UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-5215
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
DONALD MILTON BOYSAW,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of Virginia, at Roanoke. James C. Turk, Senior District
Judge. (7:03-cr-00128)
Submitted: February 14, 2008 Decided: February 22, 2008
Before WILKINSON and KING, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Larry W. Shelton, Federal Public Defender, Fay F. Spence, Assistant
Federal Public Defender, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellant. John L.
Brownlee, United States Attorney, R. Andrew Bassford, Assistant
United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Donald Milton Boysaw of being a felon in
possession of a firearm (Count 1) and ammunition (Count 2), in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2000), and the district court
sentenced Boysaw as an armed career criminal to 188 months of
imprisonment. Boysaw appealed his convictions and sentence,
challenging, inter alia, his armed career criminal classification
on the grounds that the predicate convictions should not have been
considered due to their age and that the district court violated
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), by enhancing his
sentence with convictions that were neither charged in the
indictment nor admitted by him and by sentencing him under a
mandatory guidelines system. Although this court held that “[t]he
district court properly determined that Boysaw qualified as an
armed career criminal” and that there was no Sixth Amendment error
in the district court’s reliance on the prior convictions, we
concluded that the district court committed statutory Booker error
by sentencing Boysaw under a mandatory guidelines scheme, vacated
Boysaw’s sentence, and remanded for resentencing. United States v.
Boysaw, 198 F. App’x 321, 324-26 (4th Cir. 2006) (“Boysaw I”),
cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 521 (2007) (No. 07-6723).
On remand for resentencing, Boysaw renewed his objections
to the armed career criminal designation, asserting that he was
convicted of simple possession of cocaine. Boysaw also contended
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that the district court did not follow Taylor v. United States, 495
U.S. 575 (1990), and Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13 (2005),
in determining that his prior convictions qualified as serious drug
offenses for purposes of 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(e) (West 2000 & Supp.
2007), because the court did not require the government to provide
certified copies of the state court judgments. The district court
overruled Boysaw’s objections, departed below the advisory
sentencing guideline range of 188 to 235 months of imprisonment,
and sentenced Boysaw to 180 months in prison, the statutory
mandatory minimum sentence. Boysaw appeals the 180-month sentence
imposed on remand.
In this appeal, Boysaw challenges his armed career
criminal designation on the ground that the court relied on
information not approved by Taylor and Shepard. The Government
asserts that Boysaw’s claim is foreclosed by the decision in
Boysaw I. We agree with the Government. In Boysaw I, we held that
the district court properly designated Boysaw as an armed career
criminal. Thus, we find that Boysaw’s claim is barred by the
law-of-the-case doctrine and that none of the exceptions applies.
See United States v. Aramony, 166 F.3d 655, 661 (4th Cir. 1999)
(discussing doctrine and exceptions thereto); see also Volvo
Trademark Holding Aktiebolaget v. Clark Machinery Co., 510 F.3d
474, 481 (4th Cir. 2007) (“[A] remand proceeding is not the
occasion for raising new arguments or legal theories.”); United
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States v. Bell, 5 F.3d 64, 66 (4th Cir. 1993) (stating that mandate
rule “forecloses relitigation of issues expressly or impliedly
decided by the appellate court,” as well as “issues decided by the
district court but foregone on appeal”).
Accordingly, we affirm Boysaw’s sentence. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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