UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4380
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
EDWARD LEE WATKINS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,
District Judge. (5:05-cr-00258-D)
Submitted: November 6, 2007 Decided: November 21, 2007
Before WILKINSON, NIEMEYER, and MOTZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Thomas P. McNamara, Federal Public Defender, Stephen C. Gordon,
Assistant Federal Public Defender, Raleigh, North Carolina, for
Appellant. George E. B. Holding, United States Attorney, Anne M.
Hayes, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Assistant United States Attorneys,
Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Edward Lee Watkins appeals the district court’s
revocation of his supervised release and imposition of a
twenty-four month prison term. On appeal, Watkins contends his
revocation sentence was plainly unreasonable because it exceeded
his policy statement range of four to ten months. We affirm.
This court will affirm a sentence imposed after
revocation of supervised release if it is within the prescribed
statutory range and not plainly unreasonable. United States v.
Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct.
1813 (2007). In making this determination, the court first
considers whether the sentence is unreasonable. Id. at 438. This
initial inquiry takes a more deferential appellate posture
concerning issues of fact and the exercise of discretion than
reasonableness review for guidelines sentences. United States v.
Moulden, 478 F.3d 652, 656 (4th Cir. 2007)(citations omitted).
While the district court must consider the policy
statements contained in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines
as “helpful assistance,” and the statutory requirements and factors
applicable to revocation sentences under 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(a),
3583, the court ultimately has broad discretion to revoke the
previous sentence and impose a term of imprisonment up to the
statutory maximum. Crudup, 461 F.3d at 438-39. The court must
provide a statement of reasons for the sentence imposed, as with
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the typical sentencing procedure, but this statement need not be as
specific as has been required for departing from a traditional
guidelines range. Moulden, 478 F.3d at 657. Only if this modified
“reasonableness” analysis leads us to conclude that the sentence
was unreasonable, do we ask whether it is “plainly” so. Id.
Watkins began serving his term of supervised release on
July 27, 2005. On October 6, 2005, his term of supervised release
was modified to include halfway house placement and mental health
treatment because Watkins had been charged with second degree
trespass. On August 4, 2006, Watkins tested positive for cocaine
use. On March 19, 2007, a probation officer filed a second amended
motion for revocation of Watkins’ supervised release, citing six
violations, including three that occurred after Watkins was
released from custody pending his revocation hearing.*
Watkins admitted the violations and asked the court to
consider a six-month halfway house placement. The district court
acknowledged that Watkins’ policy statement range was four to ten
months, but concluded that a sentence of twenty-four months, the
*
The probation officer alleged: (1) Watkins used a controlled
substance on February 12, 2007; (2) Watkins failed to participate
as directed in a substance abuse treatment program by failing to
attend counseling sessions on ten occasions between October 2006
and February 2007; (3) Watkins failed to perform community service
and had only completed 28.45 of the 200 hours ordered; (4) Watkins
used cocaine on March 15, 2007; (5) Watkins consumed alcohol on
March 14, 2007; and (6) Watkins failed to follow the probation
officer’s instructions not to leave the probation office after
testing positive for cocaine use on March 15.
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statutory maximum, was appropriate. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines
Manual § 7B1.4; 18 U.S.C. § 3565(a)(2)(2000).
Watkins contends the increase in his sentence above the
policy statement range was plainly unreasonable. We disagree. The
district court considered the policy range under Chapter Seven, but
sentenced Watkins to the statutory maximum based on his need for
mental health and substance abuse treatment and on his pattern of
repeated violations. It was reasonable for the court to take into
account not only the severity of Watkins’ most severe violation,
but also the number of violations. See Moulden, 478 F.3d at 658.
We therefore affirm Watkins’ sentence. We dispense with
oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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