PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 06-4836
ARTHUR LEON BREWER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
James C. Cacheris, Senior District Judge.
(1:06-cr-00110)
Argued: November 2, 2007
Decided: March 20, 2008
Before NIEMEYER and KING, Circuit Judges, and
James A. BEATY, Jr., Chief United States District Judge
for the Middle District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge King wrote the opinion, in
which Judge Niemeyer and Judge Beaty joined.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Meghan Suzanne Skelton, Assistant Federal Public
Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Bal-
timore, Maryland, for Appellant. Richard Daniel Cooke, Special
Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Richmond, Virginia, for Appellee. ON
2 UNITED STATES v. BREWER
BRIEF: Michael S. Nachmanoff, Acting Federal Public Defender,
Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Chuck Rosenberg, United States
Attorney, Dennis Fitzpatrick, Assistant United States Attorney, Mar-
tha Pacold, Special Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Alexandria, Virginia, for
Appellee.
OPINION
KING, Circuit Judge:
Arthur Leon Brewer appeals from his sentence of seventy months
in prison, imposed in the Eastern District of Virginia on his 2006 con-
viction for distributing more than five grams of cocaine base
("crack"), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). On appeal, Brewer,
who is mentally handicapped, contends that the district court erred by,
inter alia, denying him a downward departure based on diminished
capacity and imposing a sentence that is unreasonable.1 As explained
below, we reject each of these contentions and affirm.
I.
A.
Brewer is thirty-nine years old and suffers from a rare genetic dis-
order called Anhidrotic Ectodermal Dysplasia. This disorder prevents
a person from maintaining a regular body temperature and causes
high fevers, particularly during childhood. It also results in damage
to bodily structures such as hair, skin, nails, and teeth. Brewer suffers
from these symptoms and does not have sweat glands, hair, teeth, eye-
1
In connection with his unreasonableness contention, Brewer argues
that Amendment 706, the Sentencing Commission’s recent revision to
the Guidelines concerning crack offenses, applies to his sentence and
mandates a remand for resentencing. As explained further in Part II.B.2,
because the Sentencing Commission made Amendment 706 retroactive,
the sentencing court possesses ample authority to consider this argument,
and we neither resolve the issue nor remand.
UNITED STATES v. BREWER 3
brows, or eyelashes. Brewer is also mentally retarded, likely a com-
plication of the high fevers he endured as a child. A late-childhood
IQ test, performed in 1981, indicated that Brewer had a Wechsler Full
Scale IQ of 73, a Verbal IQ of 69, and a Performance IQ of 81. Dur-
ing childhood, he was diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity
Disorder, which was treated with medication.
Brewer completed a full program of special education studies
through the Arlington County, Virginia public school system, gradu-
ating in 1985. Following high school, Brewer ran afoul of the law. In
March 1987, he was arrested for possession of cocaine and received
two years probation. In September 1987, Brewer was arrested for dis-
tributing phencyclidine (PCP) and, on February 5, 1988, received a
ten-month sentence. On September 27, 1988, soon after his release
from the PCP sentence, Brewer killed a man who had allegedly
harassed the child of one of Brewer’s friends. He was apprehended
two days later, and later convicted of second degree murder, posses-
sion and distribution of cocaine, possession of a firearm while pos-
sessing cocaine, and use of a firearm in the commission of a felony.
After these convictions, Brewer underwent a court-ordered psycho-
logical evaluation, which again included an IQ test. The results of this
1989 IQ test were essentially the same as his childhood test. His
Wechsler Full Scale IQ was 73, his Verbal IQ was 69, and he had a
Performance IQ of 79.2 The evaluation noted that Brewer had limited
insight into social situations and had poor short-term memory. It con-
cluded that "Mr. Brewer is verbally functioning within the Mild range
of mental retardation and that his non-verbal abilities are basically
within the Borderline range. He does show some potential for func-
tioning as high as the Average range." J.A. 91.3
In July 1989, Brewer was sentenced to thirty years on his 1988
offenses. While incarcerated in Virginia, he underwent yet another
psychological evaluation.4 This evaluation, prompted by Brewer’s
2
Brewer’s 1981 and 1989 test results are based on the Wechsler Adult
Intelligence Scale-Revised (WAIS-R).
3
Citations herein to "J.A. ___" refer to the Joint Appendix filed by the
parties in this appeal.
4
While incarcerated, Brewer also developed a friendship with a man
named Karim Akbah, who took Brewer under his wing. In gratitude for
4 UNITED STATES v. BREWER
reported depression and a suicide attempt, noted low cognitive func-
tioning, lack of concrete thinking, and attempts to compensate for
these deficiencies. Brewer was paroled by the Virginia authorities in
the summer of 2005, after serving approximately seventeen years.
Upon release, he moved in with his sister and secured two part-time
jobs — as a maintenance worker at a Bennigan’s restaurant and as a
cook at a Food Lion deli. Brewer’s sister reported that he had diffi-
culty dealing with the changes in his life after so long in prison. He
began to report auditory hallucinations and, due to these difficulties,
Brewer’s family tried to secure support services. In 2005, Brewer
again had a psychological evaluation, using the most recent Wechsler
scales, which reflected a Full Scale IQ of 59, a Verbal IQ of 64, and
a Performance IQ of 60.5 The accompanying report concluded that
Brewer was mildly mentally retarded.
While working at the Food Lion, Brewer became reacquainted with
a high school friend named Denise. According to Brewer, Denise
knew of Brewer’s impairment and began giving him advice and
explaining matters that were difficult for him — such as cell phones
and bank transactions. Brewer contends that Denise eventually per-
suaded him to sell crack and assured him that such activities carried
no risk. Brewer trusted Denise, and thought that she was acting in his
best interests.
On October 26, 2005, Brewer sold 2.8 grams of crack to an under-
cover detective in Alexandria, Virginia. A week later, he sold the
same detective 3.5 grams of crack. Brewer made four additional crack
sales to the detective in November and December 2005, in the follow-
ing amounts: 5.4 grams, 3.6 grams, 10.6 grams, and 6.8 grams.
Remarkably, Brewer charged the detective $320 for each of the first
four crack sales and $450 for the last two sales.
kind treatment (and not due to any religious conversion), Brewer appar-
ently changed his name to Bilal Abdur Rahman Brewer. Although this
name sometimes appears in the record, Brewer does not use it currently.
We refer to him simply as Brewer.
5
These 2005 test results are based on the Wechsler Adult Intelligence
Scale — Third Edition (WAIS-3). The record is unclear on whether
Brewer’s lower IQ test scores in 2005 reflect a decline in his cognitive
functioning since 1989, result from revisions to the test, or perhaps both.
UNITED STATES v. BREWER 5
B.
In March 2006, Brewer was charged in the Eastern District of Vir-
ginia, by way of a criminal information, with a single count of unlaw-
ful distribution of five grams or more of crack, in violation of 21
U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Brewer waived his right to indictment and
pleaded guilty to the information — without the benefit of a plea
agreement — on March 28, 2006.6
Between his plea hearing and his sentencing proceedings, Brewer
moved for a downward departure on the basis of section 5K2.13 of
the Sentencing Guidelines, contending that he was suffering from
diminished mental capacity at the time of the offense of conviction.
The district court considered this motion at the sentencing hearing on
July 21, 2006, and recognized that "Mr. Brewer’s well-documented
mental retardation, including his IQ scores ranging from 59-73, quali-
fies him as having a diminished mental capacity." J.A. 154. The court
observed that it was
inclined to conclude that the defendant’s mental retardation
may have in some way caused him to engage in the instant
criminal conduct. His impaired ability to make social judg-
ments and his reliance on others to make decisions makes
him a prime target for drug dealers, which could have
occurred in this case.
Id. at 154-55. The court, however, ultimately was "unwilling to find
that Mr. Brewer does not pose a danger to society, a necessary finding
for utilizing § 5K2.13 as the vehicle for a downward departure." Id.
at 155. In so ruling, the court emphasized that Brewer’s own evidence
shows that he is "impulsive and a follower," and that "admission,
alone, is sufficient justification to deny the motion." Id. Finally, the
court relied on Brewer’s extensive criminal history, which began
when he was twenty years of age.
6
During the plea colloquy, the district court thoroughly inquired on
whether Brewer understood the proceedings and the implications of his
guilty plea. There is no dispute concerning Brewer’s capacity to know-
ingly and intelligently waive indictment and plead guilty.
6 UNITED STATES v. BREWER
Utilizing the 2005 edition of the Sentencing Guidelines, the court
calculated Brewer’s offense level as 25, his criminal history category
as III, and his advisory sentencing range as seventy to eighty-seven
months. The court then imposed a sentence of seventy months, con-
cluding, after considering the § 3553(a) factors, that:
this sentence reflects the seriousness of the offense and pro-
motes respect for the law, punishment, and deterrence from
the crime, and also because of [Brewer’s] prior record[,]
protect[s] the public from further crimes.
J.A. 160. Brewer filed a timely notice of appeal, and we possess juris-
diction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
II.
A.
In pursuing his first contention of error, Brewer maintains that the
district court erred in denying his motion for a downward departure,
pursuant to section 5K2.13 of the Sentencing Guidelines, on the basis
of diminished capacity. Such a downward departure "may be war-
ranted if (1) the defendant committed the offense while suffering from
a significantly reduced mental capacity; and (2) the significantly
reduced mental capacity contributed substantially to the commission
of the offense." USSG § 5K2.13.7 Nevertheless, "the court may not
depart below the applicable guideline range if . . . the defendant’s
criminal history indicates a need to incarcerate the defendant to pro-
tect the public." Id. As noted, the sentencing court found that Brew-
er’s "well-documented mental retardation . . . . [q]ualifies him as
having a diminished mental capacity," J.A. 154, and that "the defen-
dant’s mental retardation may have in some way caused him to
engage in the instant criminal conduct," id. at 154-55. The court
declined to grant a downward departure based on diminished capac-
7
A "[s]ignificantly reduced mental capacity" means that a defendant,
"although convicted, has a significantly impaired ability to (A) under-
stand the wrongfulness of the behavior comprising the offense or to exer-
cise the power of reason; or (B) control behavior that the defendant
knows is wrongful." USSG § 5K2.13, cmt. n.1.
UNITED STATES v. BREWER 7
ity, however, because it was "unwilling to find that Mr. Brewer does
not pose a danger to society, a necessary finding for utilizing
§ 5K2.13 as the vehicle for a downward departure." Id.
We lack the authority to review a sentencing court’s denial of a
downward departure unless the court failed to understand its authority
to do so. This legal principle has been well settled for some time, and
was not disturbed by the Supreme Court’s decision in United States
v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). See United States v. Bayerle, 898
F.2d 28, 30-31 (4th Cir. 1990) (concluding that refusal to depart
downward is not reviewable unless court mistakenly believed it
lacked authority to depart); see also United States v. Allen, 491 F.3d
178, 193 (4th Cir. 2007) (declining to disturb court’s post-Booker sen-
tence where court understood ability to depart but declined to exercise
such authority). Our position on this issue is consistent with the deci-
sions of other courts of appeals that have addressed it. See United
States v. Cooper, 437 F.3d 324, 332 -33 (3d Cir. 2006) (joining deci-
sions from First, Sixth, Eighth, Tenth and Eleventh Circuits declining
to review sentencing court decisions to deny downward departures
post-Booker).
Importantly, at Brewer’s sentencing hearing, the court recognized
"at the outset that the Court realizes that it can depart upwards or
downwards in a given case depending on the law and circumstances."
J.A. 153. The court then evaluated whether a downward departure for
diminished capacity, as contemplated by section 5K2.13, was appro-
priate in Brewer’s situation — ultimately concluding that it was not.
Because the sentencing court understood its authority, but declined to
exercise it on the facts of this case, we are unable to review its deci-
sion to deny a downward departure.8
8
Brewer also contends on appeal that the mandatory minimum of five
years (sixty months), applicable to him pursuant to 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(B), is unconstitutional under the Eighth Amendment’s cruel
and unusual punishment clause. This is so, Brewer asserts, because the
Supreme Court has recognized that mentally retarded offenders are less
culpable than average offenders. For this contention, Brewer relies prin-
cipally on the Court’s decision in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002)
(concluding that capital punishment of mentally retarded criminals vio-
lates Eighth Amendment). Brewer, however, was sentenced to seventy
months, the bottom of his advisory Guidelines range, based on the dis-
trict court’s analysis of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. In these circum-
stances, Brewer’s Eighth Amendment assertion is without merit.
8 UNITED STATES v. BREWER
B.
Brewer next contends that his sentence was greater than necessary
and thus unreasonable. First, Brewer asserts that the district court
gave excessive weight to the advisory Guidelines range and his crimi-
nal history when determining his sentence. Second, Brewer contends
that Amendment 706 — the recent Guidelines amendment concerning
crack offenses — furthers his argument that his sentence was unrea-
sonably greater than necessary and compels us to remand. We discuss
these contentions in turn.
1.
Brewer first contends that his within-Guidelines sentence of sev-
enty months is unreasonable in light of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) fac-
tors. He argues that the sentencing court erred in focusing on his prior
unlawful activity — to the exclusion of the other § 3553(a) factors —
in determining his sentence. Brewer also asserts that the court gave
excessive weight to his advisory Guidelines range in its consideration
of the § 3553(a) factors.
On appeal, we review Brewer’s sentence under a deferential abuse-
of-discretion standard, "first ensur[ing] that the district court commit-
ted no significant procedural error." Gall v. United States, 128 S. Ct.
586, 597 (2007). Such procedural error may include, inter alia, "fail-
ing to consider the § 3553(a) factors" or "failing to adequately explain
the chosen sentence." Id. When a sentencing decision is determined
to be "procedurally sound," we "should then consider the substantive
reasonableness of the sentence imposed under an abuse-of-discretion
standard." Id. In conducting our review, we may accord a presump-
tion of reasonableness to a sentence that falls within the properly cal-
culated Guidelines range. See Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456,
2462 (2007) (holding that "a court of appeals may apply a presump-
tion of reasonableness to a district court sentence that reflects a proper
application of the Sentencing Guidelines").
At Brewer’s sentencing hearing, the court properly calculated his
relevant Guidelines offense level as 25, his criminal history category
as III, and the resulting advisory sentencing range as seventy to
eighty-seven months. The court then imposed the minimum Guide-
UNITED STATES v. BREWER 9
lines sentence of seventy months, specifying that it did so after con-
sidering the § 3553(a) factors.
Brewer contends that the court’s imposition of a sentence at the
bottom of the Guidelines range was unreasonable, in that it focused
exclusively on his prior criminal activity. This contention is, however,
factually incorrect. The court possessed and weighed the evidence of
Brewer’s history and personal characteristics, including his dimin-
ished capacity; considered the nature and circumstances of his
offense; and took into account his criminal history, specifically as it
related to the necessity of protecting the public. The court then sen-
tenced Brewer to seventy months, at the bottom of his advisory
Guidelines range. In the wake of Rita and Gall, this sentence is not
unreasonable.
2.
On October 30, 2007, counsel for Brewer made a letter submission
to us, pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 28(j), contend-
ing that the Sentencing Commission’s recent crack amendments sup-
port the contention that Brewer’s sentence is unreasonable. In
supplemental briefing on this contention, Brewer urges us to remand
to the district court for resentencing in the wake of the crack amend-
ments.
On May 1, 2007, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 994(p), the Sentencing
Commission submitted to Congress amendments to the Guidelines
that, absent congressional action to the contrary, became effective
November 1, 2007. See United States Sentencing Comm’n, Report to
Congress: Cocaine and Federal Sentencing Policy (May 2007) (the
"2007 Report"); see also Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558,
569 (2007) (describing Commission’s amendments to Sentencing
Guidelines). Amendment 706, pertaining to drug offenses involving
crack, adjusts downward by two levels the base offense level assigned
to each threshold quantity of crack listed in the Drug Quantity Table
in section 2D1.1. See USSG § 2D1.1 (Nov. 1, 2007); USSG Supp. to
App’x C, Amend. 706. The Commission premised Amendment 706
on its conclusion that the 100-to-1 ratio "overstate[s]" both "the rela-
tive harmfulness" of crack, and the "seriousness of most [crack]
offenses." 2007 Report at 8.
10 UNITED STATES v. BREWER
On December 11, 2007, the Commission unanimously voted to
make Amendment 706 retroactive, effective March 3, 2008. See
USSG § 1B1.10(c) (Mar. 3, 2008).9 The March 3, 2008 date having
passed without any action or modification by Congress, Amendment
706 is now potentially applicable to Brewer’s sentence. It is, however,
for the district court to first assess whether and to what extent Brew-
er’s sentence may be thereby affected, and that court is entitled to
address this issue either sua sponte or in response to a motion by
Brewer or the Bureau of Prisons. See 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).10
Accordingly, we need not remand for resentencing in order for
Brewer to pursue relief in the district court under Amendment 706,
and we decline to do so. However, this decision is rendered without
prejudice to Brewer’s right to pursue such relief in the sentencing court.11
III.
Pursuant to the foregoing, we reject Brewer’s contentions of error
and affirm.
AFFIRMED
9
Amendment 706 was amended by Amendment 711 in ways not rele-
vant to this appeal.
10
Section 3582(c)(2) provides that a sentencing court may not modify
a term of imprisonment after its imposition except
in the case of a defendant who has been sentenced to a term of
imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has subsequently
been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 994(o), upon motion of the defendant or the Director of
the Bureau of Prisons, or on its own motion, the court may
reduce the term of imprisonment, after considering the factors set
forth in [18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)] to the extent that they are applica-
ble, if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy state-
ments issued by the Sentencing Commission.
11
To the extent that Brewer contends his sentence is unreasonable
based on criticisms of the 100-to-1 crack/powder disparity contained in
the Commission’s 2007 Report, we need not resolve this contention. We
are satisfied to have the district court determine the impact, if any, that
the Commission’s adoption of Amendment 706 may have on Brewer’s
sentence.