UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4003
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
MARIN RUELAS-VILLALOBOS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Alexandria. T. S. Ellis, III, Senior
District Judge. (1:05-cr-00442-TSE-2)
Submitted: September 28, 2007 Decided: October 15, 2007
Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and WILKINS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Harry Tun, Daniel K. Dorsey, Washington, D.C., for Appellant.
Chuck Rosenberg, United States Attorney, Steven D. Mellin,
Assistant United States Attorney, David B. Joyce, Special Assistant
United States Attorney, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Marin Ruelas-Villalobos appeals his convictions and 240-
month sentence for conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
marijuana, five or more kilograms of cocaine, and fifty grams or
more of methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1),
846 (2000); possession with intent to distribute five or more
kilograms of cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18
U.S.C. § 2 (2000); and illegal reentry after removal for an
aggravated felony, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a), (b)(2)
(2000). Ruelas-Villalobos contends the district court violated his
right to a fair trial by excessively intervening in the
proceedings. Finding no error, we affirm.
Because Ruelas-Villalobos did not object to the judicial
intervention at trial, we review the claims for plain error. See
United States v. Smith, 452 F.3d 323, 330 (4th Cir. 2006) (citation
omitted). Four conditions must be met before this court will
notice plain error: (1) there must be error; (2) it must be plain
under current law; (3) it must affect substantial rights, typically
meaning the defendant is prejudiced by the error in that it
affected the outcome of the proceedings; and (4) the error
seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of
judicial proceedings. United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733-37
(1993).
- 2 -
Pursuant to Fed. R. Evid. 614, a district court is
permitted to call witnesses on its own motion, and may interrogate
any witness who testifies at trial. It is “settled beyond doubt
that in a federal court the judge has the right, and often an
obligation, to interrupt the presentations of counsel in order to
clarify misunderstandings or otherwise insure that the trial
proceeds efficiently and fairly.” United States v. Morrow, 925
F.2d 779, 781 (4th Cir. 1991) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Because issues of trial management are largely left to
the discretion of the district court, we review judicial
interference claims with a “measure of deference” to the district
court’s judgment. Smith, 452 F.3d at 333. However, the trial
judge must ensure that he does not create an appearance of
partiality through continued intervention or interruption on behalf
of one of the parties. See United States v. Godwin, 272 F.3d 659,
677 (4th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). Ultimately, the district
court must “never [reach] the point at which it appears clear to
the jury that the court believes the accused is guilty, . . . or
[give] the appearance of bias or partiality in any way or [become]
so pervasive in his interruptions and interrogations that he may
appear to usurp the role of either the prosecutor or the
defendant’s counsel.” United States v. Parodi, 703 F.2d 768, 775-
76 (4th Cir. 1983) (citations omitted). In making such a
determination, we do not look at the challenged questions in
- 3 -
isolation, but rather examine the “demeanor and conduct of the
trial judge throughout the trial” for evidence of partiality or
bias sufficient to deprive the defendant of his right to a fair
trial. Id. at 776.
Ruelas-Villalobos claims the district court helped to
rehabilitate the Government’s witnesses after they had been
impeached. The Government’s first witness, Patricia Triana,
testified briefly regarding her translation of the Government’s
audio recordings from Spanish to English. Ruelas-Villalobos claims
that during cross-examination, he successfully attacked the
“credibility” of the translation, but that his efforts were negated
when the district court called Triana back to the stand and asked
her a series of additional questions. However, the district
court’s questions simply regarded the process used by Triana when
she found words to be unintelligible. The court’s inquiries were
clearly intended to clarify this matter for the jury and to explain
the relevance of context in making an accurate translation. See
Smith, 452 F.3d at 332.
The Government’s next witness, Donald Griffin, testified
about Ruelas-Villalobos’ presence and involvement in various
meetings during which the purchase of cocaine was discussed.
Ruelas-Villalobos claims the district court’s questions to Griffin
“tied appellant to the purchase of drugs” and that its “excessive
intervention” assisted the Government in questioning the witness.
- 4 -
However, the district court’s questions during direct examination
were intended to produce additional details regarding the nature of
the drug meetings and Ruelas-Villalobos’ role, as it was unclear
how much involvement he had due to his limited ability to speak
English. Most of the court’s questions related to clarifying which
individuals were speaking on the Government’s recordings of these
meetings and what those individuals said, as well as establishing
the context of the conversations.
During cross-examination, the district court asked
questions regarding the breadth of Griffin’s plea deal and his
assistance to the Government. While Ruelas-Villalobos claims this
“destroyed” the effectiveness of the cross-examination, the court
simply inquired as to how far Griffin might go to assist his
brother, who was also being prosecuted for drug distribution, as
Griffin had failed to answer the question directly. See Parodi,
703 F.2d at 775. The remainder of the district court’s
interactions merely involved directing the witness to answer a
question that had been previously asked by counsel.
As for Jesus Vega, Jr., another Government witness,
Ruelas-Villalobos claims that the district court’s questions helped
to tie him to the drug transactions while also bolstering the
credibility of the witness. However, the district court provided
no such assistance to the Government’s presentation; rather, the
court asked Vega to repeat his answer and noted for the record that
- 5 -
Vega had identified Ruelas-Villalobos. See Morrow, 925 F.2d at
781. The district court also intervened on two occasions after
finding the Government’s questions were leading or dealt with
irrelevant material, as the court restated the questions to avoid
any objectionable responses. See United States v. Castner, 50 F.3d
1267, 1273 (4th Cir. 1995). Finally, the district court asked
Vega, who had pled guilty, about his understanding of the
Sentencing Guidelines and sentencing procedure and whether he was
given any promises of a sentencing reduction. While Ruelas-
Villalobos contends these questions blunted his attack on Vega’s
credibility, he provides no explanation or support for these
conclusory allegations.
During the direct examination of Carlos Ruelas, Ruelas-
Villalobos’ son and the defense’s first witness, the district court
asked no questions; however, Ruelas-Villalobos contends the court’s
intervention during cross-examination had the effect of “usurping
the role of the prosecutor.” However, the district court’s
questions were brief and infrequent, as the court asked Ruelas a
few questions in an attempt to clarify his testimony. Not only was
this an appropriate effort by the court to ensure the facts were
properly developed and understood by the jury, but Ruelas-
Villalobos has failed to demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the
court’s actions or the witness’ responses.
- 6 -
Ruelas-Villalobos next contends the district court
excessively intervened in the examination of his other son, Marin
Ruelas-Gutierrez. While Ruelas-Villalobos identifies a number of
statements by the district court that he contends implicitly
questioned the witness’ credibility, almost all of the court’s
efforts involved restating and clarifying counsel’s questions or
asking for additional elaboration from Ruelas-Gutierrez.1
Finally, Ruelas-Villalobos contends the district court
unnecessarily intervened during his own testimony. However, the
court’s involvement largely related to restating counsel’s
questions, often to avoid irrelevant or objectionable testimony or
to direct Ruelas-Villalobos to answer a specific inquiry. See
Castner, 50 F.3d at 1273. The court also asked Ruelas-Villalobos
to identify the individuals speaking on a recording and to clarify
certain facts regarding his personal and criminal history. Ruelas-
Villalobos claims that certain questions asked by the district
court may have indicated to the jury that it did not find his
testimony credible. Even if the district court’s questions could
be read to indicate some level of skepticism or disbelief of
1
During direct examination, the district court asked Ruelas-
Gutierrez a series of questions regarding his father’s arrival in
the United States and his knowledge of the English language.
Additionally, during cross-examination, the court asked Ruelas-
Gutierrez whether he had previously pled guilty in Virginia to a
drug offense. While this line of inquiry is generally pursued by
the Government, Ruelas-Gutierrez has failed to demonstrate
prejudice, much less prejudice amounting to the denial of a fair
trial. See Parodi, 703 F.2d at 776.
- 7 -
Ruelas-Villalobos’ testimony, we find that in light of the court’s
conduct throughout the trial and its instructions to the jury,2
these isolated statements fail to establish any partiality or bias
that would amount to reversible error, much less plain error.
Accordingly, we affirm Ruelas-Villalobos’ convictions and
sentence. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
2
During the preliminary instructions to the jury, the district
court stated that nothing it may say or do during the trial should
be understood as indicating what the verdict should be, as the
jurors were the sole judges of the facts in the case.
Additionally, during the closing instructions, the district court
noted that any questions it may have asked during the trial were
only meant to clarify matters and did not reflect any opinion on
the issues to which the questions may have related. See Smith, 452
F.3d at 333-34; Parodi, 703 F.2d at 778.
- 8 -