UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4764
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
KEVIN CARTER,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr.,
Chief District Judge. (3:05-cr-00082)
Submitted: September 28, 2007 Decided: October 12, 2007
Before MICHAEL and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and WILKINS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Haakon Thorsen, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen
C. F. Shappert, United States Attorney, Jonathan A. Vogel,
Assistant United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Kevin Carter appeals his jury convictions and resulting
262—month sentence for possession with intent to distribute
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000), and
possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000). Carter asserts the district court erred in
sentencing him as a career offender and in failing to suppress
statements he made to officers at his home. Finding no error, we
affirm.
Under U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1(a), a
defendant is a career offender if he was older than eighteen when
he committed the instant offense, the instant offense is a felony
that is a crime of violence or a controlled substance offense, and
he had two prior felony convictions for a crime of violence or a
controlled substance offense. Prior sentences imposed in related
cases are to be treated as one sentence for purposes of USSG §
4B1.1. See USSG §§ 4A1.2, comment (n.3); 4B1.2, comment (n.3).
Cases are considered “related” if there was no intervening arrest
and the offenses “(A) occurred on the same occasion, (B) were part
of a single common scheme or plan, or (C) were consolidated for
trial or sentencing.” USSG § 4A1.2, comment (n.3).
As Carter concedes, there was an intervening arrest in this
case. Moreover, despite Carter’s assertions otherwise, separate
offenses do not become related simply because they were
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consolidated for sentencing or because the defendant received
concurrent sentences. See United States v. Breckenridge, 93 F.3d
132, 137-38 (4th Cir. 1996), rev’d on other grounds, 229 F.3d 1144
(4th Cir. 2000). We therefore find the district court properly
sentenced Carter as a career offender.
Carter next contends the district court failed to acknowledge
that he did not waive his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966). Carter essentially contends that he needed to receive
written notice of his rights before he could properly waive them.
Miranda warnings may be given orally or in writing. As the Supreme
Court has explained, there is no mandated process for providing a
suspect with the Miranda warnings; rather, the issue is whether the
warnings “reasonably convey to a suspect his rights as required by
Miranda.” Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195, 203 (1989) (quotation
and citation omitted). We agree with the district court that
Carter knowingly waived his Miranda rights; thus the court did not
err in declining to suppress Carter’s statements.
Accordingly, we affirm Carter’s convictions and sentence. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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