UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4151
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
ANDRES MORALES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia, at Charleston. John T. Copenhaver, Jr.,
District Judge. (2:06-cr-00112-1)
Submitted: October 12, 2007 Decided: November 13, 2007
Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and KING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Barron M. Helgoe, VICTOR VICTOR & HELGOE LLP, Charleston, West
Virginia, for Appellant. Charles T. Miller, United States
Attorney, Joshua C. Hanks, Assistant United States Attorney,
Charleston, West Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Andres Morales was convicted by a jury of one count of
conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§ 846 (2000). Morales was sentenced by the district court to 360
months’ imprisonment. Finding no error, we affirm.
On appeal, Morales first contends that the district court
erred in admitting expert witness testimony. We review the
admission of expert testimony for an abuse of discretion. Kumho
Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 152 (1999). Before permitting
expert testimony, the district court must determine that the
testimony is both reliable and relevant and will assist the trier of
fact in understanding or determining a fact in issue in the case.
See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592-93
(1993).
Prior to his qualification as an expert witness, Minh Dang
testified that: he was employed for approximately ten years as a
forensic chemist with the Drug Enforcement Administration (“DEA”);
he received a Bachelor of Science degree in biochemistry from
California Polytechnic University and a Master of Science degree in
chemical toxicology from George Washington University; he completed
a nine month training course for the analysis of controlled
substances, including methamphetamine, and a course on investigating
clandestine methamphetamine laboratories; during his term of
employment with the DEA, he has chemically analyzed substances to
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determine whether they contain a controlled substance, including
between 700 and 800 tests specifically involving methamphetamine;
and he has testified approximately thirty times in prior criminal
cases.
Dang’s testimony, which was subjected to vigorous cross-
examination, included the tests used as well as the protocols
performed to assure accuracy. His inability to respond to some of
the detailed questions proffered on cross-examination is relevant to
the weight of Dang’s testimony rather than to its admissibility.
See United States v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 431 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 126 S. Ct. 2054 (2006). Thus, we conclude the district
court did not abuse its discretion by admitting Dang’s testimony.
Morales next contends that several of the district court’s
rulings on evidentiary issues were improper. We review a district
court’s decision regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence
for abuse of discretion. United States v. Lancaster, 96 F.3d 734,
744 (4th Cir. 1996). Such discretion is abused only when a district
court has acted “arbitrarily or irrationally.” United States v.
Moore, 27 F.3d 969, 974 (4th Cir. 1994) (internal quotation marks
and citation omitted). However, evidentiary rulings based on
erroneous legal conclusions are “by definition an abuse of
discretion.” United States v. Turner, 198 F.3d 425, 430 (4th Cir.
1999).
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The evidence presented at trial established that Morales
supplied methamphetamine to several distributors in the southern
portion of West Virginia. On one occasion, a cooperating witness
aided investigators by placing a monitored call to Morales’s cell
phone in an effort to schedule a controlled buy. The buy was
ultimately scheduled, and a date and location were appointed.
Dannie Fraley, a co-conspirator, arrived at the chosen location in
Morales’s girlfriend’s vehicle. Two packages of what was determined
to be methamphetamine were retrieved by officers from the vehicle.
Fraley testified that he was sent by Morales to execute the deal.
Morales argues that the district court erred by: (1)
excluding testimony regarding Fraley’s niece’s alleged
methamphetamine addiction; (2) admitting testimony from Fraley’s
girlfriend regarding whether Fraley would hide his drug use from
her; (3) admitting a photograph of the interior of Morales’s
girlfriend’s vehicle in which a child’s car seat was visible; and
(4) admitting testimony regarding Morales’s personal life. He
further argues that the district court erred in denying his post-
trial motion for a new trial in light of the cumulative effect of
these errors. When viewed in the context of the trial, the district
court’s rulings were neither arbitrary nor irrational. Moreover,
even if the rulings were erroneous, such error would nevertheless be
harmless in light of the evidence adduced at trial to establish
Morales’s guilt.
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Finally, Morales contends that the imposition of a
sentence within the calculated guideline range is unreasonable. He
continues to maintain his innocence and therefore argues that his
objections to the sentencing enhancements should have been
sustained. However, the district court properly found each
sentencing factor to be supported by a preponderance of the
evidence. See United States v. Morris, 429 F.3d 65, 72 (4th Cir.
2005), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 121 (2006). To the extent Morales
challenges as “vague and unreliable” the testimony presented at
sentencing, witness credibility is solely within the province of the
factfinder and will not be reassessed on appeal. See United States
v. Saunders, 886 F.2d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1989).
Moreover, the district court appropriately calculated the
advisory guideline range and considered it in conjunction with other
relevant factors under the Sentencing Guidelines and 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) (2000). See Moreland, 437 F.3d at 432-33. Morales’s 360-
month sentence, which is at the lowest end of the applicable
guideline range and below the statutory maximum, is therefore
presumptively reasonable. See United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449,
457 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2309 (2006); see also Rita
v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2462-65 (2007) (approving
presumption of reasonableness accorded sentences within properly
calculated guideline range).
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Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid in the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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