PUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 06-4514
EDWIN GIOVANNI RODRIGUEZ-AMAYA,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Alexandria.
Gerald Bruce Lee, District Judge.
(1:05-cr-00518-GBL)
Argued: February 1, 2008
Decided: April 11, 2008
Before WILLIAMS, Chief Judge, WILKINSON, Circuit Judge, and
Patrick M. DUFFY, United States District Judge for the
District of South Carolina, sitting by designation.
Affirmed by published opinion. Chief Judge Williams wrote the opin-
ion, in which Judge Wilkinson and Judge Duffy joined.
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Geremy Charles Kamens, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL
PUBLIC DEFENDER, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Michael
John Frank, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Michael S. Nach-
manoff, Acting Federal Public Defender, Alexandria, Virginia, for
2 UNITED STATES v. RODRIGUEZ-AMAYA
Appellant. Chuck Rosenberg, United States Attorney, Alexandria,
Virginia, for Appellee.
OPINION
WILLIAMS, Chief Judge:
Edwin Giovanni Rodriguez-Amaya, an El Salvadoran national,
appeals his conviction for unlawful reentry after deportation by an
aggravated felon ("unlawful reentry"), in violation of 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1326(a) and (b)(2) (West 2005), arguing that his indictment and
subsequent conviction violated the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3161(b) (West 2000). Because the time Rodriguez-Amaya was
detained by United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement
("ICE") on administrative charges pending his removal was not deten-
tion "in connection with" his arrest for violating 8 U.S.C.A. § 1326(a)
and (b)(2), we conclude that Rodriguez-Amaya’s indictment did not
violate the Speedy Trial Act. We therefore affirm his conviction.
I.
In 1996, Rodriguez-Amaya was convicted of aggravated sexual
battery of a minor—specifically, an eleven year old girl—in Fairfax
County, Virginia and sentenced to eight years imprisonment. Under
8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(43)(A), this conviction constituted an "aggravated
felony" for purposes of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA").
8 U.S.C.A. § 1101(43)(A) (West 2005). Pursuant to the INA, aggra-
vated felons are subject to deportation, 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii) (West 2005). Accordingly, Rodriguez-Amaya
was deported to El Salvador around June 19, 1998.
Rodriguez-Amaya, however, was not deterred by his deportation
and, at some point, he returned to the United States. In April 2005,
the Department of Homeland Security received an anonymous tip that
Rodriguez-Amaya had reentered the United States and was associated
with the street gang Mara Salvatrucha, or "MS-13." Acting on this tip,
Special Agent Julian Doyle of ICE administratively arrested
Rodriguez-Amaya on May 17, 2005 and issued a "Notice of
UNITED STATES v. RODRIGUEZ-AMAYA 3
Intent/Decision to Reinstate Prior Order," which informed Rodriguez-
Amaya of the United States’ intent to reinstate the 1998 deportation
order and remove Rodriguez-Amaya to El Salvador. Rodriguez-
Amaya signed this form. Because Rodriguez-Amaya was previously
deported for committing an aggravated felony, the INA required that
ICE detain Rodriguez-Amaya pending his deportation. 8 U.S.C.A.
§ 1226(c)(1)(B) (West 2005).
On June 6, 2005, ICE briefly transferred custody of Rodriguez-
Amaya to the Commonwealth of Virginia, which desired to prosecute
him for failure to register as a sex offender. While Rodriguez-Amaya
was still in Virginia’s custody, on July 21, 2005, Agent Doyle
requested a criminal complaint and arrest warrant from the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia against
Rodriguez-Amaya for unlawful reentry, which the court issued. No
further action was taken by Agent Doyle at the time, and Rodriguez-
Amaya remained in Virginia’s custody.
On October 7, 2005, Virginia returned Rodriguez-Amaya to ICE’s
custody; ICE’s Department of Detention and Removal Operations
then resumed processing Rodriguez-Amaya in preparation for his
removal to El Salvador. Winston Chow, the Deportation Officer in
charge of Rodriguez-Amaya’s administrative removal, was unaware
of the criminal complaint filed against Rodriguez-Amaya. Thereafter,
on October 25, 2005, Agent Doyle learned that Rodriguez-Amaya had
been returned to an ICE custodial facility in southern Virginia.
Rodriguez-Amaya, at Agent Doyle’s request, was transported to
Alexandria, Virginia. On October 27, 2005, Agent Doyle executed the
criminal arrest warrant against Rodriguez-Amaya for unlawful reen-
try. At that point, Rodriguez-Amaya was transferred from ICE’s cus-
tody to the United States Marshals Service and made his initial
appearance before a magistrate judge on that day.
Following a detention hearing conducted on November 1, 2005,
Rodriguez-Amaya was ordered detained pending trial. On November
23, 2005, twenty-six days after the execution of the federal criminal
arrest warrant, a federal grand jury sitting in the Eastern District of
Virginia indicted Rodriguez-Amaya on one count of unlawful reentry,
in violation of 8 U.S.C.A. § 1326(a) and (b)(2).
4 UNITED STATES v. RODRIGUEZ-AMAYA
Before trial, Rodriguez-Amaya moved to dismiss the indictment
for violating the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(b), which
requires indictment within thirty days of arrest. The district court held
a hearing at which both Agent Doyle and Officer Chow testified.
Agent Doyle testified that he had no role in Rodriguez-Amaya’s
return to ICE administrative custody on October 7, 2005, and that he
did not learn that Rodriguez-Amaya had been returned to ICE custody
until October 25, 2005. Officer Chow testified that he did not know
of the federal arrest warrant on October 7, 2005, and that during the
period from October 7 to October 25, he was actively arranging for
Rodriguez-Amaya’s removal from the United States. Officer Chow
further testified that the removal process still had not been completed
on October 25 and that Rodriguez-Amaya’s length of stay in adminis-
trative detention was not unusual. Although Officer Chow was
responsible for reviewing the FBI’s National Crime Information Cen-
ter ("NCIC") records, which should have contained a record of the
July 21, 2005 criminal complaint and arrest warrant, he did not learn
of the warrant through NCIC (and does not recall ever running an
NCIC check in this case). Instead, Officer Chow learned of the pend-
ing federal criminal charges only after contacting Agent Doyle on
October 25, 2005 to obtain Rodriguez-Amaya’s "alien file" or "A
file." This file contained documents that Officer Chow needed to
arrange an interview with the El Salvadoran consulate, which would
then issue the travel document necessary for Rodriguez-Amaya to
return to El Salvador. Rodriguez-Amaya did not offer any witnesses
in rebuttal, and the district court denied his motion to dismiss the
indictment.
Following the denial of the motion to dismiss, the district court
conducted a bench trial, after which it found Rodriguez-Amaya guilty
of unlawful reentry and sentenced him to 41 months imprisonment.
Rodriguez-Amaya timely appealed, and we possess jurisdiction pur-
suant to 28 U.S.C.A. § 1291 (West 2006).
II.
On appeal, Rodriguez-Amaya renews his contention that the indict-
ment against him violated the Speedy Trial Act. We "review de novo
the district court’s interpretation of the Speedy Trial Act," United
States v. Bush, 404 F.3d 263, 272 (4th Cir. 2005) (internal quotation
UNITED STATES v. RODRIGUEZ-AMAYA 5
marks, alteration, and citation omitted), and review "any of the court’s
related factual findings for clear error," United States v. Leftenant,
341 F.3d 338, 342 (4th Cir. 2003).
The Speedy Trial Act, in relevant part, provides:
Any information or indictment charging an individual with
the commission of an offense shall be filed within thirty
days from the date on which such individual was arrested or
served with a summons in connection with such charges. If
an individual has been charged with a felony in a district in
which no grand jury has been in session during such thirty-
day period, the period of time for filing of the indictment
shall be extended an additional thirty days.
18 U.S.C.A. § 3161(b).
The term "offense" is defined as "any Federal criminal offense
which is in violation of any Act of Congress and is triable by any
court established by Act of Congress." 18 U.S.C.A. § 3172(2) (West
2000) (emphasis added). If the thirty-day time limit in § 3161(b) is
not met, the "complaint shall be dismissed or otherwise dropped." 18
U.S.C.A. § 3162(a)(1) (West 2000).
A.
Rodriguez-Amaya contends that the Speedy Trial Act’s thirty-day
limit began running on October 7, 2005, when he was returned to
ICE’s custody. As of that date, he argues, he was held in federal cus-
tody "in connection with" an "offense," specifically the outstanding
criminal arrest warrant and complaint for unlawful reentry. Using
October 7 as the starting date, Rodriguez-Amaya claims that fifty-six
days passed between his arrest and indictment, well outside the
Speedy Trial Act’s permissible thirty-day time limit. The Government
argues that civil detention, including detention by ICE, cannot trigger
the limits of the Speedy Trial Act, and that the Act’s time limits did
not begin running until October 27, 2005, when Agent Doyle served
the criminal arrest warrant on Rodriguez-Amaya.
6 UNITED STATES v. RODRIGUEZ-AMAYA
We have previously held that the Speedy Trial Act requires federal
action to apply. See United States v. Woolfolk, 399 F.3d 590, 596 (4th
Cir. 2005) ("[f]or this [thirty-day time] limit to commence, a person
must be held for the purpose of answering to a federal charge")
(internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Thomas, 55 F.3d
144, 148 (4th Cir. 1995) (explaining "the arrest must be a federal
arrest upon a federal charge" for the Speedy Trial Act time limit to
commence) (internal quotation marks omitted). The question we face
here is what type of federal action is necessary to trigger the running
of the thirty-day time limit. As always, we start with the statute’s
plain language in formulating an answer. U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. N.C.
Growers Ass’n, 377 F.3d 345, 350 (4th Cir. 2004).
Looking to this plain language, we conclude, in agreement with
every other circuit to have considered the issue, that the Speedy Trial
Act does not apply to civil detention generally, and to ICE administra-
tive detention specifically. See United States v. Dyer, 325 F.3d 464,
468 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v. Garcia-Martinez, 254 F.3d 16,
19 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v. De La Pena-Juarez, 214 F.3d 594,
597 (5th Cir. 2000); United States v. Noel, 231 F.3d 833, 836 (11th
Cir. 2000); United States v. Grajales-Montoya, 117 F.3d 356, 366
(8th Cir. 1997); United States v. Cepeda-Luna, 989 F.2d 353, 355-56
(9th Cir. 1993). The Speedy Trial Act requires arrest in connection
with an "offense," that is, a "Federal criminal offense." 18 U.S.C.A.
§ 3172(2) (emphasis added). Accordingly, we have little trouble con-
cluding that the plain language of the Speedy Trial Act limits the
Act’s coverage to persons detained in connection with a federal crimi-
nal arrest.
B.
Rodriguez-Amaya, likely aware that his first argument was a non-
starter, contends in the alternative that, even if civil detention gener-
ally does not trigger the protections of the Speedy Trial Act, we
should recognize a "ruse exception" to this general rule in order to
cover situations where administrative or civil detention amounts to
nothing but a cover for criminal detention. See Cepeda-Luna, 989
F.2d at 357-58. On this point, we agree. We have accepted a "ruse
exception" of sorts for defining what constitutes "federal" action, see
Woolfolk, 395 F.3d at 596 & n.7, and our sister circuits have been in
UNITED STATES v. RODRIGUEZ-AMAYA 7
agreement in adopting an exception in this context as well. This
exception to the general rule that the Speedy Trial Act does not apply
to civil detentions was initially carved out in Cepeda-Luna, in which
the Ninth Circuit reasoned that:
The requirements of the Act would lose all meaning if fed-
eral criminal authorities could collude with civil or state
officials to have those authorities detain a defendant pending
federal criminal charges solely for the purpose of bypassing
the requirements of the Speedy Trial Act. If a court found
evidence of such collusion, the provisions of the Act could
be applied to state or civil detentions.
989 F.2d at 357. See also Garcia-Martinez, 254 F.3d at 20 ("We
agree with the position taken by all of the courts of appeals that have
addressed the issue that a civil arrest by the INS does not trigger the
[Act] in the absence of collusion or evidence that the detention was
for the sole or primary purpose of preparing for criminal prosecu-
tion."); De La Pena-Juarez, 214 F.3d at 598 (adopting "ruse excep-
tion" but holding that it applies only "where the defendant
demonstrates that the primary or exclusive purpose of the civil deten-
tion was to hold him for future criminal prosecution"); Noel, 231 F.3d
at 836 ("We agree with the Fifth Circuit’s recent decision that [this
ruse] exception will provide protection for detained aliens, but that
the exception should only be applied when the defendant demon-
strates that the primary or exclusive purpose of the civil detention was
to hold him for future criminal prosecution." (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)); Grajales-Montoya, 117 F.3d at 366
(holding that a defendant failed to prove that his civil detention by the
INS was a ruse to evade the Speedy Trial Act).
As the Fifth Circuit explained in adopting the ruse exception in this
context, the exception is "an effective way of protecting against the
possibility of collusion between federal criminal authorities and civil
or state officials." De La Pena-Juarez, 214 F.3d at 598. We agree, and
hold that the Speedy Trial Act includes a ruse exception in the context
of civil detention, such that the time limits of the Speedy Trial Act
are triggered when the "primary or exclusive purpose of the civil
detention was to hold [a defendant] for future criminal prosecution."
Id. Because this ruse exception is, by definition, an exception to the
8 UNITED STATES v. RODRIGUEZ-AMAYA
general rule that civil detentions do not implicate the time limits of
the Speedy Trial Act, we further hold that civil detainees, like
Rodriguez-Amaya, bear the burden of proving the exception applies
in a given case. Id.; see also Noel, 231 F.3d at 836.
Turning to the case at bar, we have little trouble concluding that the
ruse exception does not apply. The district court held a hearing on the
matter, with testimony from only Agent Doyle and Officer Chow.
Both testified, under oath, that no collusion occurred between ICE
and criminal authorities. Moreover, Chow further testified that he had
no knowledge of the outstanding criminal arrest warrant on
Rodriguez-Amaya and that he had more administrative work to be
completed before Rodriguez-Amaya could be removed to El Salva-
dor. Agent Doyle likewise testified that he was unaware Rodriguez-
Amaya was returned to ICE custody until October 25, 2005, and that,
upon receiving this information, he immediately had Rodriguez-
Amaya transported to Alexandria for his criminal arrest. As the dis-
trict court aptly noted, Rodriguez-Amaya’s ICE custody following his
return from state custody "had the clear and documented ‘administra-
tive detention purpose’ of facilitating the government’s deportation of
[him]." (J.A. at 127.) Moreover, 8 U.S.C.A. § 1226(c)(1)(B) mandates
that the Government detain aggravated felons, like Rodriguez-Amaya,
pending their removal. We thus think it pellucidly clear that
Rodriguez-Amaya has failed to carry his burden of proving his ICE
detention beginning on October 7, 2005, was for the primary or exclu-
sive purpose of future criminal investigation.
III.
For the foregoing reasons, Rodriguez-Amaya’s conviction for
unlawful reentry is
AFFIRMED.