PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
JIMMY L. WILSON,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
No. 06-1818
PHOENIX SPECIALTY MANUFACTURING
COMPANY, INCORPORATED,
Defendant-Appellant.
JIMMY L. WILSON,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
No. 06-1836
PHOENIX SPECIALTY MANUFACTURING
COMPANY, INCORPORATED,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the District of South Carolina, at Orangeburg.
R. Bryan Harwell, District Judge.
(5:03-cv-04164-RBH)
Argued: September 27, 2007
Decided: January 23, 2008
Before NIEMEYER and MICHAEL, Circuit Judges,
and T. S. ELLIS, III, Senior United States District Judge
for the Eastern District of Virginia, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Michael wrote the majority
opinion, in which Senior Judge Ellis joined. Judge Niemeyer wrote a
dissenting opinion.
2 WILSON v. PHOENIX SPECIALTY MANUFACTURING
COUNSEL
ARGUED: George Andrew Harper, JACKSON & LEWIS, L.L.P.,
Greenville, South Carolina, for Phoenix Specialty Manufacturing
Company, Incorporated. Candy Maria Kern-Fuller, DANIELSON
AND KERN-FULLER LAW GROUP, Piedmont, South Carolina, for
Jimmy L. Wilson. ON BRIEF: Robert E. Hoskins, FOSTER LAW
FIRM, L.L.P., Greenville, South Carolina; Victoria L. Eslinger, NEX-
SEN PRUET, Columbia, South Carolina, for Jimmy L. Wilson.
OPINION
MICHAEL, Circuit Judge:
Phoenix Specialty Manufacturing Company, Inc. (Phoenix) appeals
the district court’s determination, made after a bench trial, that the
company terminated the employment of Jimmy Wilson because it
regarded him as disabled by Parkinson’s disease, in violation of the
Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
We affirm this decision because there is no error in the district court’s
findings of fact or conclusions of law. In addition, after considering
Wilson’s cross-appeal, we affirm the district court’s decision to deny
him an award of front pay. The judgment is therefore affirmed.
I.
The district court tried this case without a jury and made the fol-
lowing findings of fact. Phoenix, a family-owned company with over
ninety employees, makes specialty washers (perforated disks) that are
used primarily in aircraft manufacturing. The company hired Wilson
as its shipping supervisor in November of 1988. Ten years later he
was diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease, a progressive, degenerative
disease of the nervous system that affects both motor and non-motor
functions. On May 16, 2001, Wilson experienced a major panic attack
during a meeting at work. He left immediately to see Marion Dwight,
M.D., who was both the company physician and Wilson’s personal
physician. Dr. Dwight referred Wilson to a neurologist, Kenneth Ber-
WILSON v. PHOENIX SPECIALTY MANUFACTURING 3
gmann, M.D., who examined Wilson on May 24, 2001. At that time
Wilson was experiencing anxiety and a loss of motor control in his
right hand. Dr. Bergmann adjusted Wilson’s medications and released
him to return to work with no restrictions. When Wilson attempted an
immediate return to his job, a Phoenix official told him that he could
not return until he obtained a release from Dr. Dwight, the company
physician. On or about June 4, 2001, Dr. Dwight, without examining
Wilson, released him to work half days for two weeks. Without fur-
ther word from Dr. Dwight, Phoenix allowed Wilson to resume full-
time work around the third week of June. Notwithstanding Wilson’s
Parkinson’s symptoms, at all times between his return to work in June
2001 and his termination in August 2002 he was able to perform the
essential functions of his job.
When Wilson returned to work, he was treated differently by senior
management. Harry Wise, a company vice president and Wilson’s
immediate supervisor, stopped his practice of joining Wilson on the
loading dock for a "talk over coffee." J.A. 814. Wise "no longer met
with [Wilson] and refused to look at him." Id. Phoenix president,
Robert Hurst, avoided Wilson whenever possible. Hurst required Wil-
son, after every visit to the doctor, to report to Wise about his condi-
tion and the expected progression of his disease. In a June 2, 2001,
e-mail to the company’s human resources assistant, Hurst stated that
Wilson "qualifies for ADA designation and we will have to consider
accommodations." J.A. 815. Wilson in fact requested a 21-inch com-
puter screen and help with matters that required writing. The com-
pany provided him with a 17-inch screen, the same as other
supervisors. Although Wilson was eventually given some assistance
in writing employee evaluations, the company made no serious effort
to provide assistance with respect to writing tasks.
Phoenix believed that Wilson’s Parkinson’s disease rendered him
substantially limited in his ability to see and perform manual tasks.
In November 2001 the company installed a new, complex computer
system that was used company-wide. Senior management believed
that Wilson "had difficulty in adequately utilizing the information on
[a] computer screen" and that he "was unable to adequately key infor-
mation into a computer." J.A. 827. Indeed, the company did not pro-
vide Wilson with "substantial training [on the new] system." J.A. 815.
Senior management, fearing that Wilson would make errors, barred
4 WILSON v. PHOENIX SPECIALTY MANUFACTURING
him from inputting data into the computer and from counting wash-
ers.
In mid-June 2002 Phoenix’s officers met and discussed eliminating
two salaried positions, the shipping supervisor (Wilson’s job) and the
press room manager, and replacing them with hourly employees. At
about the same time Phoenix began looking for an additional shipping
clerk. Hurst, the company president, testified that Wilson had
requested another clerk, but the district court "d[id] not find this testi-
mony to be believable," J.A. 816, finding instead that Hurst decided
on his own to hire the additional clerk. The company filled the new
position by hiring Stacy Nix, a twenty-five-year-old woman with lim-
ited experience. Nix began work on July 8, 2002, and spent the first
three weeks in training.
On August 1, 2002, Hurst informed Wilson that the company was
undertaking a reduction in force. Wilson instantly assumed that Hurst
was going to terminate Nix because she was a recent hire who was
still in her probationary period. Thus, Wilson was quite surprised
when Hurst said that Wilson’s position in the shipping department
was being eliminated. Wilson, who was fifty-six years old, asked that
he be allowed to stay on and work in any position, including an
hourly position, but Hurst advised him that an hourly job was not
available to him. (The press room manager, whose job was also elimi-
nated, was allowed to stay on as an hourly employee.) Within minutes
of terminating Wilson, the company promoted Marviette Hogan, a
shipping clerk, to the newly created position of foreman of the ship-
ping department.
At the time of his discharge in August 2002, Wilson’s symptoms
from Parkinson’s "w[ere] stabilized by medication." J.A. 820. Dr.
Bergmann had reported in February 2002 that Wilson’s "disease was
‘motor-wise in fairly good control’ and that [he] had ‘good control of
his stiffness and tremor.’" J.A. 816. Wilson was still able to write at
the time of his discharge, although apparently with some difficulty.
He was playing golf, coaching youth sports, and driving. Wilson was
never given written or oral notice that his job performance was unsat-
isfactory. The district court found specifically that he "was a depend-
able employee who often worked six to seven days a week." J.A. 813.
WILSON v. PHOENIX SPECIALTY MANUFACTURING 5
Wilson filed a discrimination charge with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC), and Phoenix’s response to the
charge was introduced at trial. Phoenix claimed in its response that a
downturn in sales to the aircraft industry after the events of Septem-
ber 11, 2001, necessitated a further reduction in its approximately
ninety-person workforce in August 2002, specifically, the elimination
of two supervisory positions, including Wilson’s. (The company
stated that it had undergone a reduction in force in June 2001.) The
district court found that the reasons Phoenix gave to the EEOC for
Wilson’s termination were not supported by the evidence at trial.
Indeed, the court found that the company did not eliminate the posi-
tion of shipping supervisor, but simply changed the name of the posi-
tion and promoted Hogan to fill it. The district court rejected as
pretextual the following assertions that Phoenix made to the EEOC.
First, the district court discredited Phoenix’s claim that it decided
to implement a workforce reduction in August 2002. Wilson was not
eliminated in a reduction of force, the court found, because "only two
employees were involved," J.A. 816, and the company transferred the
press room manager to another job.
Second, the district court rejected the company’s claim that finan-
cial difficulties necessitated a workforce reduction in August 2002.
The company paid bonuses to most employees in 2002. Two months
after Wilson’s termination Phoenix’s three owners sold the company
at a profit to younger family members. The sellers were paid at least
$1 million for signing covenants not to compete.
Third, the district court discredited the reasons the company gave
for selecting the shipping supervisor’s (Wilson’s) position for elimi-
nation. The company claimed that Wilson had delegated many of his
job responsibilities to Hogan; that, for example, Hogan often ran ship-
ping department meetings; and that Wilson had made no attempt to
master the new computer system and could not input data. The court
credited Hogan’s trial testimony that she never ran department meet-
ings and found that Wilson did not delegate his responsibilities, "but
rather received some assistance in performing certain functions." J.A.
821. Hurst admitted at trial that Wilson had genuinely attempted to
master the new computer system. Moreover, the district court found
that the computer tasks the company complained Wilson could not do
6 WILSON v. PHOENIX SPECIALTY MANUFACTURING
were those "such as input of information which the [company had]
specifically instructed him not to handle for fear of an entry error."
J.A. 821.
Fourth, the district court did not believe the company’s assertion
that it looked for an open position for Wilson in the shipping depart-
ment, but none was available. Likewise, the court did not believe the
company’s related assertion that it would have been very reluctant to
put Wilson in an hourly position where he would be a "co-worker
with employees who he had previously supervised with a heavy
hand." J.A. 293. The district court found that the company was in
need of a shipping clerk because it posted an opening for that position
within two weeks of Wilson’s termination. Wilson submitted an
application, but the company did not respond. The court accepted the
testimony of one of Wilson’s subordinates who (1) denied Phoenix’s
allegation that she had complained about Wilson as a supervisor and
(2) stated that he had been a "fair supervisor." J.A. 822.
Fifth, the district court rejected Phoenix’s claim that the new ship-
ping foreman position was non-supervisory. Nix, the new shipping
department clerk, testified that she was supervised by Hogan, the new
shipping department foreman. In addition, Phoenix described Hogan
as a supervisor in her job performance evaluations. The district court
thus found that "Hogan performed all of the duties of Wilson’s former
position, including supervisory duties." J.A. 819.
Sixth, the district court rejected the company’s assertion that an
independent basis for Wilson’s discharge arose on August 2, 2002, his
final day of work and the day after he had been notified of his termi-
nation. Phoenix claims that Wilson ordered ten years’ worth of pack-
ing supplies on his last day of work. The district court found that
Wilson had been set up. According to the court, "it appears that some-
one wrote over [Wilson’s] notes after the fact to make it appear that
he had intentionally ordered more supplies th[a]n necessary. . . .
Instead, he simply ordered supplies that he felt the company would
need over the next several months to help [Phoenix] with the transi-
tion period after his departure." J.A. 821.
At trial Phoenix offered a reason for Wilson’s termination that had
not been argued to the EEOC. Hurst testified that Wilson was in
WILSON v. PHOENIX SPECIALTY MANUFACTURING 7
effect replaced by the new computer system. The court found that the
different reasons Phoenix gave for Wilson’s discharge were a pretext
for discrimination. According to the district court, the company exe-
cuted "a plan to hire a new shipping clerk" (Nix was in fact hired),
"then to fire [Wilson] due to his [perceived] disability, and finally to
re-name his position as a shipping foreman and to promote Ms.
Hogan to shipping foreman with the same duties that [Wilson] had as
shipping supervisor." J.A. 829.
The district court ultimately determined that Phoenix regarded Wil-
son as disabled, failed to accommodate his perceived disability as
required by the ADA, and terminated him because of his perceived
disability in violation of the ADA. The court awarded Wilson
$177,783 in back pay from August 2002 through August 2005, when
Wilson became competitively unemployable due to his Parkinson’s
disease. After finding that Wilson proved "specific harm to his emo-
tional state," J.A. 838, including depression and humiliation, as a
result of Phoenix’s conduct, the court awarded him $10,000 in com-
pensatory damages. The court also awarded Wilson $10,000 in puni-
tive damages based on its finding that Phoenix’s discriminatory plan
to terminate Wilson was developed and carried out "with reckless
indifference" to Wilson’s federally protected rights under the ADA.1
J.A. 838.
Phoenix appeals, arguing that the district court erred (1) in finding
that the company regarded Wilson as being disabled because the com-
pany did not have a mistaken perception that Wilson’s impairment
was greater than it actually was; (2) in finding that the company’s
stated reasons for terminating Wilson were pretext; and (3) in con-
cluding that Wilson was entitled to reasonable accommodation under
the ADA. Wilson cross-appeals, arguing that the district court erred
in failing to award him front pay. We review the district court’s find-
ings of fact for clear error, Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), and its legal conclu-
1
The district court also tried the claims Wilson asserted under the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.,
and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 621 et
seq., and found that Wilson did not satisfy his burden of proof on those
claims.
8 WILSON v. PHOENIX SPECIALTY MANUFACTURING
sions de novo, Roanoke Cement Company v. Falk Corporation, 413
F.3d 431, 433 (4th Cir. 2005).
II.
A.
The ADA prohibits a covered employer such as Phoenix from "dis-
criminat[ing] against a qualified individual with a disability because
of the disability of such individual in regard to" matters that include
"the hiring, advancement or discharge of employees." 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(a). A "disability" is defined as:
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities of such indi-
vidual;
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.
Id. § 12102(2). Subsection (C), which is relevant here, provides that
having a disability includes "being regarded as having,"
§ 12102(2)(C), "a physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more of the major life activities," § 12102(2)(A). Sub-
section (C)’s "regarded as" coverage includes the circumstance when
the employer "mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimiting impair-
ment substantially limits one or more major life activities." Sutton v.
United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999). The employer, in
other words, must entertain a misperception: "it must believe . . . that
[an individual] has a substantially limiting impairment when, in fact,
the impairment is not so limiting." Id. "Major life activities" refers "to
those activities that are of central importance to daily life," including
walking, seeing, hearing, and manual tasks that are "central to daily
life." Toyota Mtr. Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 197
(2002). Finally, when an employee asserts a subsection (C) claim that
he was regarded as disabled, the analysis "focuses on the reactions
and perceptions of the [employer’s] decisionmakers" who worked
with the employee. Runnebaum v. NationsBank of Md., N.A., 123
WILSON v. PHOENIX SPECIALTY MANUFACTURING 9
F.3d 156, 172-73 (4th Cir. 1997), abrogated on other grounds by
Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624 (1998).
Phoenix contends that the record does not support the district
court’s ultimate finding that the company regarded Wilson as having
an impairment that substantially limits a major life activity. We dis-
agree because the district court made specific findings, which are not
clearly erroneous, to support its ultimate finding that Phoenix
regarded Wilson as having a disability.
First, the district court found that company president Hurst’s state-
ment in his June 2, 2001, e-mail to an assistant was evidence that
Phoenix believed that Wilson was disabled. Hurst said pointblank that
Wilson "qualifies for ADA designation." J.A. 827. Phoenix argues
that this statement should be discounted because it was made before
Wilson’s medication was adjusted, and it did not reflect what the
company believed about Wilson’s condition at the time he was termi-
nated. The district court, however, cited Hurst’s e-mail as an early
example of Phoenix’s erroneous perception that Wilson was disabled,
a perception that continued, as the court found, until his termination
in August 2002.
Second, the district court found that Phoenix’s disability perception
was evident when it ignored the May 24, 2001, opinion of Dr. Berg-
mann, the neurologist, who released Wilson to return to work without
restrictions "and instead relied on the opinion of the company doctor
who had not [re]examined" Wilson. J.A. 827. In other words, the
company’s firm perception that Wilson was disabled led it to discount
the specialist’s medical opinion that Wilson was capable of returning
to work.
Third, the district court credited Wilson’s testimony that Phoenix’s
senior management treated him "like [he] was a handicapped person"
after his panic attack. J.A. 454. This testimony was accepted because
Hurst and Wise avoided Wilson whenever possible, and Wise even
refused to look at him. This treatment, the court noted, "shows [that]
the very myths and fears about disability and disease" can result in a
person being regarded as having a disability, one problem "Congress
was trying to address with the ADA." J.A. 827.
10 WILSON v. PHOENIX SPECIALTY MANUFACTURING
Ultimately, the district court found that "company officials
believed that Wilson was substantially limited in the major life
activit[ies] of performing manual tasks" and seeing. J.A. 827. This
determination was supported by findings that Phoenix believed that
Wilson (1) "was unable to adequately key information into a com-
puter, write, and count washers" and (2) could not "adequately
utiliz[e] the information on the computer screen." J.A. 827. Phoenix
argues that it "had the correct perception of Wilson’s limitations"
(some difficulty with performing manual tasks and seeing), and
"those limitations did not qualify him as being actually disabled."
Appellant’s Br. at 22. Therefore, the company says, "it could not have
‘regarded’ him as being disabled." Id. The record, however, supports
the district court’s finding that Phoenix perceived Wilson to be sub-
stantially limited in his ability to see and perform manual tasks. In
other words, Phoenix regarded Wilson as disabled.
The court’s determination that the company believed that Wilson
could not effectively operate, or see well enough to make use of, a
computer is supported by more specific findings: the company
instructed Wilson not to perform tasks on the computer, such as the
input of information, for fear of entry error; and the company did not
make the effort to give Wilson adequate training on the new computer
system. The district court found that the company believed Wilson
could not write, and this finding is supported by the testimony of the
human resources assistant who testified that she "couldn’t really read"
Wilson’s handwriting. J.A. 602. Finally, the court found that Phoenix
believed that Wilson could not count washers (the company’s prod-
uct), and this finding is supported by the testimony of Wise, who
instructed Wilson "not to do counting tasks," J.A. 259, again because
the company was afraid he would make errors.
These perceptions on Phoenix’s part about the extent of Wilson’s
impairment were inaccurate. The company, in other words, believed
that Wilson’s Parkinson’s symptoms were substantially more limiting
than they actually were, as indicated in further findings by the district
court and the record. After crediting Dr. Bergmann’s report that Wil-
son’s "disease was ‘motor-wise in fairly good control’ and that [he]
had ‘good control of his stiffness and tremor,’" J.A. 816, the district
court found that Wilson’s "symptoms were fairly well controlled by
medication" at the time of his discharge, J.A. 826. Although the court
WILSON v. PHOENIX SPECIALTY MANUFACTURING 11
recognized that Wilson "was beginning to have difficulty with his
handwriting and other fine motor functions and with reading the com-
puter screen," he was "still able to" work and "perform the essential
functions of his supervisory job." J.A. 828. Indeed, the court noted
that Phoenix admitted to the EEOC that Wilson’s "Parkinson’s dis-
ease did not impact his ability to do his job." J.A. 819. The district
court found that Wilson "was credible," J.A. 823, and Wilson testified
that he was still able to key data into the computer, albeit at a slower
pace. Yet, as the district court found, the company refused to give him
adequate training on the new computer system. Hurst admitted, how-
ever, "that Wilson tried to master the system, and that many other
employees also had problems learning the new system." J.A. 815.
Wilson’s handwriting was still legible at the time of his discharge, as
several trial exhibits confirm. And Wilson also testified that he could
still count washers when he was discharged, although he would put
the small, thin ones aside for a shipping clerk to count. Finally, with
respect to general activities in his daily life, Wilson was able to play
golf, coach youth sports, and drive at the time of his termination.
Two of the tasks Phoenix mistakenly believed Wilson could not do
at work — use a computer effectively and write — transcend the
work setting and qualify as activities that are of "central importance
to people’s daily lives." Toyota, 534 U.S. at 202. Likewise, the com-
pany’s mistaken belief that Wilson could not count washers supports
the district court’s finding that "Wilson was perceived by Phoenix as
unable to perform a variety of tasks central to most people’s daily
lives." J.A. 827; see Toyota, 534 U.S. at 202. Moreover, as the district
court found, after Wilson’s Parkinson’s symptoms flared up in May
2001, the company described him as disabled under the ADA, ignored
a specialist’s positive assessment of his ability to function, shunned
him, and concocted a plan to eliminate his position and get rid of him.
These factors, taken together, support the district court’s ultimate
finding that Phoenix regarded Wilson as having an impairment that
substantially limited him in the major life activities of performing
manual tasks and seeing.2
2
The dissent contends that the district court could not have concluded
that Phoenix regarded Wilson as being disabled because the company
had no misperception about his condition. As we have demonstrated
12 WILSON v. PHOENIX SPECIALTY MANUFACTURING
B.
Phoenix next argues that the district court erred in finding that the
reasons given by the company for discharging Wilson were a pretext
for discrimination. The district court analyzed the evidence under the
McDonnell Douglas framework. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In the final steps of this analysis, the
trier of fact’s "rejection [or disbelief] of the [employer’s] proffered
reasons [for its actions] will permit the trier . . . to infer the ultimate
fact of intentional discrimination." St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks,
509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing
Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147-49 (2000).
The district court’s disbelief of Phoenix’s proffered reasons for
Wilson’s termination was based in part on the court’s determination
above, Phoenix’s misperceptions are abundantly clear from the district
court’s findings and the underlying record. On the one hand, the district
court found that Wilson had some limitations: he was beginning to have
difficulty with his handwriting and other fine motor functions and with
reading a computer screen. Wilson typed data into the computer at a
slower pace and set aside the small, thin washers for others to count. The
district court found, however, that Wilson’s "impairment[s] did not sub-
stantially limit any major life activities." J.A. 826. On the other hand, the
district court made factual findings establishing that Phoenix’s percep-
tions of Wilson’s limitations were exaggerated. The court found that
Phoenix erroneously perceived Wilson to be substantially limited in the
major life activities of performing manual tasks and seeing. Accordingly,
the court found that Phoenix believed (1) that Wilson could not perform
the manual tasks of writing, counting washers, or keying information into
a computer, and (2) that he could not see well enough to make use of
information on a computer screen. The district court further found,
among other things, that Phoenix characterized Wilson as disabled for
ADA purposes, failed to provide him training on the company’s new
computer system, and instructed him not to enter information on the
computer, all findings that support the determination that Phoenix per-
ceived Wilson to be disabled. In sum, the district court’s findings satis-
fied the applicable standard for disability under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C):
the findings established that Phoenix perceived Wilson as having "sub-
stantially limiting impairment[s] when, in fact, the impairment[s were]
not so limiting." Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489.
WILSON v. PHOENIX SPECIALTY MANUFACTURING 13
that the reasons the company gave to the EEOC were different than
the one advanced at trial. The company claimed for the first time at
trial that the new computer system had "replaced Wilson’s job func-
tions," J.A. 830, thereby prompting the company to terminate him.
The court found that all of "the reasons given by Phoenix were merely
a pretext for discrimination." Id. According to the court, Phoenix con-
cocted and executed a scheme to hire a new shipping clerk (Nix), fire
Wilson because of his perceived disability while pretending to
undergo a reduction in force, and promote Hogan to the newly-
created position of shipping foreman with the same duties that Wilson
had performed as shipping supervisor. The court’s more detailed find-
ings about the company’s false (or pretextual) reasons for terminating
Wilson are set forth in part I, supra at 5-7, and are amply supported
by the evidence.
C.
Phoenix also challenges the district court’s determination that the
company failed to make reasonable accommodations for Wilson’s
perceived limitations when it refused to provide him with a larger
computer screen and assistance with writing. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(5)(A) (describing the requirement for reasonable accom-
modations). As a threshold matter, Phoenix argues that an employer
does not have a duty to provide accommodation to an employee it
simply regards as disabled. There is a pronounced circuit split on this
issue. Compare Kaplan v. City of N. Las Vegas, 323 F.3d 1226, 1232-
33 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding that there is no duty to accommodate
an individual who is regarded as having a disability); Weber v. Strip-
pet, Inc., 186 F.3d 907, 916-17 (8th Cir. 1999) (same); Workman v.
Frito-Lay, Inc., 165 F.3d 460, 467 (6th Cir. 1999) (reaching same
conclusion without analysis); Newberry v. E. Tex. State Univ., 161
F.3d 276, 280 (5th Cir. 1998) (same); with D’Angelo v. Conagra
Foods, Inc., 422 F.3d 1220, 1240 (11th Cir. 2005) (concluding that
there is a duty to accommodate an individual who is regarded as hav-
ing a disability); Kelly v. Metallics West, Inc., 410 F.3d 670, 675
(10th Cir. 2005) (same); Williams v. Phila. Hous. Auth. Police Dep’t,
380 F.3d 751, 772-76 (3d Cir. 2004) (same); Katz v. City Metal Co.,
87 F.3d 26, 33 (1st Cir. 1996) (same). We are not required to choose
a side on this issue because the damages awarded to Wilson are tied
14 WILSON v. PHOENIX SPECIALTY MANUFACTURING
directly to his discriminatory termination and not to Phoenix’s failure
to accommodate.
III.
Wilson cross-appeals, contending that the district court erred when
it determined that he was not entitled to an award of front pay. Front
pay is money awarded for the loss of employment after the date of
judgment. See Pollard v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 532 U.S.
843, 846 (2001). Whether front pay is to be awarded is a matter left
to the discretion of the trial judge. Duke v. Uniroyal Inc., 928 F.2d
1413, 1424 (4th Cir. 1991). Based on the uncontradicted testimony of
Wilson’s witness, Dr. Bergmann, the district court found that Wilson
was competitively unemployable by the end of 2005, which was six
months before the entry of judgment. Accordingly, the court did not
abuse its discretion in denying Wilson an award of front wages.
IV.
The judgment of the district court is affirmed.
AFFIRMED
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
James Wilson’s employment with Phoenix Specialty Manufactur-
ing Company, a manufacturer of specialty washers, was terminated
August 1, 2002. Phoenix Specialty contended that it was eliminating
Wilson’s position as part of a reduction-in-force in response to finan-
cial difficulties. It claimed that Wilson was selected as part of the
reduction-in-force because he was unable to do efficiently some of the
tasks that were required in its shipping department; he made "many
errors with tasks"; and he failed to master the new computer system
that had been installed months earlier.
Wilson contended, however, that his employment was terminated
because of his Parkinson’s disease, which had been diagnosed in
1998, and the health insurance costs required to treat that disease. He
alleged that he had an impairment but was able to perform his job
WILSON v. PHOENIX SPECIALTY MANUFACTURING 15
"with slight accommodation" and did so as expected by Phoenix Spe-
cialty.
At trial Wilson testified that he needed help in performing several
of the tasks assigned to him. He stated that he asked for a 21-inch
screen for his computer to mitigate his reduced ability to see, but he
was given a 17-inch screen. He stated he needed help with his hand-
writing:
My handwriting was bad. You couldn’t read what I was
writing. And I would ask for help in handwriting, and I was
told that I could not use — I was using Marviette Hogan,
because she was in the shipping department. I was told I
could not use her by Mr. Wise and Marviette because it was
not her job to do that.
He stated that he was told not to "mess with the Pitney-Bowes ship-
ping machine and key in inventory," because he made too many
errors inputting the machine. As he acknowledged, "I could not do it
as fast because of the slowness effect of the Parkinson’s disease on
the right side. And I asked for help." He testified that he was "slow
in typing because of Parkinson’s disease." He indicated that he had
"trouble writing for a long time; and the evaluations [of employees]
were due to be in, and I asked [Crystal Baxley, the company’s human
resources assistant] if she would help me write the evaluations." In
preparing the company’s specialty washers for shipping, he stated that
he could not perform the count that was necessary: "I counted the big
items, the bulky items. And the small items that were so thin, I would
shake so bad that I didn’t have the dexterity to handle them, so I
would set them aside when I was helping on the assembly line for
other shipping clerks to count."
To show that his firing was a pretext for discrimination based on
his disability, Wilson put in evidence that Phoenix Specialty knew
fully of his condition and monitored every detail, going so far as to
track his doctor visits and medical bills. He testified that Phoenix Spe-
cialty "required" him "to report to management . . . what the doctor
told [him]." In addition, the company was aware of the nature and
scope of the particular effects of his impairment in that it was
involved in addressing them. The company provided him with a 17-
16 WILSON v. PHOENIX SPECIALTY MANUFACTURING
inch computer screen, assisted him in writing reports, and circum-
scribed some of his tasks, prohibiting him, for instance, from
keypunching inventory into the computer system because of his lack
of dexterity. The record amply demonstrates that during the period
when Phoenix Specialty was considering its reduction-in-force, it
knew the full extent of Wilson’s ability and disability.
Following a bench trial, the district court found as facts the follow-
ing:
At all times through the date of Wilson’s termination, not-
withstanding his Parkinson’s disease, the Plaintiff was able
to perform the essential functions of his job with minimal
accommodations. In fact, the defendant states in its position
statement to the EEOC that the plaintiff’s Parkinson’s Dis-
ease did not impact his ability to do his job. Plaintiff merely
needed some help with writing and he needed a larger com-
puter screen. Although the plaintiff requested a twenty-one
inch screen he was given only a seventeen inch screen, the
size that other supervisors were given. Plaintiff also asked
for assistance with handwriting. He had instructed an
employee in his department, Marviette Hogan, to help him
write evaluations. Robert Hurst and Harry Wise told Plain-
tiff he could not use Hogan to write for him. Wilson finally
requested assistance from Defendant’s Human Resources
Assistant, Crystal Baxley, to help write the evaluations.
Both Baxley and Hurst knew that Wilson was having prob-
lems writing and that these problems were related to his Par-
kinson’s disease. The defendant presented no evidence that
these accommodations would have constituted an undue
hardship. At the time of his discharge in 2002, his medical
evidence indicates that Wilson’s condition was stabilized by
medication. In addition, as shown by plaintiff’s exhibit 7,
the handwritten notes by Wilson regarding supplies which
should be ordered, written on August 2, 2002, the plaintiff
was still able to write at that time, although apparently with
some difficulty. He could also play golf, coach youth sports
and drive.
But the district court concluded as a matter of law that the plaintiff
was not disabled as that term is defined in the Americans with Dis-
WILSON v. PHOENIX SPECIALTY MANUFACTURING 17
abilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A) (defining "disability"
as a "physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or
more of the major life activities of such individual"):
The Court finds that the plaintiff has not proved that, as of
August 1, 2002 (the date of discharge), [Wilson] satisfied
the requirements of 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). Based upon
the testimony of Dr. Bergmann, the plaintiff was still able
to work on the date of discharge, and his symptoms were
fairly well controlled by medication. Therefore, his impair-
ment did not substantially limit any major life activities at
that time.
Necessarily, therefore, the facts to which Wilson testified — and as
found by the district court — about his ability to do his job consti-
tuted an "impairment," but not one constituting a "disability." Relying
on the same facts found, however, the district court concluded, as a
matter of law, that "Phoenix regarded him as having" a disability
under 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(C). To support this ruling, the district
court stated:
[T]he testimony revealed that the company officials
believed that Wilson was substantially limited in the major
life activity of performing manual tasks. This was shown by
their belief that he was unable to adequately key information
into a computer, write, and count washers. The Court finds
that Wilson was perceived by Phoenix as unable to perform
a variety of manual tasks central to most people’s daily
lives. Further, the evidence at trial revealed that the com-
pany officials believed that Wilson was substantially limited
in the major life activity of seeing. This was shown by their
belief that he had difficulty in adequately utilizing the infor-
mation on the computer screen.
The district court thus concluded that Phoenix Specialty regarded
Wilson as being disabled because of its belief that (1) Wilson was
unable to key information into a computer adequately; (2) he was
unable to write adequately; (3) he was unable to count washers; and
(4) he had difficulty seeing the information on his computer screen.
Each of these four beliefs attributed to Phoenix Specialty were, how-
18 WILSON v. PHOENIX SPECIALTY MANUFACTURING
ever, accurate ones, and their accuracy was demonstrated by the direct
testimony of Wilson at trial and the district court’s findings of fact.
The impairments that were imputed to Phoenix Specialty’s belief
were also incontrovertibly matters with which Phoenix Specialty was
fully familiar. It knew of Wilson’s difficulty in seeing because Wilson
asked Phoenix Specialty for a 21-inch computer screen, and Phoenix
Specialty gave him a 17-inch screen. Wilson asked for help with
respect to writing and typing, and Phoenix Specialty employees pro-
vided him assistance in varying degrees. And, as for the uncounted
washers, Wilson left them for the other Phoenix Specialty employees
to count and ship. All of these situations were discussed with manage-
ment. In addition, management had the benefit of monitoring the
medical reports of doctors who were treating Wilson and of Wilson’s
debriefings of his treatment.
The analytical difficulty in which Wilson finds himself now is that
he prosecuted his case as one in which his termination was based on
a disability that involved substantial limitations with respect to major
life activities, as defined in 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2)(A). After the district
court rejected that position, finding that he did not prove actual limita-
tions of major life activities, he is left to argue the opposite position,
that he was not so disabled but Phoenix Specialty regarded him as so
disabled. The viability of such a position, however, tends to collapse
in the switch, because: (1) Wilson did not suffer limitations of major
life activities; (2) Phoenix Specialty fully understood the limitations
he was suffering at the time he was terminated and thus could not
have misperceived them; and (3) there was no evidence or finding
that Phoenix Specialty incorrectly believed that Wilson was substan-
tially limited as to major life activities. I address these three points in
order to show how they defeat his claim as a matter of law.
I
There is no question now that Wilson did not suffer limitations of
major life activities, as required to show a disability under 42 U.S.C.
§ 12102(2)(A). The district court found that Wilson was not disabled
in this manner, finding that at the time of his termination, "his impair-
ment did not substantially limit any major life activities." (Emphasis
added). And, Wilson does not appeal this holding. Accordingly, we
WILSON v. PHOENIX SPECIALTY MANUFACTURING 19
begin the analysis with the fact that while Wilson suffered from Par-
kinson’s disease, which caused him difficulties in performing his job
tasks, none of the limitations found by the district court amounted to
limitations of major life activities. Thus, Wilson is left with the claim
that Phoenix Specialty "regarded" his impairment to limit major life
activities, as "disability" is defined in § 12102 (2)(C).
II
Because Wilson did not have an impairment that substantially lim-
ited one or more of his major life activities, he must now rely on the
district court’s conclusion that Phoenix Specialty believed that he did
have such an impairment and acted on that belief.
The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against an
employee on the basis that the employer "regarded" the employee as
having an "impairment that substantially limits one or more of [his]
major life activities." 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102(2)(C), 12112(a). To estab-
lish such a "regarded as" claim, a plaintiff must show that the
employer was mistaken in its belief that its employee was suffering
a substantial limitation of one or more of his major life activities. As
the Supreme Court has explained:
There are two apparent ways in which individuals may fall
within this statutory definition: (1) a covered entity mis-
takenly believes that a person has a physical impairment that
substantially limits one or more major life activities, or (2)
a covered entity mistakenly believes that an actual, nonlimit-
ing impairment substantially limits one or more major life
activities. In both cases, it is necessary that a covered entity
entertain misperceptions about the individual — it must
believe either that one has a substantially limiting impair-
ment that one does not have or that one has a substantially
limiting impairment when, in fact, the impairment is not so
limiting.
Sutton v. United Air Lines, 527 U.S. 471, 489 (1999) (emphasis
added). Thus, as relevant to this case where Wilson did not suffer an
impairment substantially limiting a major life activity, Wilson must
demonstrate that Phoenix Specialty mistakenly believed that he did
20 WILSON v. PHOENIX SPECIALTY MANUFACTURING
suffer an impairment that substantially limited a major life activity.
It is not sufficient for him to show that Phoenix Specialty had a mis-
taken belief about whether he was "unable to perform the tasks asso-
ciated with [his] specific job." Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v.
Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 200-01 (2002).
Wilson made no such showing. Indeed, he undertook to prove at
trial (1) that he in fact had an impairment substantially limiting a
major life activity and (2) that Phoenix Specialty was fully aware of
the impairment. He undertook to prove that Phoenix Specialty was
fully aware of his condition to satisfy the requirement that the reasons
given by Phoenix Specialty for his discharge were a pretext. Yet
while the district court concluded that Wilson failed to prove the req-
uisite nature of his impairment, it agreed with Wilson that Phoenix
Specialty knew of the nature of his impairment, finding that Phoenix
Specialty’s reasons for termination were a pretext. It now becomes
nearly impossible for Wilson to claim that even though Phoenix Spe-
cialty was fully aware of his impairment, it was mistaken in its belief
that he was impaired.
The district court’s conclusions do not help Wilson. It found that
Phoenix Specialty believed that Wilson "was unable to adequately key
information into a computer, write, and count washers" and could not
"adequately utiliz[e] the information on the computer screen." It
relied on no other beliefs held by Phoenix Specialty. Yet these identi-
fied beliefs on which the district court relied were not misbeliefs or
misperceptions, as required to establish liability under the Act. To the
contrary, they were accurate beliefs.
First, Wilson testified fully to actually having the impairments
described by the district court. Wilson testified that in order to key
functions into the computer, he needed a larger computer screen; he
stated that his handwriting was "bad" and one "couldn’t read what
[he] was writing"; he said that he could not key inventory information
into the computer system "as fast because of the slowness effect of
the Parkinson’s disease on the right side," prompting him to ask for
help; he testified that he was "slow in typing because of Parkinson’s
disease"; he said that he had "trouble writing for a long time" and that
he needed help to write evaluations of subordinates; he said that he
could not count small washers because he "would shake so bad that
WILSON v. PHOENIX SPECIALTY MANUFACTURING 21
[he] didn’t have the dexterity to handle them." Each of Phoenix Spe-
cialty’s beliefs found by the district court with respect to these matters
was in fact accurate.
Moreover, the evidence showed that Phoenix Specialty knew fully
and accurately about each of the impairments testified to by Wilson
and found by the district court. With respect to seeing the computer,
Wilson informed Phoenix Specialty about his impairment, and Phoe-
nix Specialty provided him with a larger computer screen, albeit not
the 21-inch screen requested. In connection with his writing inadequa-
cies, Wilson requested other employees of Phoenix Specialty to help
him, namely Marviette Hogan, a subordinate employee, and Crystal
Baxley, the human resources assistant. As the district court found,
"Both Baxley and Hurst [the chief operating officer of Phoenix Spe-
cialty] knew that Wilson was having problems writing and that these
problems were related to his Parkinson’s disease." Finally, with
respect to the inability to count washers, Wilson stated that he set
aside the washers that he could not count for other people in the com-
pany to count. In addition, Wilson himself testified to seeking help
from company employees and to discussing his impairments with
"management." He stated affirmatively that other than the impair-
ments to which he testified, he did not discuss any other problems
with management.
In addition to the knowledge held by Phoenix Specialty about Wil-
son’s specific impairments, the record showed that Phoenix Specialty
monitored Wilson’s medical condition, reviewing doctors reports and
receiving debriefings from Wilson himself after each doctor’s visit.
There is simply no evidence from which to conclude that Phoenix
Specialty had a misperception about Wilson’s impairments at the time
it terminated his employment, nor did the district court find any. To
the contrary, the district court seemed to assume that if Phoenix Spe-
cialty believed that Wilson had the impairments that the court identi-
fied and if Phoenix Specialty acted on those beliefs, it violated the
ADA without the need for finding a misbelief. As the district court
stated:
[T]he testimony revealed that the company officials believed
that Wilson was substantially limited in the major life activ-
22 WILSON v. PHOENIX SPECIALTY MANUFACTURING
ity of performing manual tasks. This was shown by their
belief that he was unable to adequately key information into
a computer, write, and count washers. The Court finds that
Wilson was perceived by Phoenix as unable to perform a
variety of manual tasks central to most people’s daily lives.
Further, the evidence at trial revealed that the company offi-
cials believed that Wilson was substantially limited in the
major life activity of seeing. This was shown by their belief
that he had difficulty in adequately utilizing the information
on the computer screen.
(Emphasis added). Thus, the court relied on Phoenix Specialty’s
belief of the very impairments to which Wilson testified and about
which Phoenix Specialty had complete knowledge. What the court
failed to recognize, however, was that it had to find that Phoenix Spe-
cialty misperceived Wilson’s condition. In the absence of a misper-
ception, the district court could not have concluded that Phoenix
Specialty "regarded" him as being disabled. See Sutton, 527 U.S. at
489.
To support his "regarded as" claim on appeal, Wilson relies heavily
on an incident that occurred more than a year before his discharge to
argue that Phoenix Specialty had a misconception about his disability.
While the incident is hardly relevant to what occurred more than a
year later when Wilson was discharged, there are numerous additional
reasons why the incident was an insufficient basis on which Wilson
could rely to support his case.
In May 2001, Wilson suffered a panic attack while at work, after
which he spent the next few weeks on a fully paid medical leave of
absence. During his leave, he saw both his local doctor, who also hap-
pened to be Phoenix Specialty’s company doctor, and a specialist in
Charleston, South Carolina. Although the specialist cleared Wilson to
return to work with no restrictions, Phoenix Specialty instructed Wil-
son to get clearance from the local doctor before it would permit him
to work. While Wilson never actually saw the local doctor again dur-
ing this time frame, he did return to full time work in late June 2001.
During Wilson’s absence from work, the president of Phoenix Spe-
cialty wrote an email message stating that Wilson "qualifie[d] for
ADA designation." Wilson relies upon this fragmentary statement to
WILSON v. PHOENIX SPECIALTY MANUFACTURING 23
argue that Phoenix Specialty mistakenly regarded him as disabled
under the ADA.
This limited evidence, however, is taken out of context and fails to
take into account that the same person observed, after Wilson’s return
to work, that Wilson "returned to his former self," "was a lot
stronger," "was alert," and "was back to the [Wilson] who had been
with us previously." Moreover, it fails to recognize that the statement
was neither unreasonable nor inaccurate. In the weeks following Wil-
son’s debilitating panic attack that rendered him physically unable to
work, it was simply good management to note that Wilson qualified
for ADA designation, implying that the company should act appropri-
ately. Given Wilson’s Parkinson’s disease, the email was accurate
inasmuch as Parkinson’s disease is an impairment that can enable a
person to be a "qualified individual with a disability" under the ADA.
But to say that Wilson "qualifies for ADA designation" says nothing
that supports the notion that Phoenix regarded Wilson as actually
"disabled," as that term is used in the ADA.
III
Finally, the district court erred in concluding that Phoenix Special-
ty’s belief about Wilson’s identified impairments amounted to a belief
that Wilson was substantially limited in "one or more of his major life
activities."
The district court properly held that none of Wilson’s identified
impairments substantially limited a major life activity. Yet, to support
its "regarded-as-disabled" conclusion, the district court recharacter-
ized Phoenix Specialty’s belief about those very same impairments as
a belief that Wilson was substantially limited in a major life activity.
This was obviously a flawed analysis or a misperception of the law.
The district court could not properly find the specific impairments
identified by Wilson not to substantially limit any major life activities
and at the same time say that because Phoenix Specialty believed that
Wilson had these impairments, they became beliefs about substantial
limitations of major life activities.
As both Toyota and Sutton make clear, it is not enough simply for
an employer to have a mistaken perception of an employee’s impair-
24 WILSON v. PHOENIX SPECIALTY MANUFACTURING
ments with respect to his specific job. See Toyota, 534 U.S. at 200-01;
Sutton, 527 U.S. at 489-91. Rather, an employer must incorrectly
believe that an employee’s impairments substantially limit major life
activities. See 42 U.S.C. § 11202(2); Toyota, 534 U.S. at 196-202.
Thus, the district court’s factual findings with respect to Phoenix Spe-
cialty’s belief regarding Wilson’s ability to perform tasks associated
with his specific job failed to establish that Phoenix Specialty mis-
takenly regarded Wilson as limited in performing major life activities.
There can be no doubt that Phoenix Specialty had concerns about
Wilson’s ability to perform specific tasks on his job. But its concerns
were with the very impairments that the court found did not substan-
tially limit major life activities; they related merely to difficulties in
job performance. Concerns about job performance, however, do not
support the legal conclusion that Phoenix Specialty believed Wilson
to be "substantially limited" in any "major life activities." As the
Supreme Court stated in Toyota, "[T]he manual tasks unique to any
particular job are not necessarily important parts of most people’s
lives. As a result, occupation-specific tasks may have only limited rel-
evance to the manual task inquiry." Id. at 201. Absent any showing
of a misperception by Phoenix Specialty that Wilson was substan-
tially limited in a major life activity, the company was "free to decide
that some limiting, but not substantially limiting, impairments make
individuals less than ideally suited for a job" without running afoul
of the ADA. Sutton, 527 U.S. at 490-91.
IV
Because Wilson was not an individual with a disability, as defined
by the ADA, it is not necessary to consider Phoenix Specialty’s chal-
lenge to the district court’s finding that Phoenix Specialty’s stated
reasons for firing Wilson were a pretext for discrimination. Wilson
was neither actually disabled nor regarded by Phoenix Specialty as
being disabled, so Phoenix was free to discharge him as an at-will
employee for any of the reasons Phoenix provided, or even because
it thought that Wilson’s non-substantially limiting Parkinson’s disease
made him "less than ideally suited for [his] job." Sutton, 527 U.S. at
491.
For these reasons, I would reverse the judgment of the district
court. In addition, I take the dissenter’s privilege to observe that in
WILSON v. PHOENIX SPECIALTY MANUFACTURING 25
affirming the district court, the majority failed to interpret the ADA
"strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled,"
as instructed by the Supreme Court. See Toyota, 534 U.S. at 197.