Bosiger v. US Airways, Inc.

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

EDWIN PERROW BOSIGER, JR., 
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
US AIRWAYS, INCORPORATED; US
AIRWAYS GROUP, INCORPORATED;
ALLEGHENY AIRLINES, INCORPORATED;
PIEDMONT AIRLINES; MIDATLANTIC
AIRWAYS, INCORPORATED; US
AIRWAYS LEASING AND SALES,
INCORPORATED; MATERIAL SERVICES  No. 06-2085
COMPANY, INCORPORATED; PSA
AIRLINES, INCORPORATED; AIRWAYS
ASSURANCE, LTD; THE PLAN
INACCURATELY TITLED NONQUALIFIED
TOP RETIREMENT PLAN,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
TOM G. DAVIS,
Party in Interest.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Gerald Bruce Lee, District Judge.
(1:06-cv-00324-GBL)

Argued: October 31, 2007

Decided: December 14, 2007

Before WILKINSON and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and
Louise W. FLANAGAN, Chief United States District Judge
for the Eastern District of North Carolina,
sitting by designation.
2 BOSIGER v. US AIRWAYS, INC.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion,
in which Judge Motz and Judge Flanagan joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Sara Pikofsky, THELEN, REID, BROWN, RAYSMAN
& STEINER, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Christopher
Alan Weals, MORGAN, LEWIS & BOCKIUS, L.L.P., Washington,
D.C., for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Sherwin S. Kaplan, Byron L. Pic-
kard, THELEN, REID, BROWN, RAYSMAN & STEINER, L.L.P.,
Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Bridgit M. DePietto, MORGAN,
LEWIS & BOCKIUS, L.L.P., Washington, D.C., for Appellees.

OPINION

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

In August 2002, US Airways filed for bankruptcy. In order to
secure the financing necessary to emerge from bankruptcy, US Air-
ways was forced to terminate the pension plans it administered for its
active and retired pilots. A bankruptcy court approved this termina-
tion, and this court eventually held that a claim to reverse the termina-
tion was equitably moot. In September 2004, US Airways again filed
for bankruptcy. A year later, US Airways emerged from this second
bankruptcy with a second plan of reorganization.

Six months after US Airways’s emergence from its second bank-
ruptcy, Edwin Perrow Bosiger, Jr., brought suit in federal district
court contending that US Airways had improperly terminated his pen-
sion during its first bankruptcy. The district court dismissed Bosiger’s
claim, holding that it was barred because Bosiger failed to file a proof
of claim during US Airways’s second bankruptcy. After careful con-
sideration, we agree with the district court and affirm its decision. It
is simply too late in the day for Bosiger to challenge the termination
of his pension: unwinding US Airways’s second bankruptcy at this
stage would not only unduly lengthen the airline’s restructuring, but
 BOSIGER v. US AIRWAYS, INC. 3
it would also upset the legitimate interests of those creditors who
relied on US Airways’s reorganization plan.

I.

A.

In the mid-1990s, US Airways Group, Inc. ("US Airways"), and
the Air Line Pilots Association ("ALPA"), an international union rep-
resenting US Airways’s active pilots, reached an agreement on retire-
ment benefits. This agreement called for retired pilots to receive, on
a monthly basis, a share of their final salary adjusted for the length
of their tenure with US Airways.

In order to provide these monthly benefits, US Airways established
a pension plan referred to as the Non-Qualified Top Hat Retirement
Plan ("Non-Qualified Plan"). The Non-Qualified Plan supplemented
the pre-existing Retirement Income Plan for Pilots of US Airways
("Pilots Defined Benefit Plan"). The Pilots Defined Benefit Plan was
a tax-qualified pension plan capped by the Internal Revenue Code,
such that it alone could not provide the total retirement benefits prom-
ised to US Airways’s pilots under the agreement with ALPA.

The Non-Qualified Plan, on the other hand, paid retirement bene-
fits above and beyond those payable by the Pilots Defined Benefit
Plan. Although never memorialized in a written contract, the Non-
Qualified Plan was maintained pursuant to the original collective bar-
gaining agreement and subsequent letters of agreement between US
Airways and ALPA. These letters recognized that the Non-Qualified
Plan was necessary "to pay benefits which cannot be paid from the
[Pilots Defined Benefit Plan] due to [limitations imposed by the]
Internal Revenue Code."

On August 11, 2002, US Airways filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.1
In order to continue its operations during its reorganization and suc-
cessfully emerge from Chapter 11, US Airways needed almost $1.75
1
This court considered an earlier dispute arising from US Airways’s
first bankruptcy in In re US Airways Group, Inc., 369 F.3d 806 (4th Cir.
2004). Many of the facts described here are taken from that opinion.
4 BOSIGER v. US AIRWAYS, INC.
billion in financing. US Airways was able to assemble a syndicate of
lenders willing to provide this amount, but the lenders were only will-
ing to extend the credit if US Airways was able to meet certain finan-
cial targets.

A major threat to US Airways’s ability to access the loans was an
escalating pension funding problem, particularly with respect to its
pilots, who accounted for a substantial portion of US Airways’s out-
standing pension obligations. At the same time passenger revenues
had dropped precipitously in the wake of the September 11th terrorist
attacks, lower interest rates and a poor stock market had greatly
decreased the performance of US Airways’s defined benefit pension
plans, increasing the airline’s projected contribution to the plans. This
left US Airways with insufficient cash flow to both meet its pension
obligations and achieve the financial targets necessary to access the
required funding. After exploring various potential solutions to this
problem, US Airways determined that, so long as its pilot pension
plans were in place, it would be unable to secure the financing it
needed to emerge from Chapter 11.

US Airways thus sought to restructure its pilot pension obligations,
with its ultimate goal being the termination of the two existing pen-
sion plans (Pilots Defined Benefit Plan and Non-Qualified Plan) and
their replacement with a defined contribution plan. To do so, US Air-
ways petitioned the bankruptcy court to allow a "distress termination"
of its Pilots Defined Benefit Plan under the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. § 1341(c)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)
(2000). US Airways did not specifically request the "distress termina-
tion" of the Non-Qualified Plan because it was under the belief that
the Non-Qualified Plan was a "top hat" plan, terminable simply pur-
suant to an express agreement between US Airways and ALPA
approved by the bankruptcy court.

In March 2003, the bankruptcy court ruled that US Airways satis-
fied ERISA’s standards for distress termination. The court therefore
allowed US Airways to terminate the Pilots Defined Benefit Plan,
subject to a determination that the proposed termination did not vio-
late the collective bargaining agreement with ALPA. US Airways and
ALPA subsequently issued Letter of Agreement #85, which approved
the termination of both pilot pension plans. The letter stated that the
 BOSIGER v. US AIRWAYS, INC. 5
Pilots Defined Benefit Plan "will be terminated . . . and merged into"
a new defined contribution plan available only to active and non-
retired pilots, while "the [Non-Qualified Plan] will be terminated, and
payments will permanently cease, effective March 31, 2003."

In light of this letter, the bankruptcy court authorized US Air-
ways’s "distress termination." At about the same time, the bankruptcy
court also approved US Airways’s reorganization plan, one part of
which stated that all retirement plans sponsored by US Airways "will
continue in effect except, to the extent terminated in accordance with
applicable law, the Retirement Income Plan for Pilots of US Airways,
Inc. and related (non-qualified) Top Hat Plan." Finally, on March 31,
2003, US Airways emerged from bankruptcy, stopped paying benefits
on the old Pilots Defined Benefit and Non-Qualified Plans, and
started contributing to the new defined contribution plan for non-
retired pilots. At this point, retired pilots began to receive benefits
from the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation, which had guaran-
teed the Pilots Defined Benefit Plan.

As US Airways emerged from bankruptcy, US Airways’s retired
pilots appealed the district court’s distress termination decision, seek-
ing to have their old pension benefits restored. But since the retired
pilots had neglected to have the termination and reorganization orders
stayed, and since the orders had been implemented and relied on by
third parties, the district court held that the suit was equitably moot.
This court affirmed on the same grounds in In re US Airways Group,
Inc., 369 F.3d 806, 807 (4th Cir. 2004).

In September 2004, US Airways again filed for bankruptcy. A year
later, in September 2005, US Airways emerged from its second bank-
ruptcy with a new plan of reorganization.

B.

Petitioner Edwin Perrow Bosiger, Jr., is a retired US Airways pilot
who, before US Airways’s first bankruptcy, had received benefits
from both the Pilots Defined Benefit Plan and the Non-Qualified
Plan. During US Airways’s second bankruptcy, US Airways notified
Bosiger by letter of (1) the Chapter 11 filing date and the bar date for
filing general unsecured claims and (2) entry of the order confirming
6 BOSIGER v. US AIRWAYS, INC.
the second Plan of Reorganization, the effective date of the Plan of
Reorganization, and the bar date for filing certain administrative and
rejection damage claims. Though provided with these two notices,
Bosiger did not file a claim during the second bankruptcy.

Bosiger instead chose to bring suit against US Airways six months
later, filing a complaint in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Virginia on March 27, 2006. Bosiger argued that
US Airways had improperly terminated the Non-Qualified Plan dur-
ing its first bankruptcy because the Non-Qualified Plan was a "top
hat" plan in name only, and therefore not terminable merely through
express agreement between US Airways and ALPA. Bosiger there-
fore contended that he was still entitled to his benefits under the Non-
Qualified Plan.

US Airways responded by filing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, alleging
that Bosiger’s complaint failed to state a claim for various reasons.
Most relevant to this appeal, US Airways argued that, even if the ter-
mination of the Non-Qualified Plan was unlawful, Bosiger had
waived any right to challenge the termination of the Plan by failing
to file a proof of claim during US Airways’s second bankruptcy.

In September 2006, after considering Bosiger’s reply to US Air-
ways’s motion to dismiss and argument at a hearing on the matter, the
district court granted US Airways’s motion. The district court articu-
lated two grounds for its holding. First, the court stated that US Air-
ways appropriately considered the Non-Qualifed Plan to be a "top
hat" plan. Thus, US Airways had properly terminated the Plan during
its first bankruptcy, pursuant to its Letter of Agreement #85 with
ALPA and the bankruptcy court’s approval of US Airways’s reorga-
nization plan.

Second, and in the alternative, the district court held that Bosiger’s
"claim is barred because he failed to file a proof of claim during US
Airways’s second bankruptcy." The court reasoned that, to the extent
Bosiger had a valid claim after the Non-Qualified Plan was termi-
nated on March 31, 2003, he became a creditor when US Airways
entered Chapter 11 a second time in September 2004. Thus, Bosiger
was required to file a proof of claim during the second bankruptcy
proceeding; his failure to do so led to his claims being discharged
 BOSIGER v. US AIRWAYS, INC. 7
along with the rest of US Airways’s debts when US Airways emerged
from bankruptcy a second time in September 2005.

Bosiger now appeals the district court’s order dismissing his com-
plaint, arguing that each of the court’s alternate grounds for its hold-
ing constituted error. In particular, Bosiger challenges the court’s
finding that the Non-Qualifed Plan was a "top hat" plan, and argues
that his failure to file a proof of claim during US Airways’s second
bankruptcy should not bar his present suit.

II.

We review Bosiger’s appeal from the district court’s Rule 12(b)(6)
dismissal de novo, Smith v. Sydnor, 184 F.3d 356, 360-61 (4th Cir.
1999), and affirm. In reaching this decision, it is not necessary for us
to address whether US Airways appropriately classified the Non-
Qualified Plan as a "top hat" plan, because we find that the district
court’s alternate ground for its holding is sufficient to support our rul-
ing.

As the district court stated, when Bosiger failed to file a proof of
claim during US Airways’s second bankruptcy, any potential claim he
had to payments under the Non-Qualified Plan was extinguished. One
of the primary purposes of bankruptcy is the discharge of debts, and
the Bankruptcy Code and Rules explicitly state — in several places
— that all of a debtor’s pre-existing obligations terminate upon the
debtor’s emergence from bankruptcy. Bosiger does not contest the
fact that he failed to file a claim. Instead, he argues that he was not
on proper notice of US Airways’s second bankruptcy, and it was
therefore improper for the district court to dismiss his claim. We find,
however, that the district court did not err in determining that Bosiger
had received adequate notice and properly dismissed Bosiger’s suit on
these grounds.

A.

The "principal purpose" of bankruptcy is straightforward: "to grant
a ‘fresh start’ to the ‘honest but unfortunate debtor.’" Marrama v. Cit-
izens Bank of Massachusetts, 127 S.Ct. 1105, 1107 (2007) (quoting
8 BOSIGER v. US AIRWAYS, INC.
Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 286, 287 (1991)). To this end, suc-
cessful completion of the reorganization process allows a debtor, bur-
dened with "‘the weight of oppressive indebtedness,’" to restructure
its financial obligations, discharge its pre-existing debt, and emerge
from bankruptcy with a new capital structure that better reflects finan-
cial reality. Local Loan Co. v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 244 (1934) (quot-
ing Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554 (1915)).
"Replacing the old capital structure with a new one requires the termi-
nation of the rights inherent in the old structure." Douglas G. Baird,
et al., Bankruptcy: Cases, Problems, and Materials 562 (Revised 3d
ed. 2001).

Several provisions of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure
and the Bankruptcy Code work in unison to ensure that debtors
receive a "fresh start" after emerging from bankruptcy. First, Bank-
ruptcy Rule 3003(c) requires that "claimants against an estate in bank-
ruptcy . . . file timely proofs of claim in order to participate in a
reorganization." Chemetron Corp. v. Jones, 72 F.3d 341, 346 (3d Cir.
1995). Failure to bring forward such a claim — defined broadly as
any "right to payment," see 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A) (2000) — before
the claims bar date established by the bankruptcy court forfeits a
claimant’s right to participate in a bankruptcy reorganization. See
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3003(c)(3); see also Chemetron, 72 F.3d at 346.
Second, the Bankruptcy Code specifically states that a bankruptcy
court’s confirmation of a restructuring plan discharges "the debtor
from any debt that arose before" the confirmation of the plan. 11
U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A) (2000); see also United States v. Carolina
Parachute Corp., 907 F.2d 1469, 1474 (4th Cir. 1990). Third, the
Bankruptcy Code further insulates a debtor from his pre-bankruptcy
obligations by stating that the discharge of debts "operates as an
injunction against the commencement or continuation of an action,
the employment of process, or an act, to collect, recover, or offset any
such debt as a personal liability of the debtor, whether or not dis-
charge of such debt is waived." 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) (2000). Taken
together, these three provisions prevent pre-petition creditors from
hounding a debtor after restructuring, ensuring that the Bankruptcy
Code provides a true "fresh start."

In light of the directives of the Bankruptcy Code and Rules, it is
clear that Bosiger’s claim for payment under the Non-Qualified Plan
 BOSIGER v. US AIRWAYS, INC. 9
is foreclosed by US Airways’s second bankruptcy. If US Airways
improperly terminated the Non-Qualified Plan during its first bank-
ruptcy, as Bosiger alleges, Bosiger’s injury made him an unsecured
creditor of US Airways, and therefore the holder of a "claim" within
the meaning of 11 U.S.C. § 101(5)(A), during the second bankruptcy.
As the holder of a bankruptcy "claim," Bosiger was required, under
Fed. R. Bankr. P. 3003(c)(3), to file a proof of that claim with the
bankruptcy court before the bar date in order to participate in US Air-
ways’s reorganization. He did not do so, and thus, as the bankruptcy
court recognized in its Bar Date Order, US Airways was "forever dis-
charged from any and all indebtedness or liability with respect to" any
claims not brought to the court’s attention.

Although this alone is sufficient to foreclose Bosiger’s claim, the
bankruptcy court’s confirmation of US Airways’s second Plan of
Reorganization offers further proof that Bosiger’s claim is barred. In
its Confirmation Order, the bankruptcy court explicitly cited 11
U.S.C. § 1141(d) and stated that US Airways’s emergence from bank-
ruptcy served to extinguish all pre-existing "Claims and Causes of
Action, whether known or unknown." Moreover, the Confirmation
Order mirrors 11 U.S.C. § 524(a)(2) in further noting that the dis-
charge of US Airways’s debts serves to enjoin "any Person" from
"commencing or continuing any action . . . to collect, offset, or
recover any Claim . . . discharged under this Plan." It is thus clear that
US Airways’s second bankruptcy discharged any claim Bosiger had
to payment under the Non-Qualified Plan.

The bankruptcy court in this case — and the Bankruptcy Code and
Rules in general — both recognize the dramatic consequences that
would result if Bosiger were able to circumvent US Airways’s bank-
ruptcy proceedings. To begin, allowing individual creditors to opt out
of a formal bankruptcy proceeding in order to bring a subsequent civil
lawsuit against a debtor only serves to make bankruptcy proceedings
more complex and more costly. Such an outcome directly contradicts
the Supreme Court’s teaching that the prompt and efficient adminis-
tration and settlement of a debtor’s estate is a principal goal of bank-
ruptcy law. Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 328 (1966).

More importantly, unwinding the finality of bankruptcy upsets not
only the expectations of the creditors who actually do participate in
10 BOSIGER v. US AIRWAYS, INC.
the bankruptcy proceedings, but also the reliance interests of the cred-
itors who have advanced funds based on the new capital structure laid
out in the reorganization plan. See In re US Airways Group, Inc., 369
F.3d 806, 810 (4th Cir. 2004). This upsetting of reliance interests
could ultimately reduce the incentives for anyone to participate in the
bankruptcy process. If individual, pre-existing creditors were able to
avoid the diminution of their assets inherent in the bankruptcy process
by pursuing a separate legal claim, there would be no incentive for
anyone to participate in a corporate reorganization. Likewise, lenders
would be much less likely to extend financing to debtors faced with
uncertain liabilities on pre-petition claims not discharged through
their bankruptcy. At the very least, allowing claims such as Bosiger’s
would greatly increase the cost of capital to debtors emerging from
bankruptcy, diminishing their prospects of becoming viable, liquid
enterprises. It is thus no exaggeration to say that the very functioning
of the bankruptcy system is dependent on its finality.

B.

It would be difficult for any claimant to challenge directly the criti-
cal role played by finality in the bankruptcy process. Instead, Bosiger
simply contests the district court’s conclusion that he was on notice
of US Airways’s second bankruptcy. Since notice consistent with the
Due Process Clause is a prerequisite for the discharge of a creditor’s
debts in bankruptcy, Bosiger argues that it was improper to dismiss
his claim if he did not receive constitutionally adequate notice.

Bosiger’s argument proceeds as follows. First, Bosiger notes that
a court is not to consider matters outside the pleadings or resolve fac-
tual disputes when ruling on a motion to dismiss. See, e.g., Edwards
v. City of Goldsboro, 178 F.3d 231, 243-44 (4th Cir. 1999). Second,
Bosiger claims that the determination of whether a creditor received
proper notice is a heavily fact-dependent matter. Bosiger therefore
contends that his general denial of having received notice is sufficient
to defeat US Airways’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion. This is because the dis-
trict court would have to consider evidence outside the pleadings and
resolve a fact-dependent question to overcome Bosiger’s denial,
something the court is forbidden to do when considering a Rule
12(b)(6) motion.
 BOSIGER v. US AIRWAYS, INC. 11
1.

It is well settled that district courts may convert a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment,
allowing them to assess whether genuine issues of material fact do
indeed exist. See, e.g., George v. Kay, 632 F.2d 1103, 1106 (4th Cir.
1980); see also 5C Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 1366, at 159-65 & n.17 (3d ed. 2004) (list-
ing multiple cases from every circuit recognizing the district court’s
discretionary power to convert a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to a Rule 56
motion). While it may be preferable for a district court to trigger this
conversion explicitly, appellate courts may take the district court’s
consideration of matters outside the pleadings to trigger an implicit
conversion of a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to one under Rule 56. See, e.g.,
Smith v. Blackledge, 451 F.2d 1201, 1202 (4th Cir. 1971); 5C Wright
& Miller, supra, § 1366, at 167-78. The ability of appellate courts to
perform this conversion sua sponte serves judicial economy — a
value critically important in the context of a bankruptcy proceeding
— by sparing the district court an unnecessary remand. As the
Supreme Court has noted: "It would be wasteful to send a case back
to a lower court to reinstate a decision which it had already made but
which the appellate court concluded should properly be based on
another ground within the power of the appellate court to formulate."
See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943).

In this case, we find that the district court’s consideration of mat-
ters outside the pleadings did convert US Airways’s Rule 12(b)(6)
motion into a Rule 56 motion for summary judgment. Both parties
had ample opportunity to present material relevant to the question of
notice. US Airways submitted extensive briefing along with its
motion to dismiss, and Bosiger did likewise in his opposition to that
motion. The district court considered this briefing, and also held, on
July 7, 2006, a hearing on the motions at which both sides presented
argument. Furthermore, both parties presented facts relevant to the
question of notice in their briefing to this court.

Given the development of the record on the question of notice, we
feel confident that we can apply the summary judgment standard in
this case. We thus reject Bosiger’s contention that the procedural pos-
ture of this case makes his general denial sufficient to resolve the
12 BOSIGER v. US AIRWAYS, INC.
question of notice. Indeed, to rule otherwise would promote the very
circumvention of the bankruptcy process through subsequent civil
actions that the Bankruptcy Code and Rules were designed to prevent.

2.

The district court did not err in concluding that Bosiger received
adequate notice in this case. US Airways presented substantial evi-
dence that it provided constitutionally sufficient notice to Bosiger that
his claim to payment under the Non-Qualified Plan was in danger of
being discharged. Bosiger does not effectively rebut this evidence.
See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986) ("One of
the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and
dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses, and we think it
should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accomplish this pur-
pose."). We therefore find that "there is no genuine issue" of material
fact as to the question of notice, and that US Airways is thus "entitled
to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c).

On the general need for notice, there is little dispute. A pre-existing
debt can be discharged through bankruptcy only if the creditor was on
notice of a debtor’s bankruptcy filing and the claims bar date. In Mul-
lane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), the
Supreme Court held that a judicial proceeding affecting property
interests, to be consistent with due process, must afford any interested
party "notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, to
apprise [the party] of the pendency of the action and afford [him] an
opportunity to present [his] objections." Id. at 314. Since a Chapter
11 bankruptcy affects creditors’ property interests, these creditors
must receive notice consistent with Mullane for the outcome of a
bankruptcy reorganization, including the discharge of pre-existing
debts, to be binding on them. See, e.g., In re R.H. Macy & Co., 161
B.R. 355, 359 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1993).

Courts have interpreted the Mullane standard flexibly in the bank-
ruptcy context, measuring the adequacy of notice against the certainty
of a creditor’s claims. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315 ("The means
employed must be such as one desirous of actually informing the
absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it."). If a creditor pos-
sesses either a "conjectural or future" interest that "do[es] not in due
 BOSIGER v. US AIRWAYS, INC. 13
course of business come to [the] knowledge" of the debtor, id. at 317,
courts have held that notice by publication is sufficient, see
Chemetron, 72 F.3d at 346. Conversely, if the "name[ ], interest[ ],
and address[ ]" of a creditor is known, actual written notice is
required. See City of New York v. New York, New Haven & Hartford
R.R. Co., 344 U.S. 293, 296 (1953); see also Tulsa Prof’l Collection
Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 489-90 (1988).

While the flexibility of the Mullane standard can make it difficult,
in certain cases, to determine if a creditor received proper notice in
a bankruptcy proceeding, it does not do so in this case. This is
because Bosiger clearly received notice sufficient to meet the require-
ments of Mullane given the circumstances of his case. During US Air-
ways’s second bankruptcy, Bosiger was sent two timely letters: the
first, sent on October 15, 2004, notified him of the Chapter 11 filing
date and the bar date for filing general unsecured claims, see In re US
Airways, Inc., Case No. 04-13819-SSM (Bankr. E.D. Va.) (Docket
#571), and the second, sent on October 4, 2005, notified him of the
entry of the order confirming the second Plan of Reorganization, the
effective date of the Plan of Reorganization, and the bar date for filing
certain administrative and rejection damage claims, see id. (Docket
#3301). These letters are sufficient to establish that Bosiger received
actual notice of US Airways’s second bankruptcy, to say nothing of
the fact that, as the district court pointed out, US Airways’s bank-
ruptcy was very well-publicized and that Bosiger, as a retired US Air-
ways pilot, could be expected to possess more than a passing interest
in those proceedings.

Furthermore, the very event that prompted Bosiger to bring this
suit — the termination of his payments under the Non-Qualified Plan
— occurred almost 18 months before US Airways declared bank-
ruptcy for the second time and nearly three years before Bosiger
brought suit in district court. The termination of payments could rea-
sonably be expected to place a recipient or beneficiary such as
Bosiger on the alert. Moreover, the termination of US Airways’s pilot
pension plans was already the subject of a lengthy litigation, ulti-
mately resolved by this court, between US Airways and its retired
pilots. See In re US Airways Group, Inc., 369 F.3d 806 (4th Cir.
2004). Thus, while the termination of Bosiger’s benefits and the sub-
sequent litigation in the first bankruptcy concerning that termination
14 BOSIGER v. US AIRWAYS, INC.
may not have provided Bosiger with official notice of US Airways’s
second bankruptcy, it certainly should have made him aware that he
was potentially a creditor of US Airways and that he bore the same
responsibility as every other creditor: to file a proof of claim during
US Airways’s second bankruptcy.

The primary evidence Bosiger offers to rebut the foregoing is his
own deposition testimony that he cannot "recall receiving any notice
of the second bankruptcy." This general denial is insufficient to over-
come the substantial evidence indicating that Bosiger received ade-
quate notice. To begin, we must presume, absent strong evidence to
the contrary, that Bosiger received the letters of notice mailed to him.
FDIC v. Schaffer, 731 F.2d 1134, 1137 (4th Cir. 1984) (noting that,
for notice purposes, an individual is presumed to have received mail
"delivered to [a home] in the regular course of mail delivery"); see
also Hagner v. United States, 285 U.S. 427, 430 (1932) ("The rule is
well settled that proof that a letter properly directed was placed in a
post office, creates a presumption that it reached its destination in
usual time and was actually received by the person to whom it was
addressed."); In re Eagle Bus Mfg., Inc., 62 F.3d 730, 735-36 (5th Cir.
1995) (same); In re Bucknum, 951 F.2d 204, 206-07 (9th Cir. 1991)
(same).

Bosiger’s general denial does not constitute the strong evidence
needed to overcome the presumption of receipt.2 If we were to hold
2
At the July 7, 2006 motions hearing to discuss US Airways’s motion
to dismiss, Bosiger’s counsel indicated that the two letters providing
notice of US Airways’s bankruptcy may have been mailed to the wrong
address. Bosiger’s counsel mentioned that the notice letters were mailed
to the Florida address of an "Ed Bosiger," and Bosiger’s counsel repre-
sented that Edwin Bosiger, Jr., who is the Plaintiff-Petitioner in this case,
resides in Virginia. However, Bosiger’s counsel admitted during the
hearing that he had not spoken to his client on this point, and that he was
therefore unable to confirm whether the letters had, in fact, been errone-
ously mailed to the wrong location.
Bosiger did not reiterate this argument in his briefing before this court.
Bosiger’s counsel did, however, under direct questioning at oral argu-
ment, state that she "believed" that Bosiger lived in Virginia when the
notice was mailed to Florida. US Airways’s counsel noted that Bosiger
 BOSIGER v. US AIRWAYS, INC. 15
that Bosiger’s general denial was sufficient, it would make it discern-
ibly more difficult for any court to grant summary judgment in
any case where proper notice is required. The result would be to pro-
long and undercut the bankruptcy process by civil actions on the part
of creditors who failed to pursue their claims when it was timely and
appropriate for them to do so. The district court was right to recognize
this danger, and its decision is

AFFIRMED.

testified during a deposition that he lived in the residence in Florida in
2004 (when the first notice was mailed), and that he still owned the Flor-
ida residence as of 2006.
Given the tentative nature of the claims put forward by Bosiger’s
counsel, we accord little weight to the argument that Bosiger’s notice
was mailed to the wrong address. At the very least, the speculative nature
of the claims demonstrate that they do not offer sufficient evidence that
Bosiger did not receive his notice letters.