UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-6215
MICHAEL COFIELD,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
ROY BOWSER, Deputy/Support; SERGEANT STOKES,
Defendants - Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Walter D. Kelley, Jr., District
Judge. (2:06-cv-00533-WDK)
Submitted: July 27, 2007 Decided: September 14, 2007
Before WILKINSON, TRAXLER, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Michael Cofield, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Michael Cofield appeals from the dismissal without
prejudice of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000) complaint for failure to
exhaust all administrative remedies prior to filing suit pursuant
to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”). We vacate the
district court’s dismissal order and remand for further
proceedings.*
The PLRA requires that a prisoner exhaust administrative
remedies before filing any action under federal law with respect to
confinement. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) (2000). The PLRA defines a
“prisoner” as “any person incarcerated or detained in any facility
who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated
delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and
conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary
program.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h).
The district court concluded that Cofield was
incarcerated at the time he submitted his complaint because Cofield
signed the complaint on August 10, 2006, but was not released from
the Hampton City Jail until September 11, 2006. However, our
examination of the record indicates that, although the complaint
was signed over a month before Cofield left the Hampton City Jail,
the complaint was not submitted and filed until after Cofield was
released from incarceration. First, the envelope used to mail the
*
We express no opinion about the merits of Cofield’s claims.
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complaint indicates that Cofield’s initial filing was processed by
the postal service on September 12, 2006, the day after Cofield was
released. Additionally, the complaint was received on
September 13, 2006, and was filed by the district court on
September 21, 2006. Finally, Cofield’s mailing address, as listed
on the envelope and in his complaint, provided a private street
address in Newport News, Virginia, while the subject jail is in
Hampton City, Virginia. Therefore, we conclude that Cofield was
not an inmate of the Hampton City Jail at the time he filed his
complaint.
Because Cofield was not a prisoner when he filed his
complaint, the PLRA exhaustion requirement is not applicable to his
§ 1983 action. A former inmate who has been released is no longer
“incarcerated or detained” for the purposes of § 1997e(h) and
therefore does not qualify as a “prisoner” subject to the PLRA.
Furthermore, it is the plaintiff’s status at the time he filed the
lawsuit that is determinative as to whether the § 1997e(a)
exhaustion requirement applies. See Norton v. City of Marietta,
432 F.3d 1145, 1150 (10th Cir. 2005) (collecting cases concluding
that plaintiff who brings action regarding prison conditions after
his release does not have to satisfy PLRA’s exhaustion
requirement). Because Cofield was not incarcerated at the time he
filed his § 1983 action, he was not required to exhaust his
administrative remedies prior to filing suit.
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Accordingly, we grant leave to proceed in forma pauperis,
vacate the district court’s dismissal of Cofield’s § 1983 action,
and remand for further proceedings. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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