UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4443
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
versus
BRIAN JAMES BRONSON, a/k/a Little B,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III,
District Judge. (5:06-cr-00249-D)
Submitted: February 4, 2008 Decided: February 27, 2008
Before NIEMEYER and TRAXLER, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Carl G. Ivarsson, Jr., COOK & IVARSSON, Fayetteville, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Anne Margaret Hayes, Assistant United
States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Brian James Bronson appeals his conviction and the 262-
month sentence imposed following his guilty plea to one count of
knowingly and intentionally distributing fifty grams or more of
cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000).
Bronson’s attorney filed a brief in accordance with Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), certifying there are no
meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning the sufficiency of
Bronson’s Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing and the reasonableness of his
sentence. The Government did not file a brief, and although
advised of his right to do so, Bronson has declined to file a pro
se supplemental brief. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
We first conclude the district court fully complied with
the requirements of Rule 11 in conducting Bronson’s plea hearing.
The district court advised Bronson regarding his rights under
federal law, the nature and elements of the charges to which he was
pleading guilty, and the applicable statutory mandatory minimum and
statutory maximum and period of supervised release. The court also
questioned Bronson to ensure he was competent to plead guilty.
Bronson further informed the court that, prior to signing the plea
agreement, he had discussed it with his attorney, with whom he was
satisfied. The district court further accepted the Government’s
proffer of evidence to establish a factual basis for Bronson’s
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guilty plea. As noted by counsel in his Anders brief, there was no
Rule 11 error.
We next address Bronson’s contention that his sentence is
unreasonable. As recently determined by the Supreme Court,
“[r]egardless of whether the sentence imposed is inside or outside
the Guidelines range, the appellate court must review the sentence
under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, 128
S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). We remain charged with reviewing sentences
for reasonableness, id. at 594, 597, which requires that we
consider both the procedural and substantive reasonableness of a
sentence. Id. at 597.
In determining whether a sentence is procedurally reasonable,
this court first assesses whether the district court properly
calculated the defendant’s advisory Guidelines range. Id. at 596-
97. This court must then consider whether the district court
failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selected a sentence based
on “clearly erroneous facts,” or failed to sufficiently explain the
selected sentence. Id. at 597; United States v. Pauley, __ F.3d
__, 2007 WL 4555520, *5 (4th Cir. Dec. 28, 2007). Finally, we
review the substantive reasonableness of the sentence, “taking into
account the ‘totality of the circumstances, including the extent of
any variance from the Guidelines range.’” Pauley, __ F.3d __, 2007
WL 4555520, *5 (quoting Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597). This court
affords sentences that fall within the properly calculated
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Guidelines range a presumption of reasonableness, a presumption
permitted by the Supreme Court. Rita v. United States, __ U.S. __,
127 S. Ct. 2456, 2459, 2462 (2007).
Bronson did not object to the presentence report (“PSR”)
accepted by the district court. Significantly, Bronson raised no
challenge to the inclusion of either of the two prior felony drug
convictions that formed the basis for his designation as a career
offender. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1 (2006)
(“USSG”). Because the statutory maximum applicable to the charged
offense was life imprisonment, see 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(A) (West
1999 & Supp. 2007), Bronson’s career offender designation elevated
his offense level to 37 and his criminal history category to VI.
USSG § 4B1.1(b) (2006). Bronson’s base offense level was then
reduced three levels for acceptance of responsibility, resulting in
a total adjusted offense level of 34. This, coupled with the
category VI criminal history, yielded a sentencing range of 262-327
months’ imprisonment. USSG ch. 5, pt. A, sentencing table (2006).
The district court properly calculated Bronson’s advisory
Guidelines range and imposed a sentence at the bottom of that
range. As our review of the record reveals no procedural or
substantive defect in Bronson’s sentence, we conclude Bronson
cannot overcome the presumption of reasonableness that attaches to
his sentence. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at 2459, 2462.
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Because this case is before us pursuant to Anders, we
note that neither the issuance of the Supreme Court’s decision in
Kimbrough v. United States, __ U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 558 (2007), nor
the United States Sentencing Commission’s decision regarding the
retroactivity of Amendment 706,1 which lowered the base offense
level for crack offenses effective November 1, 2007, commands a
different result. Because Bronson was designated a career
offender, his base offense level of 37 was determined by the
statutory maximum sentence of life imprisonment applicable to his
offense under 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(b)(1)(A), not the drug quantity
found attributable to him. See USSG § 4B1.1(b)(A) (2006).2 Thus,
although the base offense level corresponding to the determined
drug quantity would be lower as a result of Amendment 706, the
amendment is ultimately of no consequence because calculation of
Bronson’s base offense level was driven by the career offender
designation. See USSG §§ 2D1.1(c)(3), 2D1.1 cmt. n.10(D)(I) (2007)
(calculating sentencing range using drug equivalency table as
amended would result in base offense level of 34).
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entirety
of the record and found no meritorious issues. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s judgment. We require that counsel
1
The amendment is retroactive effective March 3, 2008. See
http://www.ussc.gov/PRESS/rel121107.htm (Dec. 11, 2007).
2
The Sentencing Commission did not amend USSG § 4B1.1 in 2007.
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inform Bronson, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme
Court of the United States for further review. If Bronson requests
that a petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition
would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave
to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on Bronson. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately set
forth in the materials before the court and argument would not aid
the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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