PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
EUGENE SCHWEIKERT,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 06-2137
BANK OF AMERICA, N.A.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Maryland, at Greenbelt.
Peter J. Messitte, District Judge.
(8:06-cv-00292-PJM)
Argued: December 5, 2007
Decided: April 1, 2008
Before WILKINSON and KING, Circuit Judges, and
Henry F. FLOYD, United States District Judge for the
District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by published opinion. Judge Floyd wrote the opinion, in
which Judge Wilkinson and Judge King concurred.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Laurence S. Kaye, Gaithersburg, Maryland, for Appel-
lant. Elena Daly Marcuss, MCGUIREWOODS, L.L.P., Baltimore,
Maryland, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Julie Glass Martin-Korb, Rock-
ville, Maryland, for Appellant. Douglas M. Topolski, MCGUIRE-
WOODS, L.L.P., Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
2 SCHWEIKERT v. BANK OF AMERICA
OPINION
FLOYD, District Judge:
Eugene Schweikert appeals the district court’s order dismissing the
complaint against Bank of America, N.A. ("Bank") in this action.
Specifically, Schweikert contends that the district court erred by con-
cluding that (1) Schweikert was an "officer," whose claim was pre-
empted by the National Bank Act ("NBA"); and (2) Schweikert was
dismissed "by" the Bank’s Board of Directors ("Board"), as required
by the NBA. For the reasons stated below, we affirm the judgment of
the district court.
I.
A.
Schweikert worked for the Bank as a private client manager in the
private banking section of the Bank’s Chevy Chase, Maryland, office.
At the time of his termination, Schweikert’s title was Senior Vice
President. Schweikert helped a female client of the Bank arrange sev-
eral loans. When he received a telephone call from a caller who
claimed to be an FBI agent, Schweikert declined to divulge the female
client’s financial records.
On or about April 1, 2005, Schweikert’s employment was termi-
nated during a telephone call with one of his supervisors and a mem-
ber of the Bank’s human resources department. Schweikert was told
that he was being terminated because of poor judgment and his
alleged failure to cooperate with Bank internal and external investiga-
tions.
The Bank’s Board of Directors ratified Schweikert’s termination
from employment in its August 2, 2005, meeting. The minutes from
the meeting reflect that the
Board also reviewed proposals to approve the appointment
of Bank officers to the levels of Managing Director, Princi-
pal, Vice President, Senior Vice President, Executive Vice
SCHWEIKERT v. BANK OF AMERICA 3
President and Group Executive Vice President as set forth
on the document dated August 2, 2005 and the appointment
of all other officers as recorded in the personnel records of
the Bank and to ratify the termination from employment, as
officers of the Bank, the individuals listed on the document
entitled "Officer Separations" dated August 2, 2005. Upon
motion duly made, seconded and unanimously carried, the
Board approved the officer appointments and ratified the
terminations from employment. Copies of the lists are
attached as Exhibits H and I.
Schweikert is included on the Officer Separations list, with a separa-
tion date of April 7, 2005.
B.
Schweikert brought this action against the Bank in Maryland state
court, alleging wrongful or abusive discharge. The Bank removed the
matter to the United States District Court for the District of Maryland
on diversity grounds, then moved to dismiss the complaint on the
ground that the claim is preempted by the at-pleasure provision of the
NBA.
The district court granted the Bank’s motion to dismiss "in all
respects except insofar as [Schweikert] claims damages for the
interim period from his termination of employment on April 1,
2005[,] to the ratification of said termination by the Board of Direc-
tors on August 2, 2005." The district court held that the at-pleasure
provision of the Act precluded state common law wrongful discharge
claims. However, in the district court’s view, a question remained as
to whether, as a matter of law, there was a possible window of recov-
ery for the period between Schweikert’s termination and the Board
action ratifying the termination. Therefore, the district court invited
the Bank to file a second motion to dismiss on this limited issue.
Thereafter, Schweikert filed a motion for reconsideration, which
was denied by the district court. After the second motion to dismiss
was filed and briefed, counsel for Schweikert asked that he be given
an opportunity to amend the complaint to add a claim related to the
alleged unpaid wages that would not be dismissible in the same way
4 SCHWEIKERT v. BANK OF AMERICA
that the wrongful discharge claim would be. The district court
allowed Schweikert twenty days to amend the complaint. Schweikert
failed to amend the complaint within the twenty days. Instead, Sch-
weikert asked the court to certify judgment in favor of the Bank so
that he could take an instant appeal. This appeal by Schweikert fol-
lowed.
II.
We review de novo a district court’s dismissal pursuant to Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Schatz v. Rosenberg, 943 F.2d. 485,
489 (4th Cir. 1991). This Court will construe the factual allegations
of the complaint "in the light most favorable to plaintiff." Battlefield
Builders, Inc. v. Swango, 743 F.2d 1060, 1062 (4th Cir. 1984). How-
ever, the Court is "not so bound with respect to its legal conclusions."
Dist. 28, United Mine Workers, Inc. v. Wellmore Coal Corp., 609
F.2d 1083, 1085-86 (4th Cir. 1979).
A.
Section 24(Fifth) of the NBA provides that national banks shall
have the power
[t]o elect or appoint directors, and by its board of directors
to appoint a president, vice president, cashier and other offi-
cers, define their duties, require bonds of them and fix the
penalty thereof, dismiss such officers or any of them at plea-
sure, and appoint others to fill their places.
12 U.S.C. § 24(Fifth). "Courts that have considered [the at-pleasure
provisions of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act ("FHLBA"), 12
U.S.C. § 1432(a), and the Federal Reserve Act ("FRA"), 12 U.S.C.
§ 341(Fifth)] have interpreted them consistently with each other and
with the at-pleasure clause of the [NBA]." Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp.,
432 F.3d 976, 983 n.2 (9th Cir. 2005). This Court has previously
interpreted the at-pleasure provision of the FHLBA* and held that the
*The FHLBA provides, in relevant part, that "[t]he directors of each
Federal Home Loan Bank . . . shall have power . . . to select, employ,
and fix the compensation of such officers, employees, attorneys, and
agents . . . to define their duties, require bonds of them and fix the penal-
ties thereof, and to dismiss at pleasure such officers, employees, attor-
neys, and agents . . . ." 12 U.S.C. § 1432(a).
SCHWEIKERT v. BANK OF AMERICA 5
plaintiff’s state law claims were preempted by the clause. Andrews v.
Fed. Home Loan Bank of Atlanta, 998 F.2d 214, 220 (4th Cir. 1993)
("Congress intended for federal law to define the discretion which the
Bank may exercise in the discharge of employees."). The Court
observed that "[a]ny state claim for wrongful termination would
plainly conflict with the discretion accorded the Bank by Congress."
Id.
Consistent with our decision in Andrews that the at-pleasure provi-
sion of the FHLBA preempts state law claims for wrongful discharge,
we hold that the at-pleasure provision of the NBA preempts state law
claims for wrongful discharge as well. Accord Mackey v. Pioneer
Nat’l Bank, 867 F.2d 520, 525-26 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that the at-
pleasure provision of the NBA preempts state tort and contract
claims). Nevertheless, Schweikert contends that even if the at-
pleasure provision of the NBA generally preempts state law claims,
his wrongful discharge claim is not preempted because the require-
ments of § 24(Fifth) are not met in this case.
B.
To invoke the protection of the at-pleasure provision, a national
banking association’s board of directors must take action to dismiss
a bank officer. 12 U.S.C. § 24(Fifth); Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior
Court, 811 P.2d 1025, 1038 (Cal. 1991). Schweikert argues (1) that
he is not an "officer" of the Bank within the meaning of the NBA and
(2) that he was not dismissed "by" the Board. We disagree.
1.
Schweikert urges the Court to adopt an interpretation that limits
"other officers" to those having "unique or special power or authority
within the bank analogous to the power of the named officers."
(Appellant’s Br. 25.) Schweikert further argues that "[a]n ‘other offi-
cer’ must act or function in an executive capacity." (Appellant’s Br.
25.) We decline to adopt such a restrictive reading of "other officers."
Courts interpreting the at-pleasure provision have concluded that
persons holding comparable positions are officers. E.g., Mackey, 867
6 SCHWEIKERT v. BANK OF AMERICA
F.2d at 525 (executive vice president); Wells Fargo, 811 P.2d at 1032
(persons holding positions of vice president and serving as branch
managers). When deciding this issue, we must remain cognizant of
the purpose of the at-pleasure provision of the NBA — "to place the
fullest responsibility upon the directors by giving them the right to
discharge such officers at pleasure." Copeland v. Melrose Nat’l Bank
of New York, 241 N.Y.S. 429, 430 (N.Y. App. Div. 1930). The NBA
is broadly written and, when naming the officers who may be dis-
charged at pleasure, does not include restrictive words such as "top,"
"operating," "senior," or "executive."
Schweikert was a Senior Vice President of the Bank. (J.A. at 81-
82, 89.) He earned a salary of $135,000 per year. (J.A. at 11.) His
appointment to the position of Senior Vice President was approved by
the Board on April 27, 2004. (J.A. at 81-86.) The Board’s April 27,
2004, resolutions confirm that the corporate title "Senior Vice Presi-
dent" is an officer title of the Bank and was created as provided for
in the Bank’s bylaws. (J.A. at 87-88.) The district court did not err
when it concluded that Schweikert is an officer of the Bank within the
meaning of the NBA.
2.
Schweikert next argues that the Board’s dismissal power is nondel-
egable, and, therefore, the Board’s ratification of Schweikert’s termi-
nation does not invoke the preemptive effect of the at-pleasure
provision. We reject this argument.
Schweikert relies on Wells Fargo to support his argument that rati-
fication is not enough. However, in Wells Fargo, the Supreme Court
of California held only that the at-pleasure provision does not allow
delegation of the dismissal power, but failed to go so far as to hold
that a board’s ratification of a termination is insufficient. Rather, the
court held that "section 24 does not preempt state law causes of action
for wrongful discharge by a former national bank officer unless the
officer was dismissed by the bank’s board of directors itself or the
discharge was approved or ratified by the board." Wells Fargo, 811
P.2d at 1038.
We hold that ratification by a board of directors of a termination
is sufficient to invoke the preemptive effect of the at-pleasure provi-
SCHWEIKERT v. BANK OF AMERICA 7
sion of the NBA. An action recorded in the minutes of a board of
directors is an action taken by that board. To hold otherwise would
essentially insulate boards of directors from liability for their deci-
sions.
As previously noted, the minutes of the Board’s August 2, 2005,
meeting indicate that the "Board also reviewed proposals . . . to ratify
the termination from employment, as officers of the Bank, the indi-
viduals listed on the document entitled ‘Officer Separations’ dated
August 2, 2005." (J.A. at 92.) The document entitled "Officer Separa-
tions" includes "Schweikert, Eugene (Beau)" with a separation date of
April 7, 2005. (J.A. at 94.) These minutes reflect that the Board exer-
cised its discretion with respect to Schweikert and ratified his termi-
nation. Accordingly, the district court did not err when it determined
that Schweikert was dismissed by the Board.
III.
In sum, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the district court’s dis-
missal of Schweikert’s complaint.
AFFIRMED