UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4205
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DARRELL LAMONT BOSTICK,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, Senior
District Judge. (1:05-cr-00200-WLO)
Submitted: May 21, 2007 Decided: August 10, 2007
Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Ross Hall Richardson, LAW OFFICES OF ROSS HALL RICHARDSON,
Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner,
United States Attorney, Sandra J. Hairston, Assistant United States
Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Darrell Lamont Bostick of possession of
a firearm after previously being convicted of a felony, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2000). Bostick appeals. His
counsel has filed a brief challenging the sufficiency of the
evidence to convict and the reasonableness of his sentence.
Bostick has filed a motion to submit a pro se supplemental brief.
We grant Bostick’s motion, and we affirm the judgment of the
district court.
In reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence, we
consider whether there is substantial evidence, viewed in the light
most favorable to the government, to support the verdict. Glasser
v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942). We do not review the
credibility of witnesses, and we assume the jury resolved all
evidentiary contradictions in favor of the government. United
States v. Sun, 278 F.3d 302, 313 (4th Cir.2002). Our review of the
trial transcript convinces us that there was sufficient evidence to
support the conviction.
Finally, Bostick argues that his sentence was
unreasonable because the district court did not provide an
explanation of its reasons for selecting the sentence and because
it did not address his sentencing arguments. After United States
v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), a sentencing court is no longer
bound by the range prescribed by the sentencing guidelines, but
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still must calculate and consider the guideline range as well as
the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000). United States
v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546 (4th Cir.2005). We will affirm a
post-Booker sentence if it is both reasonable and within the
statutorily prescribed range. Id.
A sentence within a properly calculated advisory
guideline range is presumptively reasonable. United States v.
Green, 436 F.3d 449, 457 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2309
(2006). This presumption can only be rebutted by a showing that
the sentence is unreasonable when measured against the factors
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000). United States v. Montes-Pineda,
445 F.3d 375, 379 (4th Cir. 2006), petition for cert. filed, ___
U.S.L.W. ___ (July 21, 2006) (No. 06-5439). Procedurally, a
district court must: (1) properly calculate the sentencing range;
(2) determine whether a sentence within the range adequately serves
the § 3553(a) factors; (3) implement mandatory statutory
limitations; and (4) explain its reasons for selecting the
sentence, especially a sentence outside the range. Green, 436 F.3d
at 455-56.
While a district court must consider the various
§ 3553(a) factors and explain its sentence, it need not explicitly
reference § 3553 or discuss every factor on the record. United
States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006). This is
particularly the case when the court imposes a sentence within the
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applicable guideline range. Id. In determining whether there has
been an adequate explanation, we do not “evaluate a court's
sentencing statements in a vacuum”; rather, the context surrounding
a court's explanation “may imbue it with enough content for [the
Court] to evaluate both whether the court considered the § 3553(a)
factors and whether it did so properly.” Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d
at 381. However, “a district court’s explanation should provide
some indication (1) that the court considered the § 3553(a) factors
with respect to the particular defendant; and (2) that it has also
considered the potentially meritorious arguments raised by both
parties about sentencing.” Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d at 380
(citations omitted). We find the record reflects that the district
court here adequately and properly considered all of the sentencing
factors and considered all the arguments raised by the parties. We
therefore find Bostick's sentence was reasonable.
Finally, we have reviewed Bostick’s pro se supplemental
brief and find the claims therein without merit.
Accordingly, we grant Bostick’s motion to file a pro se
supplemental brief, and affirm the judgment of the district court.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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