UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-2233
BAY COUNTRY CONSUMER FINANCE, INCORPORATED,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
versus
FIDELITY SECURITY LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendant - Appellee.
--------------------
OPTIMUM RE INSURANCE COMPANY,
Party in Interest.
--------------------
BEL AIR AUTO AUCTION, INCORPORATED; BSC
AMERICA, INCORPORATED; STEVEN R. FREEMAN,
Movants.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. Catherine C. Blake, District Judge.
(1:04-cv-00253-CCB)
Argued: December 6, 2007 Decided: January 18, 2008
Before WILKINSON and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and James P. JONES,
Chief United States District Judge for the Western District of
Virginia, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ARGUED: Steven Richard Freeman, FREEMAN, WOLFE & GREENBAUM, P.A.,
Towson, Maryland, for Appellant. Barron L. Stroud, Jr., BROWN &
SHEEHAN, L.L.P., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF:
Robert C. Sanders, Upper Marlboro, Maryland, for Appellant.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2
PER CURIAM:
Lee Parsons was insured by two life insurance policies issued
by appellee Fidelity Security Insurance Company (“Fidelity”). The
policies were assigned by Parsons to appellant Bay Country Consumer
Finance, Incorporated (“Bay Country”), as collateral for loans made
to Parsons. On June 11, 2003, Parsons, after having been missing
for six days, was found dead from carbon monoxide poisoning in his
car in the garage of a friend for whom he had been house-sitting.
An autopsy was performed by the office of the Maryland Chief
Medical Examiner and on June 30, 2003, Ana Rubio, M.D., an
assistant medical examiner, issued a report that opined that the
manner of death was suicide. However, after being provided
additional information on the circumstances of Parsons’ death by
Bay Country’s attorney, Dr. Rubio changed her opinion as to the
manner of death from “suicide” to “accident.”
Because the life insurance policies in question contained an
exclusion for suicide, Fidelity declined to pay, and Bay Country
filed the present lawsuit in state court, which Fidelity removed to
the district court. At the trial below, the issue was whether
Parsons had in fact committed suicide, with the parties presenting
conflicting evidence and expert opinion. The jury returned a
verdict in favor of Fidelity and Bay Country noted this appeal,
contending that the trial judge committed reversible error in
certain evidentiary rulings. We affirm.
3
I.
We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings for abuse
of discretion. United States v. Hedgepeth, 418 F.3d 411, 419 (4th
Cir. 2005). A district court abuses its discretion when it acts
arbitrarily or irrationally, fails to consider judicially
recognized factors constraining its exercise of discretion, relies
on erroneous factual or legal premises, or commits an error of law.
Id.; United States v. Williams, 461 F.3d 441, 445 (4th Cir. 2006).
In a pretrial written opinion on Fidelity’s motion in limine,
the district judge excluded evidence from Dr. Rubio, the medical
examiner, as to the manner of death. This exclusion was based on
several grounds, including the fact that the revised opinion was
the result of “selective information brought to [Dr. Rubio’s]
attention by an advocate for one side” and thus would “inject the
issue of [the attorney’s] personal communication with the medical
examiner into the jury’s deliberations.” (J.A. 534.) After this
ruling, a copy of Dr. Rubio’s autopsy report was introduced into
evidence, but with the manner of death opinion redacted.
We believe that the district court did not commit error in
finding that the probative value of Dr. Rubio’s opinion was
outweighed by its possible confusion of the issues. See Fed. R.
Evid. 403. Along with its motion in limine, Fidelity also moved to
disqualify counsel for Bay Country, and while the district court
expressly disclaimed any suggestion of improper behavior by the
4
attorney, it was understandably concerned that these circumstances
would distract the jury from the real questions in the case.
Moreover, even if the district court’s evidentiary ruling was
error, it was harmless. See United States v. Morison, 844 F.2d
1057, 1078-80 (4th Cir. 1988) (concluding that the district court
did not commit reversible error when it excluded a portion of a
defense expert’s testimony because, inter alia, three other experts
testified to the same issue). Bay Country introduced the testimony
of two other experts, Dr. Caplan, a forensic toxicologist, and Dr.
Adams, a forensic pathologist, supporting the manner of death as
accidental. Dr. Rubio’s opinion was simply cumulative. While Bay
Country argues that the opinion of a public official such as Dr.
Rubio would have been more persuasive to the jury because of its
perceived neutrality, that contention is undercut by the
involvement of counsel in changing Dr. Rubio’s mind as to the
manner of death.
II.
Bay Country also contends that the district court erred during
trial in sustaining an objection to a hypothetical question posed
on cross examination to one of Fidelity’s expert witnesses, Dr.
Breitenecker. In his discovery deposition, Dr. Breitenecker had
been critical of the medical examiner’s change in opinion as to the
manner of Parsons’ death, and stated that had he been the medical
5
examiner under the circumstances, he might have changed his opinion
from “suicide” to “undetermined,” but not to “accident.” (J.A.
38.) Before the jury, counsel for Bay Country sought to elicit the
same answer from Dr. Breitenecker. The trial judge sustained
Fidelity’s objection on the ground that such testimony would open
up the issue of the medical examiner’s opinion as to the manner of
death, an issue foreclosed by the court’s earlier ruling.
We agree with the district court that Dr. Breitenecker’s
answer would have either led to the medical examiner’s actual
opinion in the case, an option at odds with the exclusion of that
opinion, or would have been unfair to the full context of the
witness’s answer as given in the deposition. Because the trial
court’s ruling excluding the medical examiner’s opinion is
unassailable, this evidentiary ruling is likewise not a ground for
reversal.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, and after careful consideration of
the record and the appellant’s contentions, the judgment below is
AFFIRMED.
6