UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4345
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DANIEL LEE SUGGS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Florence. R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
(4:06-cr-00474-RBH)
Submitted: October 29, 2007 Decided: November 15, 2007
Before WILKINSON and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
William F. Nettles, IV, Aileen Clare, Assistant Federal Public
Defenders, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellant. Reginald I.
Lloyd, United States Attorney, Rose Mary Parham, Assistant United
States Attorney, Florence, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Daniel Lee Suggs appeals his sentence following a guilty
plea to two counts of use and possession of a firearm in
furtherance of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c) (2000). Suggs was sentenced to thirty-two years of
imprisonment. On appeal, Suggs’ attorney has filed a brief
pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), concluding
there are no meritorious issues for appeal but raising as potential
issues whether the district court fully complied with Fed. R. Crim.
P. 11, whether the Government breached the plea agreement by not
moving for downward departure, and whether Suggs’ sentence was
reasonable. Although advised of his right to do so, Suggs has not
filed a pro se supplemental brief. Finding no reversible error, we
affirm.
Counsel first raises the issue of whether the district
court fully complied with Rule 11, but identifies no error in the
Rule 11 proceeding. After a thorough review of the record, we find
the district court fully complied with the requirements of Rule 11.
Counsel next asserts that Suggs provided substantial
assistance to the Government and thus the Government was required
to move for a downward departure. The Government was not obligated
under its plea agreement to file such a motion, see United States
v. Snow, 234 F.3d 187, 190 (4th Cir. 2000), and there is no
indication that it refused to make the motion based on an
- 2 -
unconstitutional motive such as race or religion. Wade v. United
States, 504 U.S. 181, 185-86 (1992). Rather, Suggs failed a
polygraph test, thereby failing “to be fully truthful and
forthright” as required under the terms of the plea agreement.
Thus, Suggs failed to fully cooperate under the provisions of the
plea agreement as required for the Government to consider filing a
motion for downward departure. We therefore find the Government
did not breach the plea agreement.
Suggs next questions whether his sentence was reasonable.
This court will affirm a sentence if it “is within the statutorily
prescribed range and is reasonable.” United States v. Moreland,
437 F.3d 424, 432 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2054 (2006).
“[A] sentence within the proper advisory Guidelines range is
presumptively reasonable.” United States v. Johnson, 445 F.3d 339,
341 (4th Cir. 2006); see Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456,
2462-69 (2007) (upholding application of rebuttable presumption of
reasonableness to within-guidelines sentence). We find the
district court’s imposition of the statutory mandatory minimum
sentences on each count, which were statutorily required to be
served consecutively, after considering and examining the
sentencing guidelines and the relevant 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2000)
factors, was reasonable.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire
record for any meritorious issues and have found none.
- 3 -
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right
to petition the Supreme Court of the United States for further
review. If the client requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then
counsel may move in this court for leave to withdraw from
representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy thereof
was served on the client. We dispense with oral argument because
the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the
materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
- 4 -