UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4927
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
RANDOLPH BARTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. Henry F. Floyd, District Judge.
(6:05-cr-01180-HFF-2)
Submitted: August 27, 2007 Decided: September 5, 2007
Before WILKINSON and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Melissa J. Kimbrough, KIMBROUGH & LONGSHORE, Columbia, South
Carolina, for Appellant. Regan A. Pendleton, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Randolph Barton pled guilty pursuant to a written plea
agreement to one count of conspiracy to possess with intent to
distribute and to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846 (2000). Barton was sentenced
by the district court to 125 months’ imprisonment. Finding no
error, we affirm.
On appeal, counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), asserting there were no
meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning whether the
district court erred in its application of the Sentencing
Guidelines. Barton was notified of his right to file a pro se
supplemental brief, but did not do so, and the Government elected
not to file a responsive brief.
When reviewing the district court’s application of the
Sentencing Guidelines, we review findings of fact for clear error
and questions of law de novo. United States v. Green, 436 F.3d
449, 456 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2309 (2006). Section
2D1.1(b)(6)(B) of the Sentencing Guidelines provides for a
three-level increase if the offense involved the manufacture of
methamphetamine and created a significant risk of harm to the
environment. In determining whether a significant risk was
created, a court should consider: (1) the quantity of any chemical,
hazardous, or toxic substances, and the manner in which such
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substances were stored; (2) the manner in which the substances were
disposed, and the likelihood of release into the environment; (3)
the duration of the offense; and (4) the location of the
laboratory. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1, comment.
(n.20(A)); see United States v. Houchins, 364 F.3d 182, 187-90 (4th
Cir. 2004), vacated on other grounds, 543 U.S. 1104 (2005).
Barton contends that the district court erred in its
application of § 2D1.1(b)(6)(B). He asserts that the Government’s
witness failed to identify a specific harm or environmental injury
stemming from the production of methamphetamine. Moreover, Barton
argues that the chemicals and compounds used to produce
methamphetamine are not individually unlawful to possess, use,
dispose of, and store.
However, as alleged in the indictment, the conspiracy to
manufacture methamphetamine spanned more than two years. Testimony
at the sentencing hearing established that numerous chemicals and
other materials were found at Barton’s residence. They were stored
in regular household garbage bags and placed in an open horse
trailer, which was described as having an “ether ammonia smell
emitting from it.” The trailer was located in a residential area,
and was emptied twice a year at a public landfill. Neither the
method of storage nor the manner of disposal was proper. Moreover,
a hazardous material team was required to clean up Barton’s
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property. Thus, under these circumstances, we conclude that the
district court properly applied the environmental risk enhancement.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record in this case and have found no meritorious issues for
appeal. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
This court requires that counsel inform her client, in writing, of
his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for
further review. If the client requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid in the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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