UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4806
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MARK NATHANIEL HOPE, a/k/a Askare El Bey,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Fox, Senior
District Judge. (5:06-cr-00167-F)
Submitted: March 27, 2008 Decided: April 1, 2008
Before TRAXLER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Geoffrey W. Hosford, HOSFORD & HOSFORD, P.C., Wilmington, North
Carolina, for Appellant. David L. Hayden, OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES ATTORNEY, Anne Margaret Hayes, Assistant United States
Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Mark Nathaniel Hope appeals the 210-month sentence he
received following his guilty plea to one count of being a felon in
possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1),
924 (2000). Hope’s attorney filed a brief in accordance with
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), certifying there are no
meritorious grounds for appeal, but questioning the propriety of
Hope’s sentence. In his pro se supplemental brief, Hope maintains
the district court erred in sentencing him as an armed career
criminal. The Government did not file a brief. We have considered
the various arguments on appeal and reviewed the relevant record
and, for the reasons set forth below, we affirm.
As recently determined by the Supreme Court,
“[r]egardless of whether the sentence imposed is inside or outside
the Guidelines range, the appellate court must review the sentence
under an abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United States, __
U.S. __, 128 S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). We remain charged with
reviewing sentences for reasonableness, id. at 594, 597, which
requires that we consider both the procedural and substantive
reasonableness of a sentence. Id. at 597.
In determining whether a sentence is procedurally
reasonable, this court first assesses whether the district court
properly calculated the defendant’s advisory Guidelines range. Id.
at 596-97. This court must then consider whether the district
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court failed to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selected a sentence
based on “clearly erroneous facts,” or failed to sufficiently
explain the selected sentence. Id. at 597; United States v.
Pauley, 511 F.3d 468, 473 (4th Cir. 2007). Finally, we review the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence, “taking into account
the ‘totality of the circumstances, including the extent of any
variance from the Guidelines range.’” Pauley, 511 F.3d at 473,
(quoting Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 597). This court may afford sentences
that fall within the properly calculated Guidelines range a
presumption of reasonableness, see id., a presumption permitted by
the Supreme Court. Rita v. United States, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct.
2456, 2459, 2462 (2007).
Hope contends the district court erred in classifying him
an armed career criminal and enhancing his sentence accordingly.
More specifically, Hope argues his 1991 conviction for voluntary
manslaughter was improperly counted because his civil rights, which
had been revoked upon conviction, were restored. This contention
fails. The North Carolina Parole Board’s restoration order
expressly excluded Hope’s civil right to possess a firearm from the
general restoration of his rights. Thus, this conviction was
properly counted. See 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20) (2000). Moreover,
contrary to Hope’s contention, the age of this offense is
irrelevant. United States Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.4,
cmt. n.1 (2005).
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The district court properly calculated Hope’s advisory
Guidelines range, considered the statutory sentencing factors set
forth in 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007), and
imposed a sentence at the top-end of that range. Our review of the
record reveals no procedural or substantive defect in Hope’s
sentence, and Hope has not overcome the presumption of
reasonableness that attaches to his sentence. Rita, 127 S. Ct. at
2459, 2462. In addition to imposing a reasonable sentence, the
district court conducted a thorough Rule 11 colloquy prior to
accepting Hope’s guilty plea.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entirety
of the record and found no meritorious issues. Accordingly, we
affirm the district court’s judgment. We require that counsel
inform Hope, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court
of the United States for further review. If Hope requests that a
petition be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would
be frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a
copy thereof was served on Hope. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately set forth in
the materials before the court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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