PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 06-5073
TORICO REAVES,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
William D. Quarles, Jr., District Judge.
(1:06-cr-00153)
Argued: November 2, 2007
Decided: January 8, 2008
Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, and WILKINSON
and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges.
Vacated by published opinion. Judge Michael wrote the opinion, in
which Chief Judge Williams and Judge Wilkinson joined.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Martin Gregory Bahl, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL
PUBLIC DEFENDER, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Debra L.
Dwyer, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON
BRIEF: James Wyda, Federal Public Defender, John H. Chun, Assis-
tant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC
2 UNITED STATES v. REAVES
DEFENDER, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein,
United States Attorney, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
OPINION
MICHAEL, Circuit Judge:
The police stopped Torico Reaves’s car based solely on an anony-
mous 911 call from a woman who said she had seen the driver partici-
pate in a transaction involving a sandwich bag and a gun. The
transaction, the caller assumed, was a drug deal. The district court
concluded that the tip was sufficiently reliable to provide the police
with reasonable suspicion to make the stop. As a result, the evidence
(a handgun and ammunition) seized during the stop was introduced
at trial to convict Reaves of a gun crime, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Because
the tip prompting the stop was not sufficiently corroborated in its
assertion of illegal conduct, we hold that the stop violated the Fourth
Amendment. We therefore vacate Reaves’s conviction.
I.
The undisputed facts about the anonymous tip that led to the stop
of Reaves’s vehicle are as follows. On December 7, 2005, around
10:30 a.m., an anonymous female called a 911 operator in Anne
Arundel County, Maryland, stating that she wanted "to report some-
one traveling in a car with a gun." S.J.A. 3. The caller described the
driver as a black male and the car as a plum-colored S430 Mercedes
with temporary tags. When the caller also reported that there were
drugs in the car, the operator asked the caller whether she knew the
"kind of drugs" involved. S.J.A. 4. The caller replied that she had
been sitting in her car near a local bar and saw the driver of the Mer-
cedes engage in a transaction involving "a bag of something . . . a big
sandwich bag of stuff." S.J.A. 4. The caller also reported seeing a
small gun with a black top as she witnessed the event. The caller did
not know the driver of the Mercedes, and she twice emphasized that
she "want[ed] to stay anonymous." S.J.A. 5. A heightened concern
about remaining anonymous and not "get[ting] in any kind of trouble"
led the caller to express the wish that the police not approach the
driver by saying, "we heard you got a gun in your car." S.J.A. 5, 6.
UNITED STATES v. REAVES 3
When the anonymous caller contacted 911, she was following the
Mercedes on Pioneer Drive in Anne Arundel County, not far from the
Baltimore-Washington International Airport. The 911 operator imme-
diately opened a line to the police dispatcher, passing on the tip and
the route information received from the caller as she followed the
Mercedes. The dispatcher, in turn, radioed officers on patrol in the
area, initially alerting them that an anonymous caller had reported a
drug transaction involving a black gun and that a male suspect was
in the vicinity of Pioneer Drive and Reece Road, driving a plum-
colored S430 Mercedes with temporary tags.
Detective Charles Jones heard the dispatcher’s message and took
up the hunt for the Mercedes. The detective was guided by informa-
tion — passed through the 911 operator and the dispatcher — from
the anonymous caller, who followed the Mercedes for several blocks
and contemporaneously reported its location. The caller thus reported
that the Mercedes left Pioneer Drive and turned north on Reece Road
toward the intersection of Route 174 and 170; at the intersection the
vehicle turned onto Route 170 in the direction of Baltimore. The
caller, who was on the way to the market, reported that the Mercedes
was still proceeding on Route 170 when she exited onto Route 100
toward her market destination.
Shortly thereafter, and approximately five minutes after the dis-
patcher’s first message, Detective Jones spotted the plum-colored
Mercedes and followed it for a short distance before conducting a
traffic stop. The detective stopped the car solely on the basis of the
dispatcher’s message. (The stop did not occur in a high-crime area.)
Detective Jones walked up to the Mercedes and identified himself.
The driver, Torico Reaves, asked why he had been stopped. The
detective advised Reaves that the police department had received a
complaint that he "possibly [had] a handgun." J.A. 16. Reaves imme-
diately raised his hands in the air and said, "I have a gun, man. I have
a gun right here in my pocket. Don’t shoot me." Id. Next, the detec-
tive ordered Reaves out of the vehicle, conducted a pat-down search,
and placed him in handcuffs. During this process Detective Jones
noticed a black handgun on the driver’s seat. It turned out to be a
loaded Beretta. When the Mercedes was searched, $2000 in currency
was found in the back seat.
4 UNITED STATES v. REAVES
In a one-count indictment returned in the District of Maryland, the
government charged Reaves with being a felon in possession of a fire-
arm and ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g). Reaves filed
a motion to suppress the evidence — gun, ammunition, currency, and
his statements to Detective Jones — obtained as a result of the vehicle
stop that had been triggered by the anonymous 911 call. Reaves
asserted that the call did not provide the reasonable suspicion required
to justify a forcible stop. The district court denied the motion, con-
cluding that the call provided "self-authenticating detail," which was
"a sufficient basis for the stop." J.A. 32, 39. At trial the evidence from
the stop was the crux of the government’s case, and the jury returned
a guilty verdict. Reaves appeals the judgment, arguing that the district
court erred in ruling that the police had reasonable suspicion to stop
him. The facts leading to the stop were accepted by the district court
as we have recounted them. Our review is therefore limited to de novo
consideration of the court’s legal conclusion that the traffic stop was
valid under the Fourth Amendment. See Ornelas v. United States, 517
U.S. 690, 699 (1996).
II.
The Fourth Amendment’s protection against unreasonable seizures
extends to investigatory stops made by the police. An officer "may,
consistent with the Fourth Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory
stop when [he] has a reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal
activity is afoot." Illinois v. Wardlaw, 528 U.S. 119, 123 (2000) (cit-
ing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968)). When the police rely on
an anonymous tip to support reasonable suspicion, the tip "must be
accompanied by some corroborative elements that establish [its] reli-
ability." United States v. Perkins, 363 F.3d 317, 323 (4th Cir. 2004).
In other words, "there are situations in which an anonymous tip, suit-
ably corroborated, exhibits sufficient indicia of reliability to provide
reasonable suspicion to make [an] investigatory stop." Florida v. J.L.,
529 U.S. 266, 270 (2000) (citation omitted). At bottom, the tip must
"be reliable in its assertion of illegality" to protect against mischief
and harassment by an "unknown, unaccountable informant." Id. at
271-72. We consider the totality of the circumstances in assessing the
reliability of an anonymous tip. See Perkins, 363 F.3d at 321, 324.
The government argues that three factors provide sufficient corrob-
oration to make the anonymous tip reliable in this case. First, the gov-
UNITED STATES v. REAVES 5
ernment contends that the 911 caller provided accurate predictive
information about Reaves’s route. Specifically, the government says,
"By following the suspect’s vehicle in transit, the caller provided a
continuing stream of predictive information — that is, the caller was
able to provide the police with specific, updated information as to
where the suspect was going." Appellee’s Br. 10. This argument must
depend on Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990), where an anony-
mous tipster correctly predicted in specific detail the future move-
ments of a woman who, according to the tipster, was in possession of
drugs. Under these circumstances the Supreme Court held that it was
reasonable for the police, once they corroborated the tipster’s predic-
tive information, to credit his allegations of illegal conduct. Id. at 332.
"[W]hat was important," the Court emphasized, "was the caller’s abil-
ity to predict respondent’s future behavior, because it demonstrated
inside information — a special familiarity with [the suspect’s]
affairs." Id. The Court continued: "Because only a small number of
people are generally privy to an individual’s itinerary, it is reasonable
for police to believe that a person with access to such information is
likely to also have access to reliable information about that individu-
al’s illegal activities." Id.
This case is the opposite of White because the caller here did not
make any predictions whatsoever about the suspect’s (Reaves’s)
future behavior. She simply followed Reaves’s Mercedes for a few
blocks on public roads, giving the 911 operator a running account of
the vehicle’s location until she had to leave the trail and head to the
market. Although the caller’s reports of her contemporaneous obser-
vations of Reaves’s location were accurate and readily confirmable by
the police, they did not show that the caller had reliable information
about any criminal activity on Reaves’s part. See J.L., 529 U.S. at
272; White, 496 U.S. at 332.
Second, the government argues that this case’s tip about a drug
deal (and gun) gains reliability because the caller was willing to stay
on the line with the 911 operator to report Reaves’s direction of
travel. The caller’s running account of Reaves’s movement was of
considerable assistance to the police in locating and stopping him.
And while a tipster’s running account from her automobile may con-
tribute to the presence of reasonable suspicion, it may not, by itself,
serve to validate the underlying tip here. As the Supreme Court
6 UNITED STATES v. REAVES
observed in J.L., an anonymous tipster’s accurate description of a sus-
pect’s location and appearance is "reliable in th[e] limited sense [that
it] will help the police correctly identify the person whom the tipster
means to accuse," but it "does not show that the tipster has knowledge
of . . . criminal activity." 529 U.S. at 272.
The caller here was adamant about remaining anonymous. She
twice emphasized her desires in this regard and otherwise made clear
that she wanted no further involvement in the matter. By remaining
anonymous, the caller did not put herself in a position where her "rep-
utation [could] be assessed" or she could "be held responsible if her
allegations [of illegal conduct] turn[ed] out to be fabricated." Id. at
270. When an unidentified tipster provides enough information to
allow the police to readily trace her identity, thereby subjecting her-
self to potential scrutiny and responsibility for the allegations, a rea-
sonable officer may conclude that the tipster is credible. See, e.g.,
State v. Rutzinski, 623 N.W.2d 516, 525-26 (Wis. 2001) (unidentified
informant, who reported suspect’s erratic driving, held to be reliable
when informant reported his or her exact location to police dispatcher
and pulled to the side of the highway and waited as officer stopped
the suspect; "informant . . . exposed him- or herself to being identi-
fied," and officer "could reasonably have concluded that the infor-
mant knew that he or she potentially could be arrested if the tip
proved to be fabricated"). Here, the caller studiously avoided provid-
ing information that would have allowed her identity to be traced, and
the fact that she conversed with the 911 operator for a few blocks of
travel time did not provide the police with sufficient means to test the
credibility of her allegation of illegal activity.
Third, the government asserts that the tip was reliable because the
caller made a nearly contemporaneous report of her observation of a
transaction involving a big sandwich bag and a handgun, which she
assumed to be a drug deal. Here, the government relies on Perkins,
where we concluded that "[t]he tipster’s basis of knowledge — a con-
temporaneous viewing of the suspicious activity — enhanced the tip’s
reliability." 363 F.3d at 322. This particular conclusion was based on
the Supreme Court’s longstanding recognition of "the usefulness of
verifying an informant’s basis of knowledge." Id. (citing J.L., 529
U.S. at 270-72). Neither the Supreme Court nor our court, however,
has held that an anonymous tipster’s unconfirmed, blow-by-blow
UNITED STATES v. REAVES 7
assertion of the basis of her knowledge is sufficient by itself to make
the tip reliable. Some corroboration is required because a fraudulent
tipster can fabricate her basis of knowledge.
Perkins is instructive because several corroborating factors, apart
from the contemporaneous observation, were present. There, the offi-
cer making the automobile stop reasonably assumed that the unidenti-
fied caller who gave the tip was, because of her location, a particular
informant who had previously provided reliable information about
criminal activity in her neighborhood, a high-crime area; the reported
incident (pointing rifles) occurred in the yard of a duplex known as
a drug house; and when the officer arrived in time to see the suspects
leaving in a car, he recognized one as a drug user. Perkins, 363 F.3d
at 322, 327-28. These corroborating factors led us to conclude that the
tip in Perkins was reliable.
We recognize here, as we did in Perkins, that the caller’s disclosure
of her basis of knowledge — essentially contemporaneous observa-
tion — registers positively on the reliability scale. The problem, how-
ever, is that there is not sufficient corroboration to make the tip
credible or reliable in its assertion of illegality. As we have already
noted, the caller did not predict Reaves’s future movements, which
might have indicated that she had inside information about his illegal
activities; and she insisted on remaining anonymous, which meant
that she could not be held accountable for her tip. Moreover, the offi-
cer did not know Reaves, and Reaves did not engage in any suspi-
cious activity or commit any traffic violations in the short distance he
was followed by the officer. Finally, the stop was not made in a high-
crime area, and there is no evidence that the transaction reported by
the caller occurred in a high-crime neighborhood. In sum, the circum-
stances do not permit us to conclude that the tip was sufficiently reli-
able.
Accordingly, because the officer did not have reasonable suspicion
to stop Reaves, the evidence obtained as a result of the stop should
not have been admitted at trial. Reaves’s conviction is therefore
VACATED.