would have imposed under the advisory
Guidelines scheme in the absence of the new evidence. However, the
reasonableness of such a downward variance, which is assumed by
Price, is not before us at this time. Moreover, even assuming that
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a 120-month sentence would have been reasonable based on the facts
known at Price’s first sentencing, we would still be free to find
that Price’s 168-month sentence was reasonable, even in the absence
of the new evidence. See United States v. Begay, 470 F.3d 964, 975
(10th Cir. 2006) (holding that “[i]n any given case there could be
a range of reasonable sentences that includes sentences both within
and outside the Guideline range”), petition for cert. filed
(May 22, 2007) (No. 06-11543).
Thus, Price’s argument that his sentence was enhanced
based on the finding that he suborned perjury is not quite accurate
and, in any event, is not the focus of our review. Instead, we
presume that Price’s Guideline sentence is reasonable. The
district court considered the § 3553 factors, including Price’s
background and his relative lack of culpability, as well as his
subsequent dealings with Troutman, and determined that a sentence
within the Guidelines was appropriate. Neither Price nor the
record suggest any information so compelling as to rebut the
presumption that a sentence within the properly calculated
Guideline range is reasonable.
Accordingly, we find that Price’s sentence, which was
well under the statutory maximum and in the middle of the properly
calculated Guideline range, was reasonable. Thus, we affirm. We
dispense with oral argument, because the facts and legal
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contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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