UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-1846
DAVID K. EVERSON; PATRICIA M. EVERSON,
Plaintiffs - Appellants,
versus
RICHARD L. DOUGHTON, Individually and in His
Official Capacity as Justice of the Superior
Court of Alleghany/Rockingham County, North
Carolina,
Defendant - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. James A. Beaty, Jr., Chief
District Judge. (1:06-cv-01033-JAB)
Submitted: January 9, 2008 Decided: January 23, 2008
Before NIEMEYER, MICHAEL, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
David K. Everson, Patricia M. Everson, Appellants Pro Se. Grady L.
Balentine, OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Raleigh, North Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
David K. and Patricia M. Everson appeal the district
court’s orders granting Richard L. Doughton’s motion to dismiss the
Eversons’ 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 (2000) complaint. The
district court found the Eversons’ claims were barred by absolute
judicial immunity and the Eleventh Amendment. The Eversons
challenge both of the district court’s findings. We have reviewed
the record, the parties’ informal briefs, and the district court’s
orders and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm.
Judges enjoy absolute judicial immunity from damages
liability for judicial acts unless done “in clear absence of all
jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356-57 (1978). In
making this determination, “the scope of the judge’s jurisdiction
must be construed broadly.” Id. at 456. And a judge may “not be
deprived of immunity because the action [taken] was in error, was
done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority.” Id.; see
also Chu v. Griffith, 771 F.2d 79 (4th Cir. 1985). We have
identified two important factors for consideration: whether the
function is one normally performed by a judge and whether the
parties dealt with the judge in his or her judicial capacity.
King v. Myers, 973 F.2d 354, 357 (4th Cir. 1992).
The Eversons’ only assertion is that Doughton wrongly
decided the state court action. As a judge on the state superior
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court, Doughton had authority to consider that action and he is
immune from suits arising from those acts.
The Eleventh Amendment provides, in pertinent part, that
“[t]he judicial power of the United States shall not be construed
to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted by
one of the United States by Citizens of another State.” The
Eversons correctly note that the Eleventh Amendment does not bar
suits seeking damages from government officials in their individual
capacities. See S.C. State Ports Auth. v. Fed. Mar. Comm’n, 243
F.3d 165, 170 (4th Cir. 2001). However, this principle does not
aid the Eversons because the only conduct the Eversons challenge is
Doughton’s disposition of state court proceedings. Therefore, the
district court properly dismissed the action as being barred by the
Eleventh Amendment. See Will v. Michigan Dep’t of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (“[A] suit against a state official in his
or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but
rather is a suit against the official’s office” and therefore “is
no different from a suit against the State itself.”). Accordingly,
the Eleventh Amendment also bars the Eversons’ claims.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before
the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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