UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4571
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SHIRELLE DENISE LOCKE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Robert J. Conrad, Jr.,
Chief District Judge. (3:05-cr-00036)
Submitted: February 29, 2008 Decided: March 14, 2008
Before WILKINSON and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and WILKINS, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Tolly A. Kennon, III, KENNON & ASSOCIATES, Charlotte, North
Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen C. F. Shappert, United States
Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, Amy E. Ray, Assistant United
States Attorney, Asheville, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Shirelle Denise Locke pled
guilty to one count of using and carrying a firearm during and in
relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 924(c)(1) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007). The district court sentenced
Locke to sixty months in prison. Locke timely appeals.
A federal grand jury returned a three-count indictment
against Locke, charging her with possession with intent to
distribute marijuana, in violation of 21 U.S.C.A. § 841(a)(1), (b)
(West 1999 & Supp. 2007), using and carrying a firearm during and
in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18
U.S.C.A. § 924(c)(1), and possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000). The magistrate
judge granted Locke’s motion for a psychiatric or psychological
evaluation and, over the course of her forty-five day stay at the
Federal Detention Center in Miami, Florida (“FDC Miami”), Locke was
evaluated by forensic psychologist, Manuel E. Gutierrez, Ph.D.
After reviewing Locke’s medical and criminal records,
observing her in the prison environment, interviewing her, and
subjecting her to several psychological tests, Gutierrez concluded
that Locke suffered from some mental disorders, but that she was
malingering with respect to her psychiatric symptoms and
recommended a finding of competency to stand trial. Following a
competency hearing, the magistrate judge found Locke competent to
stand trial. However, at a subsequent hearing conducted pursuant
to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, where Locke
- 2 -
had intended to enter a straight-up guilty plea to all three counts
with which she was charged, Locke expressed confusion about the day
and month and stated that she thought she was in court for a jury
trial. The magistrate judge terminated the hearing. Through
counsel, Locke requested a new mental competency evaluation from a
psychologist not associated with Dr. Gutierrez. Instead, the
district court ordered that Dr. Gutierrez perform a reevaluation,
noting that he wanted the psychologist to reassess his conclusions
in light of Locke’s behavior at the Rule 11 hearing.
Locke returned to FDC Miami where she stayed for twenty-
two days, and Dr. Gutierrez reevaluated her to determine if she was
still malingering. He reviewed the audiotape of the Rule 11
hearing, additional medical records that had been previously
unavailable, and conducted psychological testing with specific
indices for malingering. Based on this information, Dr. Gutierrez
concluded once more that Locke was malingering and was competent to
stand trial.
Locke was also examined by psychologist William M. Tyson,
Ph.D., who reviewed Locke’s medical records, the data and reports
generated by Dr. Gutierrez, and, on a single day, conducted his own
psychological tests. Dr. Tyson disagreed with Gutierrez’s
conclusion that Locke was malingering and found that, while
competent, she was likely to quickly become incompetent during
legal proceedings. After another competency hearing, where Drs.
Gutierrez and Tyson both testified and Locke was briefly
questioned, the court found Locke competent to stand trial. She
- 3 -
then entered a plea agreement and pled guilty to the § 924(c)(1)
offense.
Locke first contends on appeal that the district court
erred by finding her competent to stand trial. In making a
competency determination, the district court must decide whether
the defendant has “‘sufficient present ability to consult with
h[er] lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding
. . . and whether [s]he has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against h[er].’” United States v.
Robinson, 404 F.3d 850, 856 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting Dusky v.
United States, 362 U.S. 402 (1960)). A court must find a defendant
incompetent if it determines, “by a preponderance of the evidence
that the defendant is presently suffering from a mental disease or
defect rendering h[er] mentally incompetent to the extent that
[s]he is unable to understand the nature and consequences of the
proceedings against h[er] or to assist properly in h[er] defense.”
18 U.S.C. § 4241(d) (2000). Indicia of competence can include a
defendant’s behavior, her demeanor at trial, and any medical
opinion on competence. United States v. Mason, 52 F.3d 1286, 1290
(4th Cir. 1995). The competency standard for pleading guilty is
identical to that for standing trial. Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S.
389, 391 (1993). This court reviews a district court’s competency
determination for clear error. United States v. Cox, 964 F.2d
1431, 1433 (4th Cir. 1992).
Here, the court considered the evaluations and testimony
of two psychologists: Dr. Gutierrez, who diagnosed Locke with
- 4 -
mental disorders but found that she was competent and malingering
psychiatric symptoms, and Dr. Tyson, who found Locke competent but
likely to quickly become incompetent during legal proceedings. Dr.
Gutierrez’s conclusion that Locke was malingering was based on two
multi-week evaluations of Locke that entailed numerous tests,
including several that specifically measured malingering. Dr.
Tyson evaluated Locke for only one day and the psychological
assessment he conducted did not incorporate any tests that included
specific indices for malingering.
Dr. Tyson reviewed the data considered by Dr. Gutierrez,
as well as the tests conducted and the reports generated by
Gutierrez upon which he based his determination that Locke was
competent. Tyson questioned the validity of Gutierrez’s diagnosis
of malingering because Locke was prescribed several medications for
mental disorders while under Gutierrez’s care and the experts
agreed she suffered from mental disorders. However, neither the
fact that an individual has mental disorders nor that she is
prescribed psychiatric medications requires a finding of
incompetency. See Burket v. Angelone, 208 F.3d 172, 192 (4th Cir.
2000) (“Not every manifestation of mental illness demonstrates
incompetence to stand trial; rather, the evidence must indicate a
present inability to assist counsel or understand the charges.”).
We also note that Locke’s below average intelligence, history of
violent behavior, and her bizarre conduct at the first Rule 11
hearing did not mean that she was incompetent to stand trial. Id.
at 192 (“[N]either low intelligence, mental deficiency, nor
- 5 -
bizarre, volatile, and irrational behavior can be equated with
mental incompetence to stand trial.”).
We find that the district court did not clearly err in
choosing to credit Dr. Gutierrez’s findings over those of Dr. Tyson
and concluding that Locke was competent to stand trial. In
addition, we note that the district court’s decision to send Locke
back to Gutierrez in order to have him reassess his initial
findings in light of Locke’s behavior at the first Rule 11 hearing
and the magistrate judge’s observation of her at that hearing, was
a reasoned decision and did not amount to an abuse of discretion.
Cf. Mason, 52 F.3d at 1289 (applying abuse of discretion standard
to district court’s decision whether to hold competency hearing);
United States v. West, 877 F.2d 281, 285 n.1 (4th Cir. 1989)
(same).
Accordingly, we affirm Locke’s conviction. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
- 6 -