United States v. Chandia

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
 No. 06-4997
ALI ASAD CHANDIA, a/k/a Abu
Qatada,
Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Claude M. Hilton, Senior District Judge.
(1:05-cr-00401-CMH-1)

Argued: October 30, 2007

Decided: January 23, 2008

Before MICHAEL, MOTZ, and KING, Circuit Judges.

Affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded by published opinion.
Judge Michael wrote the opinion, in which Judge Motz and Judge
King joined.

COUNSEL

ARGUED: Marvin David Miller, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appel-
lant. John T. Gibbs, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUS-
TICE, Washington, D.C., for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Chuck
Rosenberg, United States Attorney, David H. Laufman, Assistant
United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee.
2 UNITED STATES v. CHANDIA
OPINION

MICHAEL, Circuit Judge:

Ali Asad Chandia appeals from his conviction, after a jury trial, on
three counts of providing material support to terrorists or terrorist
organizations. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B. Chandia challenges
his convictions on several grounds, although he does not contest the
sufficiency of the evidence. He also argues that the district court erred
in sentencing when it applied the terrorism enhancement under
U.S.S.G. §3A1.4. We affirm Chandia’s convictions but, because the
district court failed to make the factual findings necessary to impose
the §3A1.4 enhancement, we vacate the sentence and remand for
resentencing.

I.

This case arises out of the government’s investigation into an
alleged terrorist support network based in the suburbs of Washington,
D.C. Much of the investigation centered on individuals associated
with the Dar al Arqam Islamic Center in Falls Church, Virginia,
where a man named Ali Timimi was a lecturer and vocal supporter
of violent jihad against the enemies of Islam.1 Chandia, the defendant
in this case, is a Pakistani national who lived in Germantown, Mary-
land, and regularly attended Dar al Arqam in Falls Church.

The key event in the government’s investigation (at least with
respect to Chandia) occurred on May 8, 2003, when the FBI executed
a search warrant covering six suburban D.C. residences, including
Chandia’s. The warrant was issued on the basis of an affidavit by FBI
Special Agent John Wyman. Wyman asserted in his affidavit that the
six men whose homes were targeted — Chandia, Masoud Khan,
Hammad Abdur-Raheem, Donald Surratt, Caliph Abdur Raheem, and
Mohammed Aatique — had participated in a training program, along
with other members of Dar al Arqam, that used the game of paintball
1
Ali Timimi (also known as Ali al-Timimi) was convicted in April
2005 by a jury in the Eastern District of Virginia on various charges,
including soliciting others to levy war against the United States in viola-
tion of 18 U.S.C. § 373.
 UNITED STATES v. CHANDIA 3
as a means to prepare for engaging in violent jihad. Wyman also
asserted that several of those targeted, including Chandia, had trav-
eled to Pakistan to attend military training camps run by Lashkar-e-
Taiba (LET), an organization that the United States government des-
ignated as a foreign terrorist organization (FTO) in December 2001.
(We examine the details of the Wyman affidavit more closely in part
IV, where we consider Chandia’s challenges to the affidavit’s valid-
ity.)

The search of Chandia’s residence uncovered a significant amount
of information ultimately introduced at trial, including numerous e-
mails between Chandia and a high-level LET official named Moham-
med Ajmal Khan. Chandia was not home at the time the FBI agents
executed the search warrant, but his wife informed the agents that he
had driven a black Dodge Neon to work at Costco in Gaithersburg,
Maryland. An agent then located the car and observed inside it mate-
rials potentially relevant to the investigation. Based on these observa-
tions and the information in the Wyman affidavit, the agents sought,
and the magistrate issued, a second warrant authorizing a search of
the car. That search also yielded items introduced against Chandia at
trial, most notably a CD-ROM containing a video glorifying the Sep-
tember 11, 2001, attacks and those who perpetrated the attacks.

In June 2003 eleven people (but not Chandia) were indicted for
various offenses related in part to their participation in the paintball
training program. Chandia was the only one of the six men targeted
in the May 8, 2003, search who was not charged in this indictment.
Six of the eleven indicted ultimately pled guilty, two were acquitted,
and three were convicted after a bench trial. See United States v.
Khan, 461 F.3d 477 (4th Cir. 2006) (affirming the three convictions).

Chandia was separately charged in a four-count indictment in Sep-
tember 2005. He was charged with a conspiracy and a substantive
count of providing material support to terrorists, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2339A, and a conspiracy and a substantive count of provid-
ing material support to a foreign terrorist organization, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 2339B. Though Agent Wyman had alleged in his affida-
vit that Chandia participated in the paintball training program, the
government abandoned that contention prior to indictment. Instead,
the indictment charged, and the government pressed at trial, two basic
4 UNITED STATES v. CHANDIA
sets of allegations against Chandia. First, the government alleged that
Chandia, at the urging of Ali Timimi, traveled to Pakistan in Novem-
ber 2001 to attend an LET training camp. The defense admitted that
Chandia was in Pakistan from November 2001 to February 2002, but
it claimed that the purpose of his trip was to provide care for his
father, who underwent a thyroid operation, and to assist in the prepa-
rations for his brother’s wedding. Second, the government alleged
that during a series of events, occurring primarily between February
2002 and April 2003, Chandia provided material support to Moham-
mad Ajmal Khan (Ajmal Khan), an LET official whom Chandia
allegedly met while in Pakistan. Specifically, the government alleged
that Ajmal Khan traveled to the United States to secure high-tech
equipment and other materials for LET and that Chandia provided
material support to Ajmal Khan during his trips. The alleged material
support included picking up Ajmal Khan at the airport, providing him
access to a computer and e-mail at Chandia’s residence, and assisting
him in shipping paintballs to Pakistan for LET use in military training
operations. The defense acknowledged Chandia’s relationship with
Khan but claimed Chandia was unaware of Khan’s association with
LET.

The jury convicted Chandia on three counts and acquitted him on
the substantive § 2339A count of providing material support to terror-
ists. The government appears to concede that the acquittal on the one
count serves as a rejection of its contention that Chandia attended an
LET training camp while in Pakistan.

At sentencing the government sought the terrorism enhancement
under U.S.S.G. §3A1.4. A conviction under the material support stat-
utes provides a base level guidelines range of 63-78 months’ impris-
onment for those, like Chandia, with no criminal history. See
U.S.S.G. §2M5.3. Application of the terrorism enhancement, how-
ever, increases Chandia’s guidelines range to 360 months to life.
Chandia argued that the terrorism enhancement was not warranted in
his case and, in addition, contested several factual assertions in the
presentence report (PSR). The district court did not resolve the factual
disputes and did not explicitly state that the terrorism enhancement
applied, but the court did conclude in its oral disposition that
Chandia’s guidelines range was "properly assessed at . . . 360 months
to life." J.A. 2384. Ultimately, the district court sentenced Chandia to
 UNITED STATES v. CHANDIA 5
a total of 180 months in prison, which equals the statutory maximum
for a single material support conviction.2

Chandia now appeals. He advances several challenges to his con-
viction, although he does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence
on any of the three counts for which he was convicted. In addition,
Chandia challenges the district court’s application of the terrorism
enhancement in determining his sentence.

II.

We turn first to Chandia’s argument that 18 U.S.C. § 2339B is
unconstitutional. This argument runs squarely into our decision in
United States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316 (4th Cir. 2004), which
upheld § 2339B against several constitutional challenges that mirror
those advanced here by Chandia. First, Chandia’s argument that
§ 2339B violates the First Amendment right of association is fore-
closed by Hammoud, which rejected a similar argument because the
statute "does not prohibit mere association; it prohibits the conduct of
providing material support to a designated FTO." 381 F.3d at 329.
Second, Chandia advances a series of related arguments — based on
principles or doctrines ranging from due process to nondelegation of
congressional authority — that boil down to a contention that
§ 2339B is unconstitutional because it empowers the executive to des-
ignate LET as an FTO (a designation that Chandia cannot challenge).
These arguments fail under Hammoud’s holding that a criminal
defendant’s inability to challenge the FTO designation does not vio-
late his constitutional rights because "the fact of an organization’s
designation as an FTO is an element of § 2339B, but the validity of
the designation is not." 381 F.3d at 331.

2
The district court imposed the statutory maximum on each count,
which it found to be 60 months for the § 2339A count and 180 months
for the § 2339B counts. The court chose (without explanation) to run the
sentences concurrently, although it could have run them consecutively in
order to impose a total punishment within the guidelines range of 360
months to life. See U.S.S.G. § 5G1.2 cmt. n.1. The government did not
cross-appeal any aspect of the sentence.
6 UNITED STATES v. CHANDIA
Our decision in Hammoud also precludes Chandia’s argument that
§ 2339B cannot be applied against him because certain terms related
to the definition of a "terrorist organization" are vague. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B(g)(6) (defining "terrorist organization" as "an organization
designated as a terrorist organization" under the procedures estab-
lished in 8 U.S.C. § 1189). Even if we assume for argument’s sake
that certain terms in the definition are vague, that circumstance would
be relevant only to an organization seeking to challenge the validity
of its own designation. As we held in Hammoud, the mere fact of des-
ignation, rather than the designation’s validity, is what is relevant to
a defendant (such as Chandia) who stands accused of providing mate-
rial support. 381 F.3d at 331.

III.

Chandia argues that the three counts for which he was convicted
are multiplicitous or violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. We agree
with the government that conviction on all three counts was permissi-
ble because "[e]ach offense contains one statutorily-mandated ele-
ment that the other[s] [do] not, and Congress has not expressed a clear
intention that multiple punishment not be imposed." United States v.
Terry, 86 F.3d 353, 355 (4th Cir. 1996).

When a single course of conduct violates multiple statutes, multiple
punishments may be imposed without violating the Double Jeopardy
Clause, if that is what Congress intended. Terry, 86 F.3d at 355 (cit-
ing Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 344 (1981)). Our only
task is to determine whether Congress intended to impose multiple
punishments. We begin the inquiry into legislative intent by examin-
ing "whether proof of each crime ‘requires proof of an additional fact
which the other does not.’" Terry, 86 F.3d at 355 (quoting Blockbur-
ger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932)). If the statutory ele-
ments "do not overlap, then multiple punishments are presumed to be
authorized absent a clear showing of contrary Congressional intent."
Terry, 86 F.3d at 356.

The elements of the separate crimes charged under § 2339A and
§ 2339B do not overlap. Section 2339B requires proof that Chandia
provided material support to an organization designated as a foreign
terrorist organization. By contrast, § 2339A requires proof that
 UNITED STATES v. CHANDIA 7
Chandia provided material support or resources that he knew would
"be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a violation of [18
U.S.C. § 956]," which prohibits conspiracies to injure persons or
damage property outside the United States. Because each statute
requires proof of an element that the other does not, we presume that
Congress authorized multiple punishments.

Chandia has not made the showing of clear congressional intent
necessary to overcome this presumption. The sole support cited for
his argument is congressional testimony given in April 2005 by Barry
Sabin, a Justice Department official. Sabin’s testimony purportedly
suggests that material support cases are typically prosecuted under
§ 2339A prior to an organization’s designation as a foreign terrorist
organization and under § 2339B after designation. This testimony was
given well after the passage of the statutes in question and, therefore,
sheds no light on legislative intent.

We also disagree with Chandia’s argument that Congress did not
intend to authorize multiple punishments for a conspiracy and a sub-
stantive violation under § 2339B. Chandia’s argument is based on the
language of the statute, which prohibits the conspiracy and the actual
provision of material support in the same section. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B(a)(1)("Whoever knowingly provides material support . . . or
attempts or conspires to do so . . ."). But, as the Supreme Court has
held, the "settled principle" that "the commission of the substantive
offense and a conspiracy to commit it are separate and distinct
offenses" does not give way simply because the statute describing the
substantive offense also specifically prohibits conspiracies. Callanan
v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 593 (1961).

IV.

Chandia contends that the district court should have suppressed
evidence obtained during the May 8, 2003, searches of his residence
and automobile.

A.

Chandia argues that evidence from searches of his residence and
automobile should have been suppressed primarily because the
8 UNITED STATES v. CHANDIA
Wyman affidavit supporting those searches contained false and mis-
leading statements as well as material omissions. Specifically,
Chandia argues that the Wyman affidavit omitted information,
obtained by the government in its investigation, that would have
negated probable cause with respect to Chandia by showing that he
did not participate in the paintball training program.

This argument would typically be evaluated under the Supreme
Court’s decision in Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978), which
defines the circumstances when a defendant can attack a facially suf-
ficient affidavit. Under Franks a defendant can obtain an evidentiary
hearing on an affidavit’s integrity by making "a substantial prelimi-
nary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or
with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the
warrant affidavit." United States v. Colkley, 899 F.2d 297, 300 (4th
Cir. 1990) (quoting Franks, 438 U.S. at 155-56). A Franks hearing
is also warranted if the defendant makes a substantial showing that
the "affiant[ ] omit[ted] material facts with the intent to make, or in
reckless disregard of whether they thereby made, the affidavit mis-
leading." Colkley, 899 F.2d at 300 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Ultimately, suppression under Franks is called for if the district court
determines that the affidavit contained false or misleading statements
or omissions that were "essential to the probable cause determina-
tion." Id.

In his motion to suppress filed in district court, Chandia did not
expressly request a Franks hearing. Therefore, we review for plain
error the issue of whether the district court should have held such a
hearing. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); United States v. Olano, 507 U.S.
725, 731-32 (1993). In his motion to suppress Chandia asserted that
the Wyman affidavit was tainted by false statements and material
omissions. But these bare allegations did not entitle Chandia to a
Franks hearing. Rather, to make the "substantial preliminary show-
ing" required by Franks, a defendant’s "allegations [of Franks-type
misconduct] must be accompanied by an offer of proof." Franks, 438
U.S. at 171. For instance, "[a]ffidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable
statements of witnesses should be furnished, or their absence satisfac-
torily explained." Id. Because Chandia did not make the required
offer of proof in support of his allegations of misconduct, the district
court did not err in omitting a Franks hearing.
 UNITED STATES v. CHANDIA 9
B.

Our inquiry does not end simply because Chandia is not entitled to
relief under Franks. Suppression would still be warranted if the infor-
mation contained in the Wyman affidavit was not sufficient to estab-
lish probable cause to search Chandia’s residence. In addition to his
Franks-like claims of deliberate falsehoods and material omissions,
Chandia asserts (albeit somewhat indirectly) that the affidavit is inad-
equate because some of its most important allegations are "bare con-
clusions" lacking any independent basis in fact. See Illinois v. Gates,
462 U.S. 213, 239 (1983) (magistrate’s probable cause determination
"cannot be a mere ratification of the bare conclusions of others").
Because we give "great deference" to a magistrate’s probable cause
decision, our review is limited to determining whether there was "a
substantial basis for the [magistrate’s] decision." United States v.
Hurwitz, 459 F.3d 463, 473 (4th Cir. 2006) (internal quotation marks
omitted).

Chandia first takes issue with several statements in the affidavit
that link him to the paintball training program. Specifically, Agent
Wyman included in his affidavit a statement from a confidential infor-
mant, Ibrahim al-Hamdi, that a man named "Ali Asad," who lived in
Maryland and attended the Dar al Arqam Islamic Center in Falls
Church, participated in paintball. Wyman also stated that he (Wyman)
believed that this "Ali Asad" was in fact Ali Asad Chandia. Chandia
argues that Wyman’s belief was unsupported and should not have
been relied upon in the probable cause calculus. We disagree. Even
if ultimately proven erroneous, Wyman’s belief was not a bare con-
clusion advanced with no supporting facts. Instead, the magistrate
could have deemed the belief reasonable based on the facts in the affi-
davit demonstrating that Chandia likewise lived in Maryland,
attended Dar al Arqam, and associated with other paintball partici-
pants.

Chandia also objects to the affidavit’s inclusion of a statement from
another confidential informant, Yong Kwon, suggesting that Chandia
attended an LET training camp in Pakistan. The affidavit stated that
Kwon had seen Chandia at an LET office in Pakistan soon after Kwon
had attended an LET training camp. (The affidavit included informa-
tion confirming that Chandia was in Pakistan at the relevant time.)
10 UNITED STATES v. CHANDIA
The affidavit further stated that Kwon believed, based on his conver-
sation with Chandia at that LET office and his prior knowledge of
Chandia from Dar al Arqam, that Chandia planned to attend the camp
as well. The affidavit did not, however, flesh out the details of the
conversation which led Kwon to form this belief. As a result, we
believe that Kwon’s statement, considered alone, could not support a
probable cause determination. But we see no reason why the magis-
trate was not permitted to rely on this statement as one part of the
probable cause calculus. When we consider Kwon’s statement beside
the other information in the affidavit, particularly that Chandia’s con-
versation with Kwon occurred at an LET office in Pakistan, that
Chandia was confirmed to be in Pakistan during the relevant time
frame, and that other information suggested that Chandia participated
in paintball, we have no basis to second-guess the magistrate’s deter-
mination that the affidavit demonstrated probable cause.

C.

Chandia also argues that the agents conducted an impermissible
general search of his residence that exceeded the scope authorized by
the warrant. This argument, too, lacks merit. Chandia does not iden-
tify any item that was outside the scope of the warrant but was none-
theless seized and introduced against him at trial. Instead, he
apparently contends that the purported breadth of the search justifies
blanket suppression of all items seized. Blanket suppression due to an
overly broad general search is only justified when officers exhibit fla-
grant disregard for the terms of the warrant. United States v. Foster,
100 F.3d 846, 849 (10th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Squilla-
cote, 221 F.3d 542, 556 (4th Cir. 2000) (the "extraordinary remedy
of blanket suppression" has applied only when officers have seized
"large quantities of evidence clearly not within the scope of the war-
rant"). After comparing the scope of the warrant with the lists of the
items seized, we find no basis for concluding that the officers in this
case flagrantly disregarded the terms of the warrant.

D.

We also reject Chandia’s argument that, even if the search of his
residence was supported by probable cause, there was no nexus to
support the second warrant for the search of his automobile. The
 UNITED STATES v. CHANDIA 11
agent’s plain view sighting of potentially relevant material inside the
car, when combined with the additional information about Chandia
contained in the Wyman affidavit, was sufficient to establish probable
cause for the warrant authorizing the automobile search.

V.

We turn next to Chandia’s contention that the district court com-
mitted reversible error by admitting into evidence two video clips
from a CD-ROM found on the front seat in the search of Chandia’s
car. The clips, which together were approximately three minutes in
length, glorify the September 11, 2001, attacks and those who perpe-
trated them, including Osama Bin Laden.

Chandia argues that video clips should have been excluded because
they were not relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 401, consti-
tuted barred character evidence under Rule 404, and were unfairly
prejudicial under Rule 403. Chandia claims that a new trial is war-
ranted because the clips were so powerful that their admission risked
causing the jury to act on the basis of fear and hatred, rather than on
a rational evaluation of the evidence.

We disagree. Even if admission of the video clips was error, it was
harmless in this case. The clips were not a central part of the govern-
ment’s case; in fact, they took up only three minutes during the nearly
five days the government spent presenting its case-in-chief. In addi-
tion, the clips were shown only once, were not used to frame the gov-
ernment’s case at the trial, and were not unduly emphasized during
the government’s arguments to the jury. Most important, the central
thrust of Chandia’s prejudice argument — that the video clips were
so overpowering that they caused the jury to convict based on emo-
tion rather than the evidence presented — is discredited to a signifi-
cant extent by the jury’s rejection of one of the four counts charged
in the indictment. The jury found Chandia not guilty on the substan-
tive count that charged him with providing material support to terror-
ists. This outcome suggests that the jury conducted a rational
evaluation of the evidence in reaching its verdict and was not misled
by emotion.3
3
Chandia makes a brief argument that the district court erred in deny-
ing certain pretrial discovery motions. He also argues that the district
12 UNITED STATES v. CHANDIA
VI.

Finally, Chandia contends that his sentencing proceedings were
flawed. He argues first that the district court failed to resolve disputed
issues of fact that were relevant to the application of the terrorism
enhancement under U.S.S.G. §3A1.4. Alternatively, he argues that the
facts of his case do not warrant application of the enhancement.

Application of the terrorism enhancement provides a twelve level
enhancement — and an automatic criminal history category of VI —
when the "offense is a felony that involved, or was intended to pro-
mote, a federal crime of terrorism." U.S.S.G. § 3A1.4. The key term,
"a federal crime of terrorism," is defined to consist of two elements:
(1) the commission of one of a list of specified felonies, which
includes each of the material support offenses at issue in this case,
and (2) a specific intent requirement, namely, that the underlying fel-
ony was "calculated to influence or affect the conduct of government
by intimidation or coercion, or to retaliate against government con-
duct." 18 U.S.C. § 2332b(g)(5). In Hammoud we applied the terrorism
enhancement in a material support case and held that the intent
requirement was satisfied because the trial evidence established that
the defendant provided the material support "with the intent to influ-
ence or coerce government conduct." 381 F.3d at 356.

In this case Chandia’s PSR stated that the terrorism enhancement
applied but gave no explanation for this conclusion. Chandia’s con-
victions under the material support statutes clearly satisfied the first
element of the enhancement. However, the PSR did not contain any
factual assertions and the district court did not make any factual find-
ings related to the intent element. Instead, both appeared to assume
(erroneously) that the enhancement automatically applies to a material
support conviction.

court erred in denying his request for a hearing under Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), with respect to the
government’s expert witness on Islamic terrorism. These arguments fail
because the district court did not abuse its discretion in any of the rulings
cited by Chandia.
 UNITED STATES v. CHANDIA 13
The government argues that we should nonetheless affirm the sen-
tence. It attempts to rely on Hammoud, which affirmed application of
the enhancement in a material support case based, among other
things, on evidence that the defendant personally supported Hezbol-
lah’s violent activities. 381 F.3d at 356. But the government has not
pointed to similar evidence here. Instead, it appears to suggest that we
should infer the required intent from the basic facts that gave rise to
the conviction. While it is true that Chandia did not (in his objections
to the PSR) dispute the allegations that he provided support to Ajmal
Khan by, for instance, helping him ship paintballs to Pakistan, these
facts alone do not support application of the enhancement. Unlike in
some cases where the enhancement has been applied, the acts under-
lying the conviction in this case were not violent terrorist acts. See,
e.g., United States v. Mandhai, 375 F.3d 1243 (11th Cir. 2004) (con-
spiracy to force changes in government policy by blowing up public
utility structures). Therefore, these acts cannot, standing alone, sup-
port application of the terrorism enhancement. Because there has been
no factual finding on the intent element, and because the basic facts
supporting the conviction do not give rise to an automatic inference
of the required intent, we must vacate Chandia’s sentence and remand
for resentencing.

On remand the district court may reconsider whether the enhance-
ment should apply in this case. In doing so, the court must determine
whether Chandia had the intent required by §3A1.4.4 To make this
determination, the court must resolve any factual disputes that it
deems relevant to application of the enhancement. See Fed. R. Crim.
P. 32(i)(3)(B). If the court finds that Chandia had the requisite intent,
it should identify the evidence in the record that supports its determi-
nation.

***
4
This court has not decided whether the § 3A1.4 intent requirement
must be found by clear and convincing evidence or merely by a prepon-
derance. See Hammoud, 381 F.3d at 354-55 (discussing split of authority
on the issue but not resolving it). We reserve consideration of this issue,
both because it has not been briefed and because we will be in a better
position to address it in a case where we are presented with relevant find-
ings.
14 UNITED STATES v. CHANDIA
For the reasons stated above, we affirm Chandia’s convictions but
vacate his sentence and remand for resentencing.

AFFIRMED IN PART,
VACATED IN PART,
AND REMANDED