UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4595
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CRAIG LEWIS WATLINGTON,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle
District of North Carolina, at Durham. William L. Osteen, Senior
District Judge. (1:06-cr-00404-WLO)
Submitted: March 3, 2008 Decided: April 7, 2008
Before KING and DUNCAN, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Joseph M. Wilson, Jr., MERRITT, FLEBOTTE, WILSON, WEBB & CARUSO,
PLLC, Durham, North Carolina, for Appellant. David Paul Folmar,
Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Greensboro, North Carolina,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Craig Lewis Watlington pled guilty to distributing
cocaine base (Count 1), and to possession of a firearm by a
convicted felon (Count 2). The district court properly calculated
Watlington’s advisory Sentencing Guidelines range as 262-327 months
of imprisonment and sentenced him to 270 months for Count 1 and to
a concurrent sentence of 120 months for Count 2. Watlington timely
appeals, and his counsel has filed a brief under Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), alleging that there are no
meritorious claims on appeal, but raising the following issue:
whether the district court erred by imposing a sentence that is
unreasonably long. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
After United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), we
review a sentence to determine whether it is unreasonable, applying
a “deferential abuse-of-discretion standard.” Gall v. United
States, 128 S. Ct. 586, 591 (2007). A district court must engage
in a multi-step process at sentencing. First, the district court
must calculate the appropriate advisory Sentencing Guidelines range
by making any necessary factual findings. United States
v. Moreland, 437 F.3d 424, 432 (4th Cir. 2006). Then the court
should afford the parties “an opportunity to argue for whatever
sentence they deem appropriate.” Gall, 128 S. Ct. at 596-97.
Next, the sentencing court should consider the resulting advisory
sentencing range in conjunction with the factors set out in 18
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U.S.C.A. § 3553(a) (West 2000 and Supp. 2007), and determine
whether the § 3553(a) factors support the sentence requested by
either party. Id. Considering the factors in § 3553(a) does not
require the sentencing court to “robotically tick through” every
subsection of § 3553(a). United States v. Montes-Pineda, 445 F.3d
375, 380 (4th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 3044 (2007).
To determine whether a sentencing court abused its
discretion, we undertake a two-part analysis. United States
v. Pauley, 511 F.3d 468 (4th Cir. 2007). First, we examine the
sentence for “significant procedural errors,” and second, we
evaluate the substance of the sentence. Id. at 473. Significant
procedural errors include “failing to calculate (or improperly
calculating) the Guidelines range, treating the Guidelines as
mandatory, failing to consider the § 3553(a) factors, selecting a
sentence based on clearly erroneous facts, or failing to adequately
explain the chosen sentence--including an explanation for any
deviation from the Guidelines range.” Id. (citing Gall, 128 S. Ct.
at 597). “Substantive reasonableness review entails taking into
account the totality of the circumstances, including the extent of
any variance from the Guidelines range.” Id. While an appellate
court may presume a sentence within the Guidelines range to be
reasonable, it may not presume a sentence outside the range to be
unreasonable. Id.
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Here, the district court followed the necessary steps in
sentencing Watlington, and we find no abuse of discretion in its
within-Guidelines range sentence of 270 months for Count 1 and the
concurrent 120-month sentence for Count 2. We have examined the
entire record in this case in accordance with the requirements of
Anders, and find no meritorious issues for appeal. Despite notice,
Watlington has not filed a pro se supplemental brief. Accordingly,
we affirm. This court requires that counsel inform his client, in
writing, of his right to petition the Supreme Court of the United
States for further review. If the client requests that a petition
be filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be
frivolous, then counsel may move in this court for leave to
withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a
copy thereof was served on the client. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately
presented in the materials before the court and argument would not
aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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