UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4025
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
CLEVELAND KILGORE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Greenbelt. Richard D. Bennett, District Judge.
(8:06-cr-00115-RDB)
Submitted: October 31, 2007 Decided: November 15, 2007
Before WILKINSON, TRAXLER, and SHEDD, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Cleveland Kilgore, Appellant Pro Se. Rod J. Rosenstein, United
States Attorney, Barbara Suzanne Skalla, Assistant United States
Attorney, Michele Walls Sartori, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Greenbelt, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Cleveland Kilgore was convicted by a jury on four counts
of bank fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000), four counts of aggravated
identity theft, 18 U.S.C. § 1028A (2000), and aiding and abetting
those offenses, 18 U.S.C. § 2 (2000). He was sentenced to 149
months of imprisonment. On direct appeal, Kilgore has chosen to
proceed pro se. Although Kilgore’s arguments on appeal are largely
indecipherable, construing his claims broadly, Kilgore appears to
challenge the district court’s subject matter jurisdiction and the
sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions.
As recently noted by this court, “[s]ubject-matter
jurisdiction (in the sense of judicial power) over federal criminal
prosecutions is conferred on district courts by 18 U.S.C. § 3231.”
United States v. Hartwell, 448 F.3d 707, 716 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 127 S. Ct. 328 (2006). Accordingly, a federal district
court has jurisdiction over “all offenses against the laws of the
United States.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (2000). Moreover, “there can
be no doubt that Article III permits Congress to assign federal
criminal prosecutions to federal courts. That’s the beginning and
the end of the ‘jurisdictional’ inquiry.” Hartwell, 448 F.3d at
716 (quoting Hugi v. United States, 164 F.3d 378, 380 (7th Cir.
1999)).
Kilgore does not dispute that his criminal prosecution
involved the laws of the United States. Relying on commercial law,
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he provides no valid authority for the proposition that the
district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. To the extent
that Kilgore argues in his informal brief that he is a “Foreign
Nation (not a person) who rules autonomously and [is] not subject
to any entity or jurisdiction anywhere,” his claim is patently
meritless. Accordingly, we find that the district court properly
exercised subject matter jurisdiction over Kilgore’s criminal
prosecution under 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
A jury’s verdict must be sustained if there is
substantial evidence, taking the view most favorable to the
Government, to support it. Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60,
80 (1942). This court has “defined ‘substantial evidence’ as
‘evidence that a reasonable finder of fact could accept as adequate
and sufficient to support a conclusion of a defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Smith, 451 F.3d 209,
216 (4th Cir.) (quoting United States v. Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862
(4th Cir. 1996) (en banc)), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 197 (2006).
This court “must consider circumstantial as well as direct
evidence, and allow the government the benefit of all reasonable
inferences from the facts proven to those sought to be
established.” United States v. Tresvant, 677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th
Cir. 1982). In evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence, this
court does not review the credibility of the witnesses and assumes
that the jury resolved all contradictions in the testimony in favor
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of the Government. United States v. Romer, 148 F.3d 359, 364 (4th
Cir. 1998). Moreover, the uncorroborated testimony of one witness
or an accomplice may be sufficient to sustain a conviction. United
States v. Wilson, 115 F.3d 1185, 1190 (4th Cir. 1997). This court
“can reverse a conviction on insufficiency grounds only when the
prosecution’s failure is clear.” United States v. Moye, 454 F.3d
390, 394 (4th Cir.) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 452 (2006).
To prove bank fraud, the Government had to establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that Kilgore
knowingly execute[d], or attempt[ed] to execute, a scheme
or artifice (1) to defraud a financial institution; or
(2) to obtain any of the moneys, funds, credits, assets,
securities, or other property owned by, or under the
custody or control of, a financial institution, by means
of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or
promises.
18 U.S.C. § 1344. The elements of aggravated identity theft, 18
U.S.C. § 1028A, are: (1) knowing use, possession, or transfer,
without lawful authority, of the means of identification of another
person and (2) that such conduct occurred during and in relation to
a felony enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(c). See United States v.
Montejo, 442 F.3d 213, 215 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 366
(2006). In turn, § 1028A(c)(5) defines an enumerated felony to
include “any provision contained in chapter 63 (relating to mail,
bank, and wire fraud).”
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We have reviewed the transcripts of the trial and find
sufficient evidence to sustain the jury’s verdict. Accordingly, we
affirm Kilgore’s convictions and sentence. We deny Kilgore’s
motion for release pending appeal as moot and we further deny the
“Motion to Grant Settlement.” We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in
the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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