UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-5026
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
LANDIS RICHARDSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr.,
Chief District Judge. (3:04-cr-00252)
Submitted: July 18, 2007 Decided: August 9, 2007
Before MOTZ, GREGORY, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Kimberly Y. Best, THE BEST LAW FIRM, PLLC, Charlotte, North
Carolina; Steven T. Meier, MALONEY & MEIER, LLC, Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellants. Keith Michael Cave, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Landis Richardson appeals his conviction and eighty-four
month sentence following his jury conviction of conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute marijuana, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 846 (2000) (“Count One”); possession with intent to
distribute marijuana and aiding and abetting the same, in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(D) (2000) (“Count Two”); possession of a
firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000) (“Count Three”); and
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000) (“Count Five”). The district court
sentenced Richardson to concurrent terms of twenty-four months’
imprisonment for Counts One, Two and Five and a consecutive term of
sixty months on Count Three, the statutory minimum for that
offense. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Richardson’s counsel filed a
brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 286 U.S. 738, 744 (1967),
stating that there were no meritorious issues for appeal, but
suggesting that the district court erred in sentencing Richardson.
Richardson was advised of his right to file a pro se supplemental
brief, but he has not done so. For the following reasons, we
affirm.
This court reviews the imposition of a sentence for
reasonableness. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 260-61
(2005); United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546-47 (4th Cir.
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2005). After Booker, a district court is no longer bound by the
range prescribed by the Sentencing Guidelines. Hughes, 401 F.3d at
546. However, in imposing a sentence post-Booker, courts still
must calculate the applicable Guidelines range after making the
appropriate findings of fact and consider the range in conjunction
with other relevant factors under the Guidelines and 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2006). United States v. Moreland, 437
F.3d 424, 432 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2054 (2006).
This court will affirm a post-Booker sentence if it “is within the
statutorily prescribed range and is reasonable.” Id. at 433
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). “[A] sentence
within the proper advisory Guidelines range is presumptively
reasonable.” United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339, 341 (4th Cir.
2006).
First, the district court correctly calculated
Richardson’s advisory guideline range. Although Richardson
questions whether one of the criminal history points was correctly
assessed, even without this disputed point, Richardson would have
remained in criminal history category III.
Moreover, the district court explicitly treated the
Guidelines as advisory, and sentenced Richardson only after
considering the § 3553(a) factors and counsel’s arguments.
Although the district court did not recite facts to support each
§ 3553(a) factor, the court need not “robotically tick through
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§ 3553(a)’s every subsection” or “explicitly discuss every
§ 3553(a) factor on the record.” Johnson, 445 F.3d at 345.
Richardson’s eighty-four month sentence is presumptively
reasonable, as it is within the appropriate guideline range, and
below the statutory maximum sentence.* As neither Richardson nor
the record suggests any information to rebut the presumption, we
find that Richardson’s sentence is reasonable.
As required by Anders, we have reviewed the entire record
and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore
affirm the district court’s judgment. This court requires that
counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the
client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that
such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this
court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion
must state that a copy thereof was served on the client. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
*
Counts One, Two and Five carried statutory maximum terms of
five and ten years’ imprisonment, respectively. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(D); 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)(2000).
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