UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4816
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
JEFF NICHOLAS HILL,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, Senior
District Judge. (1:05-cr-00315-3)
Submitted: October 15, 2007 Decided: October 26, 2007
Before WILKINSON, KING, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Christopher R. Clifton, GRACE, HOLTON, TISDALE & CLIFTON, LLP,
Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Anna Mills Wagoner,
United States Attorney, Kearns Davis, Assistant United States
Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Jeff Nicholas Hill appeals his convictions and 172-month
sentence following his guilty plea to conspiracy to distribute
oxycodone, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C)
(2000); possession with intent to distribute oxycodone, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), 18 U.S.C. § 2
(2000); and possession of firearms in connection with a drug
trafficking offense, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c)(1)(A)(i),
(c)(1)(C)(i), 2 (2000). Hill contends the district court erred in
denying his motion to suppress evidence resulting from a stop and
search of his vehicle.1 We conclude the district court did not err
in finding police officers had reasonable suspicion to justify the
stop and protective search or in denying the motion to suppress.
Accordingly, we affirm.
This court reviews the district court’s factual findings
underlying a motion to suppress for clear error and the district
court’s legal determinations de novo. United States v. Grossman,
400 F.3d 212, 216 (4th Cir. 2005). When a suppression motion has
been denied, this court reviews the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Government. Id.
“[A]n officer may, consistent with the Fourth Amendment,
conduct a brief, investigatory stop when the officer has a
1
Hill’s conditional guilty plea preserved his right to appeal
the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
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reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.”
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (citing Terry v.
Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)). To conduct a Terry stop, there must be
“at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the
stop.” Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 123. Reasonable suspicion requires
more than a hunch but less than probable cause and may be based on
the collective knowledge of officers involved in an investigation.
Id. at 123-24.
Hill contends the police officers lacked reasonable
suspicion to stop his vehicle because they did not have reliable or
specific information that he was engaged in criminal activity. The
police officers stopped Hill’s vehicle based on the following
circumstances. A suspect was arrested in connection with an
assault, and upon arrest, the police began conducting surveillance
of the suspect’s house. The police also had information at the
time, provided by a confidential informant, that the suspect’s
house contained a marijuana grow room and an arsenal of weapons.
Shortly after the officers began watching the house, three vehicles
parked in front of the house, and the drivers hurriedly began
transferring items from the house into the vehicles. Among the
items carried out, the officers observed numerous plastic bags, a
safe, and what appeared to be a long gun wrapped in a blanket. The
vehicles then hurriedly departed, and the officers followed and
eventually pulled them over. One of the cars was driven by Hill.
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Hill points out that the confidential informant’s
information regarding the contents of the house was not based on
personal observation and none of the information implicated him.
Nevertheless, the officer who obtained the information from the
confidential informant personally knew the informant. The officer
also knew that the source of the information was the informant’s
spouse, who worked closely with the arrested suspect for the same
employer. Moreover, much of the information provided was detailed
and corroborated. Accordingly, we agree with the district court
that the police had reasonable suspicion based upon information
provided by the informant. See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213,
243-44 (once corroborated, even an otherwise unreliable tip may
establish the higher, probable cause standard). Additionally,
while the tip did not convey any information about Hill, and
indeed, the officers did not know who Hill was as they observed him
taking items from the house, the activity observed by the officers,
along with information they already had, gave rise to reasonable
suspicion that Hill was engaged in criminal activity.
Hill also contends the police officers were not entitled
to search the passenger compartment of his car because the stop of
the vehicle was unjustified, his consent to search was invalid, and
there was no basis to believe he was dangerous.2 When a police
2
When the officer searched the passenger compartment of the
car, he found hand-made grenades in a plastic container. He
stopped searching, called the bomb squad, and arrested Hill. In a
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officer lawfully stops a vehicle and possesses “a reasonable belief
based on ‘specific and articulable facts’. . . that the suspect is
dangerous and . . . may gain immediate control of weapons,” the
officer may search the areas of the passenger compartment of the
automobile where “a weapon may be placed or hidden.” Michigan v.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049-50 (1983) (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at
21). In so holding, “the Long Court rejected the argument that an
officer has no reasonable basis for believing that a suspect may
gain control of a weapon in his vehicle when the suspect is outside
of the vehicle and under an officer's ‘brief control.’” United
States v. Holmes, 376 F.3d 270, 276 (4th Cir. 2004)(citing Long,
463 U.S. at 1051-52).
Here, the police officers had a reasonable belief Hill
was dangerous because they had reason to believe he had removed
items from a house containing numerous weapons. The officers also
knew that at least one of the items taken from the house appeared
to be a gun. Moreover, when they approached the car, both officers
involved in stopping Hill’s car observed a gun in the back seat.
As was the case in Holmes, although Hill was out of the car and
restrained when the officer searched the passenger compartment, the
officer was entitled to conduct a protective search of that area
because of the possibility that Hill would have access to any
later search of the car, the officers found additional ammunition
and a variety of drugs.
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weapons located there. See Holmes, 376 F.3d at 280 (protective
search of passenger compartment warranted when suspect was
handcuffed in the back of police cruiser, because if not arrested,
the suspect would be permitted to return to the vehicle).
Accordingly, the district court correctly found the
officers had reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a stop and
protective search of the passenger compartment of Hill’s car and
properly denied Hill’s motion to suppress. We therefore affirm
Hill’s convictions and sentence. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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