UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 03-4951
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
VERNON ANDRE JACKSON,
Defendant - Appellant.
On Remand from the Supreme Court of the United States.
(S. Ct. No. 04-9540)
Submitted: August 29, 2007 Decided: September 13, 2007
Before NIEMEYER, TRAXLER, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Dismissed in part; affirmed in part by unpublished per curiam
opinion.
Kenneth W. Ravenell, SCHULMAN, TREEM, KAMINKOW, GILDEN & RAVENELL,
P.A., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein,
United States Attorney, John F. Purcell, Jr., Bonnie S. Greenberg,
Assistant United States Attorneys, Baltimore, Maryland, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
This case is before the court on remand from the United
States Supreme Court. We previously affirmed Vernon Andre
Jackson’s conviction. United States v. Jackson, No. 03-4951 (4th
Cir. Jan. 10, 2005) (unpublished). The Supreme Court vacated our
decision and remanded Jackson’s case to us for further
consideration in light of United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220
(2005).
In Jackson’s supplemental brief, filed at this court’s
direction after the Supreme Court’s remand, he contends that he is
entitled to resentencing in light of Booker because the district
court considered the guidelines as mandatory and the district court
has subsequently indicated that it would seriously consider a
sentence less than the 108 months imposed if given an opportunity
at a resentencing.
Jackson entered into a plea agreement and waived his
right to appeal whatever sentence imposed, within the statutory
limits and unless an upward departure was imposed. On remand from
the Supreme Court, Jackson argues that the appellate waiver in the
plea agreement should not bar consideration of his sentence because
the district court did not state on the record available on appeal
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that his guilty plea was voluntary.* Jackson does not argue that
his guilty plea was in fact involuntary or unknowing.
Because Jackson did not seek to withdraw his guilty plea
in the district court, any alleged Rule 11 error is reviewed by
this court for plain error. United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d
517, 524-26 (4th Cir. 2002). To establish plain error, Jackson
must show that an error occurred, that the error was plain, and
that the error affected his substantial rights. United States v.
White, 405 F.3d 208, 215 (4th Cir. 2005).
Jackson asserts in his supplemental brief, although he
did not do so in his initial appeal, that the district court erred
because it did not make a determination that he entered into the
plea agreement knowingly and voluntarily. Jackson contends that a
review of the record indicates that the district court failed to
find that his plea was voluntarily made as required by Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(b)(2). Under Rule 11(b)(2), “[b]efore accepting a plea
of guilty or nolo contendere, the court must address the defendant
personally in open court and determine that the plea is voluntary
and did not result from force, threats or promises (other than
promises in the plea agreement).”
*
The district court agreed at the Rule 11 hearing to withhold
judgment until sentencing so that the defendant could continue on
release status. The sentencing transcript is lost and was not
available on appeal.
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During the plea colloquy, the district court thoroughly
questioned Jackson about his intention to plead guilty even though
he was giving up numerous constitutional rights. We therefore
conclude that the district court’s omission on the available record
did not affect Jackson’s substantial rights. See United States v.
Goins, 51 F.3d 400, 402-03 (4th Cir. 1995) (discussing factors
courts should consider in determining whether substantial rights
were affected in decision to plead guilty). Our review of the
transcript of the plea hearing also reveals that the district court
otherwise fully complied with the mandates of Rule 11. The court
specifically asked Jackson if he wished to enter into the plea
agreement with the conditional waiver. The district court ensured
that Jackson’s plea was knowing and voluntary and was supported by
a sufficient factual basis. Further, Jackson does not contend that
the district court did not make a finding that he entered into the
plea agreement knowingly and voluntarily at the sentencing hearing.
Jackson is therefore not entitled to relief on the Rule 11 claim
and avoid the waiver.
Furthermore, in United States v. Blick, 408 F.3d 162, 168
(4th Cir. 2005), this court held that “[w]here, as here, the United
States seeks enforcement of an appeal waiver, and there is no claim
that the United States breached its obligations under the plea
agreement, we will enforce the waiver to preclude a defendant from
appealing a specific issue if the record establishes that the
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waiver is valid and that the issue being appealed is within the
scope of the waiver.” Id. at 168 (citations omitted). The Blick
court held that an appeal waiver that was accepted prior to the
Supreme Court’s decision in Booker is not invalidated by the change
in law effected by that decision. Blick, 408 F.3d at 170, 173.
Therefore the intervening change in law does not operate to
invalidate the waiver.
Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal as to Jackson’s
sentencing claim on remand in light of Booker. In addition, we
reinstate our January 10, 2005, opinion affirming his conviction.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
DISMISSED IN PART;
AFFIRMED IN PART
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