UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-4559
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
TIMOTHY G. CRAIG, a/k/a Boot,
Defendant - Appellant,
versus
GIGGIES BONDING COMPANY; ANNIE BLACKMON; ALL
OUT BAIL BONDING; ACE BONDING; HORACE GLENN,
JR.; LISA CLINE,
Parties in Interest.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Greenville. Henry M. Herlong, Jr., District
Judge. (6:02-cr-01358-HMH)
Submitted: August 10, 2007 Decided: November 8, 2007
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
W. Gaston Fairey, W. GASTON FAIREY, LLC, Columbia, South Carolina,
for Appellant. Reginald I. Lloyd, United States Attorney, Regan A.
Pendleton, Assistant United States Attorney, Greenville, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Timothy G. Craig appeals his conviction for conspiracy to
possess with intent to distribute fifty grams or more of crack
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (2000). He argues that
there was insufficient evidence to support the conclusion that his
drug distribution was part of the charged conspiracy and that the
district court erred in limiting cross-examination of a Government
witness about pending charges. Finding no error, we affirm.
Craig alleges that the Government did not prove that his
sale of crack cocaine was part of the conspiracy alleged in the
indictment or that he knowingly and voluntarily joined the
conspiracy. Craig argues that there is no evidence of
interdependence among the co-conspirators and limited testimony to
infer knowledge and participation in the conspiracy.
This court reviews the denial of a Rule 29 motion de
novo. United States v. Alerre, 430 F.3d 681, 693 (4th Cir. 2005).
Where, as here, the motion was based on a claim of insufficient
evidence, “[t]he verdict of a jury must be sustained if there is
substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the
Government, to support it.” Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60,
80 (1942). This court “ha[s] defined ‘substantial evidence’ as
‘evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate
and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Alerre, 430 F.3d at 693 (quoting
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United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996)). This
court “must consider circumstantial as well as direct evidence, and
allow the government the benefit of all reasonable inferences from
the facts proven to those sought to be established.” United
States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir. 1982). This
court “may not weigh the evidence or review the credibility of the
witnesses.” United States v. Wilson, 118 F.3d 228, 234 (4th Cir.
1997).
To sustain a conviction for conspiracy to possess cocaine
base with intent to distribute under 21 U.S.C. § 846, the
Government must prove that (1) an agreement to possess cocaine base
with intent to distribute existed between two persons; (2) the
defendant knew of the conspiracy; and (3) the defendant knowingly
and voluntarily became part of the conspiracy. United States v.
Wilson, 135 F.3d 291, 306 (4th Cir. 1998). We conclude that the
evidence was sufficient to sustain the conviction. In addition,
Craig’s arguments regarding the credibility of the Government
witnesses, including their statements and previous testimony that
did not mention Craig, may not be reviewed by the court. See
Wilson, 118 F.3d at 234.
Next, Craig contends that the district court improperly
limited his cross-examination of John Rogers in relation to whether
he had pending criminal charges. Craig did not object to the
ruling in the district court; therefore, review is for plain error.
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See United States v. Maxton, 940 F.2d 103, 105 (4th Cir. 1991).
Craig argues that his questioning regarding pending charges was
relevant to truthfulness, bias, and prejudice. He contends that
the court mistakenly believed he was attempting to introduce
pending charges as impeachment evidence. Craig received the
opportunity on cross-examination to explore many issues related to
truthfulness, bias, and prejudice. Rogers testified on direct
examination that he did not have any pending charges. Craig does
not present any evidence that Rogers indeed had a pending charge at
the time of the trial, and thus cannot establish prejudicial error.
The district court’s ruling was within the scope of its discretion.
See United States v. Ambers, 85 F.3d 173, 177 (4th Cir. 1996)
(upholding limitation on defendant’s cross-examination of
government witness where trial court allowed “abundant opportunity
to explore the motivation of the Government witnesses
testifying.”).
We therefore affirm the judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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