Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Firestone Fibers & Textiles Co.

PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
DAVID WISE,
Intervenor-Plaintiff,
v.  No. 06-2203
FIRESTONE FIBERS & TEXTILES
COMPANY, a Division of BFS
Diversified Products; BFS
DIVERSIFIED PRODUCTS, LLC;
BRIDGESTONE AMERICAS HOLDING,
INCORPORATED,
Defendants-Appellees.

2 EEOC v. FIRESTONE FIBERS

DAVID WISE, 
Intervenor-Plaintiff-Appellant,
and
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION,
Plaintiff,
v.  No. 06-2241
FIRESTONE FIBERS & TEXTILES
COMPANY, a Division of BFS
Diversified Products; BFS
DIVERSIFIED PRODUCTS, LLC;
BRIDGESTONE AMERICAS HOLDING,
INCORPORATED,
Defendants-Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Western District of North Carolina, at Charlotte.
Robert J. Conrad, Jr., Chief District Judge.
(3:04-cv-00467)

Argued: December 5, 2007

Decided: February 11, 2008

Before WILKINSON and KING, Circuit Judges, and
Henry F. FLOYD, United States District Judge for the
District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.

Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Wilkinson wrote the opinion,
in which Judge King and Judge Floyd joined.
 EEOC v. FIRESTONE FIBERS 3
COUNSEL

ARGUED: James M. Tucker, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Washington, D.C.; Vicki B.
Rowan, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellants. H. Bernard Tis-
dale, III, OGLETREE, DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART,
P.C., Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellees. ON BRIEF: Ronald
S. Cooper, General Counsel, Lorraine C. Davis, Acting Associate
General Counsel, U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
COMMISSION, Washington, D.C., for Appellant Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. James B. Spears, Jr., OGLETREE,
DEAKINS, NASH, SMOAK & STEWART, P.C., Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellees.

OPINION

WILKINSON, Circuit Judge:

The United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
and David A. Wise appeal the district court’s grant of summary judg-
ment for Firestone Fibers & Textiles Company in this Title VII
action. Specifically, appellants contend that Firestone discriminated
against Wise because of his religion when it failed to reasonably
accommodate Wise’s religious beliefs, resulting in his unlawful ter-
mination.

Because we find that Firestone provided Wise with a reasonable
accommodation, and thus satisfied its obligation under 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(j), we affirm.

I.

A.

From December 1994 to September 2002, Firestone employed
Wise at its two facilities in Gastonia and Kings Mountain, North Car-
olina. Both plants operate a treating unit for tire cord fabric that
requires support from a testing laboratory. Each laboratory, when
4 EEOC v. FIRESTONE FIBERS
fully staffed, has four people working per shift, including a laboratory
floater and laboratory technician. There must always be someone
working the laboratory technician shift when the treating unit is oper-
ating.

In 2001, while serving as a lab floater, Wise became a member of
the Living Church of God. His religion prohibits him from working
during the faith’s weekly Sabbath, which takes place from sundown
on Friday to sundown on Saturday. In addition, Wise must observe,
and therefore cannot work on, seven sets of religious holidays. The
holidays, which are based on certain biblical Holy Days, are Passover,
the Feast of Unleavened Bread, the Day of Pentecost, the Feast of
Trumpets, the Day of Atonement, the Feast of Tabernacles, and the
Last Great Day. These holidays typically total twenty days, including
fourteen that do not already coincide with part of the weekly Sabbath.
Despite these numerous religious obligations, Wise did not encounter
a work attendance problem in 2001 because, as a day-shift floater, he
typically worked from 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m., Mondays through Fri-
days. Thus, he usually was not scheduled to work during the Sabbath
and used company vacation days for his non-Sabbath observances.

In February 2002, Firestone instituted a series of layoffs and, as a
result, restructured its operations. Though he was not laid off, the
restructuring forced Wise to change positions and shifts. Pursuant to
the applicable collective bargaining agreement, Wise was bumped by
a fellow employee with more seniority from his position as a floater
to the job of lab technician. Additionally, and once again based on
seniority, Wise also was assigned a new shift: 3:00 p.m. to 11:00
p.m., Mondays through Fridays, and Saturdays whenever the treating
unit was operating (which, in 2002, was nearly every Saturday). The
more desirable 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. shift, Wise’s former time slot,
went to employees with more seniority.

Because the 3:00-11:00 p.m. shift would conflict with his Sabbath
on a weekly basis (i.e. Friday evenings and Saturday afternoons),
Wise realized he would not possess enough leave time to meet both
his work and religious obligations. Thus, soon after the change was
implemented, Wise approached his supervisor, Kevin Cash, to talk
about his predicament. Wise and Cash then met with Dennis Jozwia-
kowski, Firestone’s Human Resources Manager, to discuss the matter.
 EEOC v. FIRESTONE FIBERS 5
Wise explained his situation and asked whether he could be accom-
modated in a way that would permit him to observe his weekly Sab-
bath without running afoul of the company’s attendance policy.

In reviewing the request, Jozwiakowski considered several possible
accommodations. First, he looked into whether Wise could be trans-
ferred to a different shift, particularly the 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. slot.
Jozwiakowski determined that such a move was not feasible because
Wise lacked the requisite seniority to make such a transition without
contravening the governing collective bargaining agreement ("CBA").1
Similarly, Jozwiakowski looked at whether Wise could be moved to
a different position. This, too, was deemed a non-viable option as
Wise lacked either the necessary seniority or required skills to be
placed in a different job. Jozwiakowski also considered whether it
would be possible to leave Wise’s shift uncovered during the hours
of his Sabbath. However, this was rejected because a lab technician
had to be present at all times when the treating unit was operating.
Likewise, Jozwiakowski determined that excusing Wise from the por-
tions of his shift that conflicted with his Sabbath, without having the
absences count against the company’s attendance policy, would be
too problematic. This was because of the burden such an accommoda-
tion would place on Firestone and especially on Wise’s fellow
employees, as someone would have to consistently work overtime to
cover Wise’s shift.

About a week after the initial meeting, Jozwiakowski informed
Wise that Firestone could not make any special accommodation and
that Wise would instead have to rely on the standard attendance
accommodations provided to all employees. Specifically, the CBA
granted all employees with Wise’s seniority fifteen, eight-hour vaca-
tion days and three floating holidays. Firestone also allowed employ-
1
Wise’s employment relationship with Firestone was largely governed
by a collective bargaining agreement between Firestone and the United
Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO, LLC, Local Union 1133. The agree-
ment covers a variety of issues, including those involving grievance pro-
cedures (Article IV), hours and overtime (VI), vacations (VII), holidays
(VIII), wages (IX), and leaves of absence (XI). Like most collective bar-
gaining agreements, its provisions relied heavily on a seniority-based
system (see Article V).
6 EEOC v. FIRESTONE FIBERS
ees to swap shifts twice per quarter, for a total of eight times per year.
In addition, pursuant to a company attendance policy referenced in
the CBA, employees could take up to sixty hours of unpaid leave for
any reason of their choosing. Finally, under the CBA, if an employee
took less than thirty-six hours of unpaid leave, he could use up to
three of his vacation days in half-day increments, for a total of six
half-day vacations. However, under the company’s attendance policy,
an employee who exceeded sixty hours of unpaid leave would be ter-
minated. Because of the staffing concerns noted above, this sixty hour
cap remained in force with respect to Wise.

From February to September 2002, Wise utilized vacation days,
floating holidays, and unpaid leave time in order to avoid working
during the Sabbath and on religious holidays. He did not, however,
make use of the available shift-swapping mechanisms. Cash also
assisted Wise by altering the schedule when possible and having Wise
work a 7:00 a.m. to 7:00 p.m. shift on certain Fridays when a lab
worker from the 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. shift was absent.

On September 3, 2002, having exhausted his allotted vacation days
and floating holidays, and close to using all of his unpaid leave time,
Wise requested permission to take an unpaid leave of absence (which
is distinct from the aforementioned sixty-hours unpaid leave). Wise
requested leave for eleven days in September in order to observe two
religious holidays: the Day of Atonement (Monday, September 16)
and the Feast of Tabernacles (Friday, September 20 through Sunday,
September 29). The request was received and considered by Jozwia-
kowski and Tom Kirksey, Firestone’s Employee Relations Manager.
After reviewing Firestone’s handling of previous leaves of absence
requests, Jozwiakowski and Kirksey determined that such requests
had typically been granted only for "one-time," or non-recurring,
events. Consistent with this precedent, they denied Wise’s leave of
absence request.

Wise did not report to work those days and, as a result, exceeded
his sixty-hour unpaid leave limit on September 20, 2002. He was ter-
minated by Firestone three days later.

B.

On March 19, 2003, Wise filed a charge of discrimination with the
EEOC, alleging that Firestone had discriminated against him because
 EEOC v. FIRESTONE FIBERS 7
of his religion when it terminated him in September 2002. The charge
claimed that Firestone violated Title VII when it failed to provide
Wise with a reasonable accommodation that would allow him to
observe his Sabbath and religious holidays without being fired. After
conducting an investigation, the EEOC determined that the evidence
supported Wise’s allegations.

On September 9, 2004, the EEOC filed a complaint on behalf of
Wise in federal district court against Firestone, BFS Diversified Prod-
ucts, LLC, (of which Firestone is a division), and Bridgestone Ameri-
cas Holding, Inc., which is Firestone’s parent corporation. The
complaint alleged that the defendants had discriminated against Wise
because of his religion and failed to accommodate his religious beliefs
in violation of Title VII. Wise joined the suit as a plaintiff-intervenor
and filed his own complaint in intervention. After taking discovery,
the defendants requested that Bridgestone be dismissed as a defen-
dant, since it was not named in the initial EEOC charge, and filed a
motion for summary judgment on the merits of the plaintiffs’ claims.

On September 13, 2006, the district court dismissed Bridgestone
and granted the motion for summary judgment in favor of Firestone.
As to the merits, the district court held that Firestone had "provide[d]
reasonable accommodation for Wise’s religious observances in accor-
dance with Title VII requirements." It emphasized the various vaca-
tion and leave time policies that were available to Wise and the
general nature of the seniority system. In the alternative, the court
opined that "to the extent Firestone did not accommodate [Wise], its
failure was legally excused by the [undue] burden such accommoda-
tion would" have inevitably caused Firestone. Therefore, the court
concluded, no reasonable juror could find that Firestone had failed to
satisfy its obligations under Title VII.

The EEOC and Wise filed timely appeals, which we now consider.

II.

We briefly set forth the relevant legal standards that guide our deci-
sion in this case.
8 EEOC v. FIRESTONE FIBERS
A.

Title VII makes it an "unlawful employment practice for an
employer . . . to discharge any individual . . . because of such individ-
ual’s . . . religion." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000). "[S]omewhat
awkwardly," Congress "illuminate[d] the meaning of religious dis-
crimination" by how it defined "religion" for the purposes of Title
VII. Ansonia Bd. of Educ. v. Philbrook, 479 U.S. 60, 63 n.1 (1986).
Specifically, § 2000e(j) provides that "[t]he term ‘religion’ includes
all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief,
unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably
accommodate to an employee’s or prospective employee’s religious
observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the
employer’s business." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). Thus, an employer has a
"statutory obligation to make reasonable accommodation for the reli-
gious observances of its employees, short of incurring an undue hard-
ship." Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 75 (1977).

In religious accommodation cases, we employ a burden shifting
scheme akin to the one articulated by the Supreme Court in McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). A plaintiff must
first establish a prima facie claim by showing that "(1) he or she has
a bona fide religious belief that conflicts with an employment require-
ment; (2) he or she informed the employer of this belief; [and] (3) he
or she was disciplined for failure to comply with the conflicting
employment requirement." Chalmers v. Tulon Co. of Richmond, 101
F.3d 1012, 1019 (4th Cir. 1996) (quoting Philbrook v. Ansonia Bd. of
Educ., 757 F.2d 476, 481 (2d Cir. 1985), aff’d on other grounds, 479
U.S. 60 (1986)).

"If the employee establishes a prima facie case, the burden then
shifts to the employer to show that it could not [reasonably] accom-
modate the plaintiff’s religious needs without undue hardship." Chal-
mers, 101 F.3d at 1019; see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j). This is a two-
prong inquiry. To satisfy its burden, the employer must demonstrate
either (1) that it provided the plaintiff with a reasonable accommoda-
tion for his or her religious observances or (2) that such accommoda-
tion was not provided because it would have caused an undue
hardship — that is, it would have "result[ed] in ‘more than a de
 EEOC v. FIRESTONE FIBERS 9
minimis cost’ to the employer." Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 67 (quoting
Hardison, 432 U.S. at 84).

Thus, if an employer has provided a reasonable accommodation,
we need not examine whether alternative accommodations not offered
would have resulted in undue hardship. See Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 68.
In fact, "where the employer has already reasonably accommodated
the employee’s religious needs, the statutory inquiry is at an end." Id.
This is because "the statute directs that any reasonable accommoda-
tion by the employer is sufficient to meet its accommodation obliga-
tion." Id. Moreover, the employer need not provide the employee with
his or her preferred accommodation. See id. (finding no basis "for
requiring an employer to choose any particular reasonable accommo-
dation"). Rather, so long as the employer has offered a reasonable
accommodation, it has fulfilled its duty under Title VII. See id. at 68-
69.

B.

Appellants contend, as they did before the district court, that an
employer provides a reasonable accommodation only when it "elimi-
nate[s] the conflict between the religious practice and the work
requirement." Brief of Appellant at 26. Put another way, appellants
argue that Title VII requires an employer, absent undue hardship, to
totally accommodate an employee’s religious observances. This
would essentially limit the Title VII analysis to whether an employ-
er’s failure to provide total accommodation was based on undue hard-
ship.

For the reasons that follow, we cannot accept appellants’ interpre-
tation of § 2000e(j) and hold that "reasonably accommodate" means
what it says: reasonably accommodate.

The problem with appellants’ "total" accommodation interpretation
is that such a construction ignores the plain text of the statute, namely
the inclusion of the word "reasonably" as a modifier of accommodate.
If Congress had wanted to require employers to provide complete
accommodation absent undue hardship, it could easily have done so.
For instance, Congress could have used the words "totally" or "com-
pletely," instead of "reasonably." It even could have left out any qual-
10 EEOC v. FIRESTONE FIBERS
ifying adjective at all. Rather, Congress included the term reasonably,
expressly declaring that an employer’s obligation is to "reasonably
accommodate" absent undue hardship — not to totally do so.

As the statutory language of § 2000e(j) makes clear, this is not an
area for absolutes. Religion does not exist in a vacuum in the work-
place. Rather, it coexists, both with intensely secular arrangements
such as collective bargaining agreements and with the intensely secu-
lar pressures of the marketplace. Hence the import of the statutory
term "accommodate." The provision’s use of the terms "reasonably"
and "undue hardship" likewise indicates that this is a field of degrees,
not a matter for extremes. Both terms are "variable ones," dependent
on the extent of the employee’s religious obligations and the nature
of the employer’s work requirements. See EEOC v. Ithaca Indus.,
Inc., 849 F.2d 116, 120 (4th Cir. 1988) (en banc) (Wilkinson, J., con-
curring). This makes sense in light of the competing purposes and
concerns underlying the right to religious accommodation in the
workplace. On the one hand, the "principal goal" of Title VII is "to
eliminate discrimination in employment." Hardison, 432 U.S. at 71
n.6. On the other hand, Congress recognized that because of business
necessity and the legitimate rights of other employees, it could "not
impose a duty on the employer to accommodate at all costs." Phil-
brook, 479 U.S. at 70.

In Hardison, while addressing Title VII’s "reasonable accommoda-
tion requirement," the Court observed that "the statute provides no
guidance for determining the degree of accommodation that is
required of an employer." 432 U.S. at 74-75 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Instead, the Court found that while "the employer’s statu-
tory obligation to make reasonable accommodation" was "clear," the
precise "reach of that obligation ha[d] never been spelled out by Con-
gress." Id. at 75. By struggling to locate the degree of accommodation
required under § 2000e(j), the Court recognized that the line was one
of reasonable, not total, accommodation.

A duty of "reasonableness" cannot be read as an invariable duty to
eliminate the conflict between workplace rules and religious practice.
See, e.g., Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 69 ("We accordingly hold that an
employer has met its obligation under [§ 2000e(j)] when it demon-
strates that it has offered a reasonable accommodation to the
 EEOC v. FIRESTONE FIBERS 11
employee." (emphasis added)); Ithaca, 849 F.2d at 118 ("[Title VII]
thus requires that an employer, short of undue hardship, make reason-
able accommodations to the religious needs of its employees."
(emphasis added)). But see Baker v. The Home Depot, 445 F.3d 541,
548 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that the "offered accommodation cannot
be considered reasonable because it did not eliminate the conflict
between the employment requirement and the religious practice"
(quoting EEOC v. Ilona of Hungary, Inc., 108 F.3d 1569, 1576 (7th
Cir. 1996))); Opuku-Boateng v. California, 95 F.3d 1461, 1467 (9th
Cir. 1996) (holding that the employer must "eliminate the religious
conflict," or "either accept the employee’s proposal or demonstrate
that it would cause undue hardship were it to do so").

Finally, appellants’ view also fails to square with US Airways, Inc.
v. Barnett, 535 U.S. 391 (2002). In that case, the Supreme Court inter-
preted a linguistically similar provision of the Americans with Dis-
abilities Act ("ADA") that also contains a "reasonable
accommodations" absent "undue hardship" clause. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(b)(5)(A). The plaintiff argued that "reasonable accommoda-
tion" should mean only "effective accommodation." Barnett, 535 U.S.
at 399. Specifically, he claimed that the Court, when interpreting the
term, should only consider the "accommodation’s ability to meet an
individual’s disability-related needs" and not any detrimental impact
it might otherwise create, either on the employer or others. Id. In
rejecting this interpretation, the Court remarked that "[f]or one thing,
in ordinary English the word ‘reasonable’ does not mean ‘effective.’"
Id. at 400. It also observed that the use of the term "reasonable" in the
disability context incorporates considerations other than those involv-
ing the effectiveness of the accommodation as it relates to the
employee’s needs. See id. at 400-401 (noting that "a demand for an
effective accommodation could prove unreasonable because of its
impact . . . on fellow employees"). Likewise, the term "reasonably
accommodate" in the religious context incorporates more than just
whether the conflict between the employee’s beliefs and the employ-
er’s work requirements have been eliminated. Considering an accom-
modation’s impact on both the employer and coworkers, for example,
is appropriate when determining its reasonableness.

Although we hold the "reasonably accommodate" and "undue hard-
ship" inquiries to be separate and distinct, this does not mean they are
12 EEOC v. FIRESTONE FIBERS
not interrelated. Indeed, there is much overlap between the two. For
instance, an accommodation that results in undue hardship almost cer-
tainly would not be viewed as one that would be reasonable. Like-
wise, the failure to consider alternative accommodations that pose no
undue hardship may, generally speaking, influence the determination
of whether an employer’s offered accommodation was reasonable. Cf.
Ithaca, 849 F.2d at 118 (finding the employer had violated Title VII
given its "absolute lack of effort at accommodation"). Taken together,
these standards ensure that while an employer must "actively attempt
to accommodate an employee’s religious expression or conduct,"
Chalmers, 101 F.3d at 1018, it is not required to do so "at all costs,"
Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 70.

In sum, if the plaintiff has established a prima facie case under
Chalmers, the burden is on the employer to show either (1) that it has
provided the plaintiff with a reasonable, though not necessarily a
total, accommodation or (2) that such reasonable accommodation was
not possible without causing undue hardship to the conduct of its
business. With these principles in mind, we now turn to the case at
hand.

III.

For the purposes of summary judgment and this appeal, Firestone
concedes that plaintiffs have established a prima facie case. The only
question before us then is whether Firestone satisfied its obligation
under Title VII. We hold that the district court properly determined
that Firestone reasonably accommodated Wise’s religious obser-
vances. Its grant of summary judgment was therefore appropriate.

A.

Through various mechanisms, each significant in their own right,
Firestone sought to assist Wise. These accommodations included pre-
existing company policies provided to all employees and specific
accommodations tailored to Wise’s particular situation. These accom-
modations plainly satisfied Title VII.

First, Firestone’s use of a seniority-based bidding system for work-
ing shifts "itself represent[s] a significant accommodation to the
 EEOC v. FIRESTONE FIBERS 13
needs, both religious and secular, of all of [its] employees." Hardison,
432 U.S. at 78. This is because a "seniority system represents a neu-
tral way of minimizing the number of occasions when an employee
must work on a day that he would prefer to have off." Id. When Joz-
wiakowski first reviewed Wise’s request, he examined whether Wise
could change shifts or positions. Unfortunately for Wise, Jozwia-
kowski could not grant such a move because Wise’s preferred shift
(7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m.) was occupied by employees with more
seniority. As the district court noted, however, "[t]he fact that Wise
does not currently benefit from the seniority system does not negate
the reasonableness of the accommodation."

Second, the governing CBA provided Wise with fifteen, eight-hour
vacation days and three floating holidays. Under the CBA, there were
no restrictions on the reasons for which these holidays could be used.
In addition, pursuant to the CBA, an employee with less than thirty-
six hours unpaid leave could take three of his vacation days in half-
day increments, for a total of six half-day vacations. These policies
also represent a significant accommodation. Indeed, the EEOC Guide-
lines on Discrimination Because of Religion highlights the use of
"[f]lexible [s]cheduling," such as "floating or optional holidays," as
"[o]ne means of providing reasonable accommodation." 29 C.F.R.
§ 1605.2(d)(1)(ii) (2007). Furthermore, because these holidays did not
contain any restriction on their use, they did not possess the sort of
limitations as did the "personal business" days at issue in Philbrook.
See Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 64; see also id. at 71 (noting that "unpaid
leave is not a reasonable accommodation when paid leave is provided
for all purposes except religious ones").

Third, Firestone allowed its employees to swap shifts up to twice
per quarter, for a total of eight times per year. Such an accommoda-
tion has also been described as another means of reasonable accom-
modation. See 29 C.F.R. § 1605.2(d)(1)(i) (stating that the use of
"voluntary swap[s]" constitutes a "[r]easonable accommodation").
Despite its availability, Wise did not attempt to take advantage of this
accommodation. This, however, does not render the accommodation
any less significant in the reasonableness calculus. See Philbrook, 479
U.S. at 69. In fact, Philbrook noted the importance of "bilateral coop-
eration" between an employer and employee in their search for a rea-
14 EEOC v. FIRESTONE FIBERS
sonable accommodation. Id. (quoting Brener v. Diagnostic Ctr.
Hosp., 671 F.2d 141, 145-146 (5th Cir. 1982)).

Fourth, under its company attendance policy, Firestone provided all
employees with sixty hours unpaid leave. This accommodation was
commonly referred to as the "no fault" attendance policy, because
employees could take unpaid leave for any reason of their choosing.
Such a flexible, non-restrictive, attendance policy also represents a
significant accommodation. See Philbrook, 479 U.S. at 70-71; 29
C.F.R. § 1605.2(d)(1)(ii).

These pre-existing attendance policies provided Wise and other
Firestone employees with numerous ways of taking time off when
necessary. Indeed, the combination of vacation days, floating holi-
days, shift swaps, and unpaid leave time could be structured in a way
to permit most employees the opportunity to meet all of their religious
observances.

Beyond these pre-existing attendance policies, Firestone offered
Wise at least two additional accommodations. First, supervisor Cash
allowed Wise to take more half-day vacations than allowed under the
CBA. As noted above, if an employee had less than thirty-six hours
unpaid leave, he could use up to three vacation days in half-day incre-
ments (for a total of six half-day increments). Although Wise had tal-
lied more than thirty-six hours of unpaid leave, he was nonetheless
allowed nine half-day vacations. This accommodation exceeded the
CBA allowance in two ways: (1) he took vacation days in half-day
increments despite having more than thirty-six hours unpaid leave and
(2) he took nine, rather than the maximum six, half-day vacations.
This demonstrates the willingness of Firestone to tolerate some vari-
ance from the CBA when it felt it was possible and appropriate. At
the very least, it constitutes another meaningful accommodation to
Wise’s religious observances.

Second, Cash would review the shift schedules on a weekly basis.
Notably, when someone from the 7:00 a.m. to 3:00 p.m. shift was
absent on Fridays, Cash would try to schedule Wise to work a 7:00
a.m. to 7:00 p.m. shift, allowing him to observe his Sabbath without
taking any leave time for Friday evening. When such a shift alteration
was not possible, Cash would have to find someone to cover Wise’s
 EEOC v. FIRESTONE FIBERS 15
absence. Given the limitations imposed by the seniority-based shift
assignments, this weekly review of the work schedule, and particu-
larly Cash’s willingness to alter Wise’s shift when possible, demon-
strates that Firestone "actively attempt[ed] to accommodate [Wise’s]
religious" observances. Chalmers, 101 F.3d at 1018.

Based on the accommodations described above, we agree with the
district court’s holding that "no reasonable juror could conclude that
Firestone did not provide reasonable accommodation for Wise’s reli-
gious observances in accordance with its Title VII requirements."

B.

Because we hold that Firestone reasonably accommodated Wise’s
religious observances, we need not consider whether alternative
accommodations would have been appropriate. See Philbrook, 479
U.S. at 68-69. Nevertheless, appellants insist that the above accom-
modations did not constitute a reasonable accommodation under Title
VII. Instead, they claim that Firestone, in order to satisfy its Title VII
obligation, should have allowed Wise to take more unpaid leave time
than permitted by the company’s attendance policy and/or granted
Wise’s request for a religious leave of absence. We do not find this
claim persuasive.

1.

Appellants first contend that Firestone should "have excused Wise
from its attendance policy’s sixty-hour limit on unpaid leave." Brief
of Appellant at 38. They assert that this would have eliminated the
conflict without adversely affecting Firestone or Wise’s fellow
employees.

It is well established that Title VII does not require an employer
to violate the terms of a collective bargaining agreement, especially
provisions pertaining to seniority-based scheduling. In Hardison, the
Court stated plainly that it did "not believe that the duty to accommo-
date require[d] [an employer] to take steps inconsistent with [an] oth-
erwise valid [collective bargaining] agreement." Hardison, 432 U.S.
at 78-83. Likewise, an employer is not required to adversely impact
16 EEOC v. FIRESTONE FIBERS
or infringe on the rights of other employees when accommodating
religious observances. See id. at 81. In fact, it "would be anomalous
to conclude that by ‘reasonable accommodation’ Congress meant that
an employer must deny the shift and job preference of some employ-
ees, as well as deprive them of their contractual rights, in order to
accommodate or prefer the religious needs of others." Id. Similarly,
our own circuit has held that an employer is not required to accommo-
date an employee’s religious need if it would "impose personally and
directly on fellow employees." Chalmers, 101 F.3d at 1021; see also
Weber v. Roadway Express, Inc., 199 F.3d 270, 274 (5th Cir. 2000)
(noting that the "mere possibility of an adverse impact on co-workers"
is sufficient grounds for not providing the proposed accommodation);
Balint v. Carson City, Nevada, 180 F.3d 1047, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999)
(en banc) (observing that an employer is not required to provide an
accommodation that "would cause more than a de minimis impact on
coworkers, such as depriving coworkers of seniority rights or causing
coworkers to shoulder the plaintiff’s share of potentially hazardous
work").

Therefore, when determining the reasonableness of a possible
accommodation, it is perfectly permissible for an employer to con-
sider the impact it would have on a seniority-based scheduling system
as well as on other employees. While such considerations may not be
based on mere speculation or conjecture, see Brown v. Polk County,
Iowa, 61 F.3d 650, 655 (8th Cir. 1995) (en banc), an employer is not
required "to wait until it [feels] the effects" of the proposed accommo-
dation before determining its reasonableness, see Weber, 199 F.3d at
275 (citing Beadle v. City of Tampa, 42 F.3d 633 (11th Cir. 1995)).
Indeed, employers must be given leeway to plan their business opera-
tions and possible accommodative options in advance, relying on an
accommodation’s predictable consequences along the way. If an
employer reasonably believes that an accommodation would entail a
violation of the applicable CBA or impose "more than a de minimis
impact on coworkers," then it is not required to offer the accommoda-
tion under Title VII. Balint, 180 F.3d at 1054.

Given the frequency with which Wise wanted time off and the fact
that a lab technician needed to be present whenever the treating unit
was operating, Firestone asserts that excusing Wise from the atten-
dance policy’s sixty-hour leave limit would impose a disproportionate
 EEOC v. FIRESTONE FIBERS 17
and unfair burden on his fellow employees. Specifically, Firestone
thought it could not accommodate Wise’s request because "other lab
employees would be imposed upon from the standpoint of being
required to work to cover for [Wise]." See J.A. 152, 204, 219 (deposi-
tion of Dennis Jozwiakowski); see also Brief of Appellees at 48-49.
When Wise was absent, a coworker would typically have to work
overtime to cover his shift. To complicate matters, the times that
needed to be covered, Friday evenings and Saturday afternoons, were
"the most undesirable hours to get anybody to work overtime," mak-
ing them the "hardest time . . . to fill." See J.A. 264 (deposition of
Kevin Cash). Firestone feared that if it allowed Wise to take extra
unpaid leave, this would undermine the seniority-based scheduling
system and adversely affect the "shift and job preference of some
employees." Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81.

We find this assessment reasonable. To begin, the company atten-
dance policy and its sixty-hour cap are intimately tied to the seniority-
based scheduling system utilized under the CBA. Because of Fire-
stone’s "around-the-clock operation[s]," id. at 80, and limited number
of laboratory staff, allowing excessive amounts of unpaid leave time
would in all likelihood deprive other employees of their desired shift
preferences under the CBA. The sixty-hour cap underpins the entire
scheduling structure, ensuring that employees are not required to
work other, less-preferred shifts on an inordinate number of occa-
sions. If Firestone were not to apply the attendance policy to one, and
only one, employee, it would risk lowering morale by displaying
favoritism, impinging on the shift rights of other employees, and vio-
lating the CBA and its seniority-based scheduling system.

Appellants retort that several of Wise’s coworkers indicated they
did not have a problem with covering his absences. While that may
have been the case at the time, it was reasonable for Firestone to be
concerned that such feelings would not be long-lived. This is because
there is a significant difference between covering for an employee
who is using the same amount of leave time as everyone, and cover-
ing for an employee who has been granted a special exception and
allowed to take substantially more leave time than anyone. While the
former could be viewed as just "part of the job," the latter may carry
with it the sting of unfairness.
18 EEOC v. FIRESTONE FIBERS
This is no small matter. Other employees may be left wondering
why they are forced to work during valuable personal or family time
despite having higher seniority. Indeed, such an accommodation treats
an employee with a religious obligation differently than an employee
with important, but non-religious, obligations of their own, such as
caring for a sick child or spouse. See Hardison, 432 U.S. at 81. This
could cause feelings of unequal treatment, which can cause real prob-
lems in a workforce. See Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S.
703, 710 & n.9 (1985) (noting that "[o]ther employees who have
strong and legitimate, but non-religious, reasons for wanting a week-
end day off" would be "significant[ly] burden[ed]" if Sabbath observ-
ers were granted an absolute right not to work on their Sabbath). In
addition to considering "lost efficiency" concerns, see Hardison, 432
U.S. at 84, it was permissible for Firestone to consider the rights and
perceptions of fairness of other employees when determining whether
to provide such an accommodation.

Because of the magnitude of the accommodation sought, and the
sheer number of hours a small group of coworkers would have been
forced to cover, it was sensible for Firestone to believe that Wise’s
proposed accommodation was not a reasonable one.

2.

Appellants’ next claim — that Firestone should have granted
Wise’s leave of absence request — is equally unpersuasive. In Sep-
tember 2002, Wise requested an unpaid leave of absence for eleven
days in order to observe two religious holidays. Jozwiakowski and
Kirksey denied the request, noting that unpaid leaves of absence had
traditionally been granted only for one-time, non-recurring, events.
They also noted that Firestone had twice denied earlier religious-
related leaves of absence requests, both pertaining to annual mission
trips, because they were not one-time events. Those employees had
to use vacation time instead.

For the reasons noted in the previous section, Firestone acted rea-
sonably when it denied Wise’s request. The CBA’s leaves of absence
section proclaims that "excessive or unwarranted absenteeism" "re-
duces Plant effectiveness and places an unnecessary burden on
employees." In light of these concerns, it had been Firestone’s prac-
 EEOC v. FIRESTONE FIBERS 19
tice to deny leaves of absence requests for recurring commitments.
This is not surprising, as such absences would be, in essence, a conve-
nient circumvention of the attendance policy’s sixty-hour limit for
unpaid leave time.

It is plain that Wise’s religious observances were not one-time obli-
gations. If Firestone were to grant a special exception for Wise for
recurring obligations, it would have imposed the same type of bur-
dens on the seniority-based scheduling system and Wise’s fellow
employees as if it had excused him from the attendance policy alto-
gether. As discussed earlier, evenhandedness and fairness are of para-
mount importance to the functionings of any workplace. Co-workers
have their rights, too.

IV.

While we in no way question the sincerity of Wise’s beliefs, we are
equally convinced that the accommodations Firestone provided satis-
fied its obligations under § 2000e(j). Firestone’s inability to com-
pletely accommodate Wise was not the result of a lack of desire, nor
was it based on any intent to discriminate against his religion. Rather,
the failure to achieve a total accommodation rests on the simple fact
that Wise’s request for such an extraordinary number of hours
exceeded what could be reasonably accommodated under the circum-
stances described above.

Because we find no issue of triable fact, and because the district
court correctly determined that Firestone reasonably accommodated
Wise’s religious beliefs,2 the district court’s decision is in all respects

AFFIRMED.
2
We also affirm the district court’s decision to dismiss Bridgestone as
a defendant. Because we would have dismissed the case against Bridge-
stone, even if it were a proper party, on the same grounds as Firestone,
we need not resolve the merits of the EEOC notification issue.