UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4700
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
LE’TRON ANTHONY SINGLETON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
South Carolina, at Beaufort. David C. Norton, Chief District
Judge. (9:06-cr-00832-DCN)
Submitted: December 19, 2007 Decided: January 7, 2008
Before WILKINSON, MOTZ, and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
J. Robert Haley, Assistant Federal Public Defender, Charleston,
South Carolina, for Appellant. John Charles Duane, Assistant
United States Attorney, Charleston, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Le’Tron A. Singleton appeals his conviction and eighteen-
month sentence after pleading guilty to possession of two
unregistered shotguns, both with an overall length of less than
twenty-six inches and a barrel length of less than eighteen inches,
in violation of 26 U.S.C. §§ 5841, 5861(d), and 5871 (2000).
Singleton’s counsel filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), in which he asserts that there are no
meritorious issues for appeal, but asks this court to review the
Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing and the reasonableness of Singleton’s
sentence. Singleton was given an opportunity to file a pro se
supplemental brief, but has not done so. Finding no error, we
affirm.
Under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1), the district court must
address the defendant in open court and inform him of the
following: the nature of the charge; any mandatory minimum sentence
and the maximum possible sentence; the applicability of the
Sentencing Guidelines; the court’s obligation to impose a special
assessment; the defendant’s right to an attorney; his right to
plead not guilty and be tried by a jury with the assistance of
counsel; his right to confront and cross-examine witnesses; his
right against self-incrimination; and his right to testify, present
evidence, and compel the attendance of witnesses. The defendant
also must be told that a guilty plea waives any further trial and
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that his answers at the proceeding may be used against him in a
prosecution for perjury. Under Rule 11(b)(2), the court must
address the defendant to determine that the plea is voluntary. The
court must require disclosure of any plea agreement under Rule
11(c)(2) and determine a factual basis for the plea under Rule
11(b)(3). Because Singleton did not move in the district court to
withdraw his guilty plea, any challenges to the Rule 11 hearing are
reviewed for plain error. See United States v. Martinez, 277 F.3d
517, 524 (4th Cir. 2002).
During the plea hearing, the district court properly
informed Singleton of the rights that he was forfeiting as a result
of his plea and the nature of the charges and penalties that he
faced, found that Singleton was competent and entering his plea
voluntarily, and determined there was a sufficient factual basis
for the plea. Therefore, the record establishes that Singleton
knowingly and voluntarily entered into his guilty plea with a full
understanding of the consequences and that there was no error in
the district court’s acceptance of his plea.
As for Singleton’s sentence, this court reviews the
imposition of a sentence for reasonableness. United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 260-61 (2005); United States v. Hughes, 401
F.3d 540, 546-47 (4th Cir. 2005). After Booker, courts must
calculate the appropriate guidelines range, making any appropriate
factual findings. United States v. Davenport, 445 F.3d 366, 370
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(4th Cir. 2006). The court then should consider the resulting
advisory guidelines range in conjunction with the factors under 18
U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007), and determine an
appropriate sentence. Davenport, 445 F.3d at 370. This court will
affirm a post-Booker sentence if it is within the statutorily
prescribed range and is reasonable. Hughes, 401 F.3d at 546-47.
A sentence within the proper advisory guidelines range is
presumptively reasonable. United States v. Green, 436 F.3d 449,
457 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2309 (2006); see Rita v.
United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456 (2007).
At sentencing, Singleton did not object to the findings in his
presentence report or to the sentencing guidelines range, which was
calculated at eighteen to twenty-four months. The district court
imposed a sentence at the bottom of the guidelines range,
sentencing Singleton to eighteen months’ incarceration. On appeal,
Singleton has failed to demonstrate his sentence is either
procedurally or substantively unreasonable. The district court
correctly calculated the advisory guidelines range and considered
the relevant factors under 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a). Therefore, we
affirm his sentence.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the record in this
case and have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore
affirm Singleton’s conviction and sentence. This court requires
counsel inform his client, in writing, of his right to petition the
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Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If the
client requests that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that
such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this
court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion
must state that a copy thereof was served on the client. We
dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions
are adequately presented in the materials before the court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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