UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4794
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CHARLES TYRONE BLACKSHEAR,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western
District of North Carolina, at Charlotte. Frank D. Whitney,
District Judge. (3:03-cr-00215-FDW)
Submitted: March 7, 2008 Decided: April 10, 2008
Before TRAXLER and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Eric A. Bach, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellant. Gretchen
C. F. Shappert, United States Attorney, Adam Morris, Assistant
United States Attorney, Charlotte, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Charles Tyrone Blackshear appeals the 322-month sentence
imposed after he pled guilty to three counts of possession with
intent to distribute an unspecified quantity of cocaine base, and
one count of possession with intent to distribute a detectable
amount of cocaine and fifty grams of cocaine base, all in violation
of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (2000) (Counts One through Four), one
count of using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a
drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000)
(Count Five), and one count of possession of a firearm after having
been convicted of a crime punishable by more than one year of
imprisonment, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2000) (Count
Six). We conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in sentencing Blackshear and affirm.
In the presentence report (PSR), the probation officer
recommended a base offense level of thirty-two for the drug counts
pursuant to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual (USSG) § 2D1.1(c)(4)
(2005). The Guidelines term on Count Five was the statutory
minimum of sixty months consecutive, pursuant to USSG § 2K2.4. The
base offense level for Count Six was twenty-four pursuant to USSG
§ 2K2.1(a)(2), but the cross-reference to USSG § 2D1.1 applied, so
the base offense level became thirty-two. Blackshear’s prior
convictions qualified him for sentencing as a career offender, and
mandated an offense level of thirty-seven. After a three-level
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reduction for acceptance of responsibility, Blackshear’s total
offense level for Counts One through Four and Six was thirty-four.
Because he was a career offender, Blackshear was in
criminal history category VI. Offense level thirty-four and
criminal history category VI yielded a sentencing range of 262 to
327 months for Counts One through Four and Six, plus a consecutive
sixty months on Count Five, for a total Guidelines range of 322 to
387 months. Because Count Four involved fifty grams of cocaine
base, and the Government filed a 21 U.S.C. § 851 (2000) information
establishing two prior felony drug convictions, Blackshear was
subject to a statutory mandatory sentence of life imprisonment,
plus five years consecutive on Count Five.
Prior to sentencing, the Government moved for a downward
departure pursuant to USSG § 5K1.1 and 18 U.S.C.A. § 3553(e) (West
2000 & Supp. 2007). The Government requested a sentence of 262
months on the drug counts and a consecutive sixty months on Count
Five, for a total of 322 months of imprisonment. Blackshear did
not object to the PSR, which the court adopted without change. The
court accepted the Government’s motion for a departure.
Blackshear’s counsel stated that he accepted the Government’s
motion as to the Guidelines, then argued for a variance below the
sentence recommended by the Government in the departure motion.
The district court noted the advisory Guidelines and the 18
U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007) factors and sentenced
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Blackshear to 322 months of imprisonment, ten years of supervised
release, and a $600 special assessment.
On appeal, Blackshear argues that the district court
failed to make proper findings regarding the § 3553(a) factors and
the factors supporting a departure under § 5K1.1 and § 3553(e), and
that the court erred in failing to consider a lesser sentence based
on the crack-to-powder cocaine disparity, anticipating the Supreme
Court’s decision in Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558
(2007). We review a district court’s sentence for reasonableness
under an abuse of discretion standard. Gall v. United States, 128
S. Ct. 586, 597 (2007). In this case, the district court
explicitly treated the Guidelines as advisory, and sentenced
Blackshear only after considering the Sentencing Guidelines, the
§ 3553(a) factors, the Government’s departure motion, and counsel’s
arguments. Although the district court did not recite facts to
support each § 3553(a) factor, the court need not “robotically tick
through § 3553(a)’s every subsection” or “explicitly discuss every
§ 3553(a) factor on the record.” United States v. Johnson, 445
F.3d 339, 345 (4th Cir. 2006). Our review of the record leads us
to conclude that the district court properly considered the
sentencing factors, and did not abuse its discretion in concluding
that the sentence recommended by the Government was appropriate.
The Supreme Court recently decided, in Kimbrough, that
“it would not be an abuse of discretion for a district court to
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conclude when sentencing a particular defendant that the
crack/powder disparity yields a sentence ‘greater than necessary’
to achieve § 3553(a)’s purposes, even in a mine-run case.” 128 S.
Ct. at 575. We conclude, however, that Kimbrough is of no
assistance to Blackshear because his ultimate Guidelines range was
not determined based on drug quantity, but on his status as a
career offender. Accordingly, the district court did not err in
failing to consider the crack-to-powder cocaine disparity as a
basis for imposing a lower sentence.
We therefore affirm Blackshear’s sentence. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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