UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4971
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
TIMOTHY FENNON SAMPSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Charlottesville. Norman K. Moon, District
Judge. (3:05-cr-00011-nkm)
Submitted: July 18, 2007 Decided: August 23, 2007
Before MICHAEL and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John E. Davidson, DAVIDSON & KITZMANN, PLC, Charlottesville,
Virginia, for Appellant. John L. Brownlee, United States Attorney,
William F. Gould, Assistant United States Attorney,
Charlottesville, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Timothy Fennon Sampson was convicted by a jury of
conspiracy to commit perjury, 18 U.S.C. § 371 (2000) (Count 1);
perjury and subornation of perjury, 18 U.S.C. § 1622 (2000) (Counts
2 and 4); and providing materially false statements to the
judiciary, 18 U.S.C.A. § 1001 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007) (Count 3).
The court imposed a variance sentence of twenty years of
imprisonment, going above the advisory guideline range of 108-135
months after first deciding that an upward departure pursuant to
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4A1.3, p.s. (2005), to a range
of 151-188 months would not adequately serve the factors set out in
18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007). Sampson appeals
his sentence, contending that the court incorrectly determined the
advisory guideline range in the first place and that the variance
sentence was unreasonable because the court based its decision to
vary on his supposed involvement with several murders and other
crimes for which he had not been convicted. We affirm.
Sampson’s conviction resulted from his attempt to portray
himself as a witness to the murders of Mary and Michael Short in
Henry County, Virginia, and the abduction of their daughter. The
daughter’s body was found a month later in Rockingham County, North
Carolina. A year after the murders, Sampson contacted the
Rockingham County Sheriff’s Department and claimed to have been
behind the Short house looking for items to steal when the murders
- 2 -
occurred. Sampson said he had seen a person bring a weapon out of
the house and then a child, and that the person looked like Abraham
Lincoln. This was significant because, at the time, authorities
had identified a “person of interest,” who had a beard and had been
described as resembling Lincoln. On October 7, 2003, Sampson
testified before a grand jury in Charlottesville, Virginia, that he
had been traveling from Greensboro, North Carolina, to Roanoke,
Virginia, in a Ford van with a friend named “Bobby” on the night of
the murders, had stopped to urinate, went behind the Shorts’ house
looking for items to steal, and heard several shots. He said he
heard a child say “No, no,” and then saw a man come out of the
house, first with a weapon, then carrying a child.
On November 5, 2003, Sampson accompanied his daughter,
Beth Braxton, to Charlottesville, where she testified before the
grand jury that, when Sampson came home on the day of the murders,
he was “shaking and crying” and told her “he had just seen someone
get killed.” Beth Braxton had not met her father until she was
eighteen years old, in late 2000, when she moved in with Sampson
and his girlfriend, Dawn Phillips. A month later, Phillips
disappeared. During the following year, Sampson entered into an
incestuous relationship with Braxton, which she said began when he
raped her at knifepoint, and which produced a child in March 2003.
On the same day that Braxton testified before the grand
jury, Sampson was interviewed by Major Kimmi Nester of the Henry
- 3 -
County Sheriff’s Office and other law enforcement officers. In the
course of the interview, Sampson volunteered that he had shot and
killed a man who had sex with Dawn Phillips, and burned the man’s
body. He also told the officers he had seen Phillips’ dead body
wrapped in a rug from his own residence, but he denied having
killed Phillips.
Shortly after this interview, Sampson persuaded a friend,
Jerry Mills, to say that he had driven Sampson to Virginia on the
night of the Short murders, using the name “Bob” while in Virginia.
Sampson suggested to Mills that it might be a way for him to obtain
lenient treatment on the habitual offender charge he was facing.
To prepare Mills, Sampson drove him to Henry County to show him the
murder site and rehearse his story. Mills’ interview with members
of the task force investigating the Short murders took place on
December 17, 2003, at Mills’ attorney’s office in Greensboro.
Mills testified before the grand jury in Charlottesville on April
28, 2004. At trial, Mills testified that his grand jury testimony
was untrue.
At Sampson’s request, Mills also asked a mutual friend,
Michael Holland, to tell Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
investigators that he sold Mills a Ford van, then took the vehicle
back and had it crushed. Holland initially complied when he was
questioned on December 18, 2003, but when he learned that the FBI
was working on the Short case, he immediately called the
- 4 -
investigators and told them he had been instructed to say what he
did. On December 21, 2003, Sampson called both Captain Bobby
Lawson, of the Rockingham County Sheriff’s Office, and Nester, and
complained that investigators had been in Greensboro. He told
Lawson he had received death threats and had a gun stuck down his
throat. He said, “[Y]ou come up here and I’ll stick a gun down
your ‘GD’ throat and blow your ‘M F’n’ head off.” To Nester, in a
cell phone call that was interrupted numerous times, Sampson said
he would “use a weapon to blow [their] Goddamn, motherfucking heads
off.”
On February 10, 2004, both Mills and Holland were
scheduled for separate interviews at the FBI office in Greensboro.
Sampson came with Mills, although he had not been invited to
appear. Mills’ interview lasted longer than expected, with the
result that, when Mills and Sampson were leaving, they encountered
Holland at the elevator. According to Holland, words were
exchanged and Sampson “punched and hit” him. Mills testified that
he left a few minutes before Sampson and, when Sampson came out of
the building, Sampson said he had met Holland and had hit him.
On July 20, 2004, Sampson was arrested and charged with
the murder of Dawn Phillips. On August 11, 2004, Beth Braxton
testified a second time before the grand jury and recanted the
testimony she gave previously. At trial, she testified that, in
her first grand jury testimony, she said what Sampson told her to
- 5 -
say. She said that when Phillips disappeared, Sampson took her to
a hotel that night, engaged in an elaborate carpet cleaning at his
home the next day, and finally removed the carpet altogether. She
also testified that he later told her that he killed Dawn Phillips
and described in detail how he did it. Braxton also related that
Sampson told her that he had hit his former wife, Donna Slayton, in
the face with a hammer.
Braxton described how Sampson punched her in the face and
cut her arm in 2002 when she said she was sorry she had met him and
wanted to separate from him. She read from a letter she received
from Sampson after he was arrested in which he threatened to
disclose her incestuous relationship with him. She said it made
her feel that if she didn’t help him she would lose her freedom and
her child and “everything [she] had ever done wrong would be out in
the open for everyone to know.”
After Sampson’s conviction, the probation officer
recommended a base offense level of 14, U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 2J1.3 (2005), with an 8-level enhancement for causing or
threatening to cause physical injury to a person to suborn perjury
under § 2J1.3(b)(1), and a 3-level enhancement for substantial
interference with the administration of justice under
§ 2J1.3(b)(2). The probation officer also recommended a 2-level
adjustment for having an aggravated role in a criminal activity
involving fewer than five persons under USSG § 3B1.1(c), and a 2-
- 6 -
level adjustment for obstruction of justice under USSG § 3C1.1.
The recommended offense level was 29. Sampson was in criminal
history category III. His recommended advisory guideline range was
108-135 months. The probation officer suggested that an upward
departure might be warranted under USSG § 4A1.3, p.s. (Inadequate
Criminal History Category).
The government moved for an upward departure under
§ 4A1.3, requesting the statutory maximum sentence of twenty years
under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007), based in part on
Sampson‘s admissions during his discussions with law enforcement
officers. The government noted that charges were pending against
Sampson in North Carolina for the murder of Dawn Phillips and that
he also had larceny charges pending. The government argued that
Sampson would always be a danger to the community. Sampson
contested all the recommended enhancements and adjustments, and
opposed a departure.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court overruled
Sampson’s objections to the presentence report. With respect to
the requested upward departure, the government called Rockingham
County Sheriff’s Department Deputy Perry Brookshire, who testified
that, in an interview on November 5, 2003, Sampson volunteered that
he had seen Dawn Phillips’ body wrapped in a blanket that had come
from his residence, talked to the person who killed her, killed an
African-American male who was at the scene where Phillips was
- 7 -
murdered, and burned the man’s body. Sampson also stated that he
had testified in the trial of John Malone, Jr., who was acquitted
of the 1991 murder of his stepmother, Colby Malone. Sampson
admitted he had been involved in a plan to rob Colby Malone, but
said he backed out of it, although he helped to hide the murder
weapon. Brookshire testified that Sampson’s DNA had recently been
discovered on a pair of gloves that were found at the crime scene.
Brookshire further testified that Sampson had been
convicted of insurance fraud after a house he owned burned. During
the investigation, the body of an Hispanic male was found about a
mile from Sampson’s residence. The man, who was never identified,
had been shot in the head and burned beyond recognition.
Brookshire testified that Sampson stated he married Donna Slayton
so that she could not testify against him concerning some staged
break-ins that occurred during this time.1 Finally, Brookshire
testified that, because of Sampson’s conduct during the
investigation of the Short case, approximately 1000 additional
hours of investigation were expended. The government asked the
court “to not only depart from the guideline range, but vary, based
1
Sampson was convicted of insurance fraud relating to the
staged break-ins in 1994.
- 8 -
on Blakely[2] and Booker[3], up to the statutory maximum, which is
240 months.”
The district court agreed with the government and the
probation officer that Sampson’s criminal history was under-
represented by category III. The court concluded that, if all
Sampson’s criminal conduct were counted in his criminal history,
Sampson would be in category VI. However, the court decided that
a departure to category VI would not result in a sentence
sufficient to protect the public from future crimes by Sampson.
Therefore, the court imposed a variance sentence of 240 months by
imposing consecutive sentences on each of the four counts of
conviction.
Upward Variance
In this appeal, Sampson first challenges the district
court’s divergence from the guideline range. A sentence is
reviewed for reasonableness. Booker, 543 U.S. at 261; United
States v. Tucker, 473 F.3d 556, 560 (4th Cir. 2007). It is the
district court’s responsibility to impose a sentence sufficient,
but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes of
§ 3553(a). Tucker, 473 F.3d at 561. If the appeals court
concludes that the sentence achieves this goal, the sentence may be
affirmed as reasonable. Id. To this end, the sentencing court
2
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
3
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
- 9 -
should correctly determine the advisory guideline range and decide
whether a sentence within the range serves the factors set out in
§ 3553(a). Id. If not, the court should first determine whether
a departure is warranted. Id. If the court finds that the
departure range is still inadequate, the court may impose a
variance sentence. Id. at 560-61. When reviewing a variance
sentence, the appeals court considers “whether the sentencing court
acted reasonably both with respect to its decision to impose such
a sentence and with respect to the extent of the divergence from
the sentencing range.” United States v. Hernandez-Villanueva, 473
F.3d 118, 123 (4th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
Here, the district court did not state whether it
intended the sentence to be a departure or a variance. However,
the court’s explanation for the sentence indicates that it believed
a criminal history departure could not produce a 240-month
sentence, which was the sentence it had determined was the only
appropriate sentence. Therefore, the sentence should be viewed as
a variance. In light of Sampson’s pending charge for the murder of
Dawn Phillips, a crime he had admitted to Braxton, his admission
that he had murdered an unidentified African-American man, and his
involvement with the murder of Colby Malone, we conclude that the
district court’s decision to impose a variance sentence, and to
impose the statutory maximum on each count, was reasonable.
- 10 -
Sampson argues that the court erred by giving excessive
weight to the goal of protecting the public from future crimes he
might commit. However, “[t]he district court need not discuss each
factor set forth in § 3553(a) ‘in checklist fashion;’ ‘it is enough
to calculate the range accurately and explain why (if the sentence
lies outside it) this defendant deserves more or less.’” United
States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 432 (4th Cir.) (quoting United
States v. Dean, 414 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2005)), cert. denied,
126 S. Ct. 2054 (2006). The district court here clearly considered
the other § 3553(a) factors, as evidenced by its statement that
“none of the factors in § 3553(a) mitigate against anything but the
maximum sentence the Court could possibly impose.”
Relying on United States v. Curry, 461 F.3d 452, 461 (4th
Cir. 2006), Sampson also maintains that the increased sentence was
based on the court’s assessment of his “supposedly violent nature,”
and thus is contrary to the jury’s decision to acquit him of “the
threat charges, the only violent crimes with which Mr. Sampson was
charged in this case.” In Curry, this court held that a downward
variance of 70% from the advisory guideline range was unreasonable,
in part because the district court based its decision to vary
downward on its belief that the defendant had not initially planned
to defraud the victims, a conclusion that “contradicted the weight
of evidence and the verdict.” Id. at 460-61.
- 11 -
Sampson’s reliance on Curry is misplaced. First, the
district court concluded that Sampson was a dangerous person mainly
because of his involvement with several murders and his conduct
toward his daughter, rather than because of his threats to Nester
and Lawson. Long-standing authority permits the sentencing court
to consider any evidence at sentencing that “has sufficient indicia
of reliability,” see USSG § 6A1.3(a), including “conduct underlying
[an] acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been proved by
a preponderance of the evidence.” United States v. Watts, 519 U.S.
148, 156-57 (1997) (per curiam); United States v. Montgomery, 262
F.3d 233, 249 (4th Cir. 2001). Here, in contrast to Curry, the
weight of the evidence supported the court’s conclusion that
Sampson was a dangerous person. To the extent that the court based
its decision on Sampson’s threats to the officers, the evidence
supported the court’s finding. Nester and Lawson testified that
Sampson threatened them. Sampson did not testify. In acquitting
Sampson of making threats to impede the administration of justice,
the jury did not necessarily decide that Sampson was innocent of
making the threats, but only that he did not do so with the intent
of obstructing justice. Therefore, we are satisfied that Sampson
has not shown that the court’s decision to vary upward to the
statutory maximum was procedurally or substantively unreasonable.
USSG § 2J1.3(b)(1) Enhancement
- 12 -
The district court did not explain its decision to apply
the 8-level enhancement under USSG § 2J1.3(b)(1) for an “offense
involved causing or threatening to cause physical injury, or
property damage, in order to suborn perjury.” The presentence
report and the government offered the following potential bases for
the enhancement: (1) Sampson’s threats to and intimidation of
Braxton, in particular, raping her, telling her what he did to his
former wife and girlfriend, threatening her after his arrest with
loss of her freedom and her child; (2) Sampson’s assault on Holland
in the FBI building; and (3) Sampson’s threats to Nester and
Lawson.
We agree with Sampson that there was no evidence he
explicitly threatened anyone with physical injury or property
damage to suborn their perjury. However, we are satisfied that the
enhancement was justified based on the implied threat to Braxton.
She testified that, during the time she lived with Sampson, “[i]t
was understood that he was in control. If my behavior was what he
wanted, everything was all right. But if I behaved in a way that
he did not like, then I would be punished for it.” She testified
that their sexual relationship began when he raped her at
knifepoint. He told her in detail how he killed Dawn Phillips and
how he hit his former wife, Donna Slayton, in the face with a
hammer. Braxton said these revelations “made me feel like he is in
control and if he’s not in control, he will get you in control.”
- 13 -
Braxton also experienced violence from Sampson in addition to the
rape. She testified that, in October 2002, after she and Sampson
had both been drinking and using drugs at a bar, she told him that
she wished she had never met him, that her life had gone from bad
to worse after she met him, and that she didn’t want to see him
anymore. Sampson punched her in the face several times and, when
she put her arm up to protect herself, cut her on the arm. The cut
required sixteen stitches.
Braxton testified that, when Sampson told her about his
plan to claim to be a witness to the Short murders, she said she
wanted no part of it. She later testified before the grand jury
and “said what Timothy told me to say.” Although she was not
apparently induced to commit perjury by any overt threat, an
implied threat is enough to warrant the enhancement. See United
States v. Loudon, 385 F.3d 795, 799 (2d Cir. 2004) (affirming
similar 8-level enhancement under USSG § 2J1.2(b)(1) for implied
threat made with intent of obstructing justice). Because, during
the time-frame of the offense, Braxton was living in an atmosphere
of continual implied threats of physical violence from Sampson, we
conclude that the enhancement was correctly applied.
USSG § 2J1.3(b)(2) Enhancement
There was ample support for a 3-level enhancement under
§ 2J1.3(b)(2) for substantial interference with the administration
of justice, which includes “the unnecessary expenditure of
- 14 -
substantial government or court resources.” Nester testified at
trial that as much as 1000 extra man hours were expended because of
Sampson’s actions and false claims.
USSG § 3B1.1(c) Adjustment
The evidence supported a finding that Sampson had an
aggravated role in the conspiracy to commit perjury. He originated
the scheme to claim falsely that he was a witness to the Short
murders, and recruited Mills and Braxton to assist him, as well as
Holland, for a brief time. Even though Mills was a willing
participant, Sampson was the leader and organizer of the
conspiracy. The adjustment was not clearly erroneous.
USSG § 3C1.1 Adjustment
Finally, the district court did not clearly err in
applying an adjustment for obstruction of justice, § 3C1.1, based
on Sampson’s threatening phone calls to Nester and Lawson. The
adjustment does not apply when the defendant has been convicted of
perjury unless “a significant further obstruction occurred during
the investigation, prosecution, or sentencing of the obstruction
offense itself . . . .” USSG § 3C1.1, comment. (n.7). Sampson
argues that the adjustment was impermissible double counting.
However, Sampson’s threats to the officers were not part of the
offense of conviction. The district court found by a preponderance
of the evidence that the threats were an attempt by Sampson,
however short-lived, to obstruct the investigation of his perjury
- 15 -
and the related conspiracy. Thus, the adjustment did not
constitute impermissible double counting.
Sampson also contends that the adjustment was contrary to
the jury’s verdict, which acquitted him of making threats to the
officers with the intent of impeding the administration of justice.
As previously discussed, the sentencing court may consider “conduct
underlying [an] acquitted charge, so long as that conduct has been
proved by a preponderance of the evidence.” Watts, 519 U.S. at
156-57; Montgomery, 262 F.3d at 249. Sampson again relies on
Curry, but here again the weight of the evidence supports the
district court’s finding.
We therefore affirm the sentence imposed by the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
- 16 -