UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 06-5161
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
LAMONT ANTWON SANDERS, a/k/a Twon,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of
Maryland, at Baltimore. J. Frederick Motz, District Judge.
(1:06-cr-00087-JFM)
Submitted: March 7, 2008 Decided: April 7, 2008
Before MICHAEL, TRAXLER, and GREGORY, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
John A. Bourgeois, Steven M. Klepper, KRAMON & GRAHAM, P.A.,
Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant. Rod J. Rosenstein, United
States Attorney, John W. Sippel, Jr., Michael J. Leotta, Assistant
United States Attorneys, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Pursuant to a written plea agreement, Lamont Antwon
Sanders entered a conditional guilty plea to possession with intent
to distribute five grams or more of crack cocaine, in violation of
21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (2000), possession of a firearm by a convicted
felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2000), and possession
of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in
violation of 18 U.S.C.A. § 924(c)(1) (West 2000 & Supp. 2007).
Sanders reserved the right to challenge on appeal the district
court’s denial of the motion to suppress the evidence seized from
his apartment at 629 S. Beechfield Avenue. He raises numerous
claims challenging the validity of the search warrant and the
district court’s conclusion that the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule applied. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.
Sanders asserts for the first time on appeal that
Detective Brooks violated Sanders’ Fourth Amendment rights by using
Sanders’ keys to enter the Beechfield Avenue apartment before the
state court judge issued the warrant and by conducting a protective
sweep of that apartment. Next, Sanders asserts that Detective
Brooks illegally searched another address without a warrant and
that such search then rendered the items seized at the Beechfield
Avenue apartment fruit of the poisonous tree. Sanders also
contends that the search warrant was invalid because he did not
make any representations to Detective Brooks about where he lived.
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Because Sanders believes that the warrant was based upon Brooks’
misleading statements, he asserts that the district court’s factual
finding that he concealed the Beechfield Avenue apartment was
clearly erroneous. Sanders did not raise these claims in the
motion to suppress filed in the district court. Accordingly, we
find that they are waived under the terms of his plea agreement.
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 12(b)(3), (f); United States v. Ricco, 52 F.
3d 58, 62 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Lockett, 406 F.3d 207,
212 (3d Cir. 2005) (“[I]n the context of a motion to suppress, a
defendant must have advanced substantially the same theories of
suppression in the district court as he . . . seeks to rely upon in
this Court.”).
Sanders also asserts on appeal, as he did below, that the
search warrant was invalid because there was no probable cause to
believe that his drug activity was linked to the Beechfield Avenue
apartment and that the good faith exception did not apply. We
review the district court’s factual findings underlying a motion to
suppress for clear error and the district court’s legal
determinations de novo. United States v. McCoy, 513 F.3d 405, 410
(4th Cir. 2008) (citing Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699
(1996)). When a suppression motion has been denied, this court
reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the Government.
United States v. Colonna, 511 F.3d 431, 434 (4th Cir. 2007).
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In reviewing the validity of a search warrant, the
relevant inquiry is whether, under the totality of the
circumstances, the issuing judge had a substantial basis for
concluding that there was probable cause to issue the warrant.
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983); see United States v.
Chandia, 514 F.3d 365, 373 (4th Cir. 2008) (noting that
magistrate’s probable cause determination entitled to “great
deference”); United States v. Grossman, 400 F.3d 212, 218 (4th Cir.
2005) (“[I]t is reasonable to suspect that a drug dealer stores
drugs in a home to which he owns a key.”). Even if a warrant is
found to be defective, the evidence obtained from the defective
warrant may nevertheless be admitted under the good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule if the officers’ reliance on the warrant
was objectively reasonable. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
922-23 (1984). With these standards in mind, we have reviewed the
parties’ briefs and the record on appeal and conclude that the
district court did not err in denying Sanders’ motion to suppress.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district
court. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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