UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4856
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
MAURO SOTO CHAVEZ,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr.,
Chief District Judge. (3:05-cr-00002-ALL)
Submitted: August 23, 2007 Decided: August 28, 2007
Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, and WILKINS and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Samuel B. Winthrop, WINTHROP AND WINTHROP, Statesville, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Amy Elizabeth Ray, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Mauro Soto Chavez appeals his convictions and the 180-
month sentence imposed after he pleaded guilty to one count of
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or
more of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000), and one
count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug
trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000). On
appeal, counsel filed an Anders* brief, in which he states there
are no meritorious issues for appeal, but questions whether the
district court complied with Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 in accepting the
guilty plea, and whether the sentence was required. In a pro se
supplemental brief, Chavez asserts that the district court erred in
concluding that it did not have authority to impose a variance
sentence, and that the factual basis for his plea was not
established. We affirm.
Chavez did not move in the district court to withdraw his
guilty plea, therefore this court reviews his challenge to the
adequacy of the Rule 11 hearing for plain error. See United
States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d 517, 525 (4th Cir. 2002). Prior to
accepting a guilty plea, the trial court must ensure the defendant
understands the nature of the charges against him, the mandatory
minimum and maximum sentences, and other various rights, so it is
clear that the defendant is knowingly and voluntarily entering his
*
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
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plea. The court must also determine whether there is a factual
basis for the plea. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1), (3); United
States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116, 120 (4th Cir. 1991). Counsel
does not specify any deficiencies in the district court’s Rule 11
inquiry, and our review of the plea hearing transcript reveals that
the court conducted a thorough Rule 11 colloquy that assured
Chavez’s plea was made both knowingly and voluntarily.
We review a district court’s sentence for reasonableness.
United States v. Hughes, 401 F.3d 540, 546-47 (4th Cir. 2005). In
this case, the drug conspiracy count carried a statutory mandatory
minimum sentence of ten years of imprisonment; the firearm count
carried a minimum five year term of imprisonment that must be
imposed consecutively to any other term of imprisonment. See
21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A) (2000), 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(I),
(c)(1)(D)(ii) (2000). The district court correctly noted that it
was without authority to impose the requested variance sentence, as
we have recognized that, even after United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220 (2005), “[e]xcept upon motion of the Government on the
basis of substantial assistance, a district court may not depart
below a statutory minimum.” United States v. Robinson, 404 F.3d
850, 862 (4th Cir. 2005). In this case, Chavez was sentenced to
the statutory minimums applicable to the charges to which he
pleaded guilty, and we conclude that his sentence is reasonable.
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In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in
this case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We have
considered the arguments asserted in Chavez’s pro se supplemental
brief and find them to be without merit. We therefore affirm
Chavez’s convictions and sentence. This court requires that
counsel inform Chavez, in writing, of the right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Chavez
requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such
a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court
for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must
state that a copy thereof was served on Chavez.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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