IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
No. 96-40133
Summary Calendar
BILLIE DORIS MALLORY,
Individually and On Behalf of
the Estate of L.A. MALLORY,
Deceased,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
ALL AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE
COMPANY, A U.S. LIFE COMPANY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
For the Eastern District of Texas
(6:94-CV-841)
August 8, 1996
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, WIENER, and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
This is a diversity case from the Eastern District of Texas.
The question is whether an insurance policy provision covering
injuries suffered “while riding in, boarding on, exiting from or
being struck by . . . [a] land . . . transport vehicle which the
insured has not been hired to run” covers a hunting accident which
*
Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4.
occurred aboard a four-wheel all-terrain vehicle. A reading of
“land transport vehicle” to include a four-wheel all-terrain
vehicle would render another section of the contract superfluous
and the operative language appears in a section entitled “Common
Carrier Coverage.” We find no coverage and affirm for essentially
the reasons stated by Judge Hannah.
Decedent L.A. Mallory died as a result of a gunshot wound to
the chest while operating a four-wheel all-terrain vehicle alone on
a private hunting lease in the State of Colorado. Appellee insurer
paid appellant $100,000 in accordance with the “Twenty-Four Hour
Accident Coverage” section of the insurance policy. Appellant
claims she is entitled to an additional $100,000 under the language
of the “Common Carrier Coverage” section quoted above. She appeals
from the district court’s grant of appellee’s motion for summary
judgment and its denial of her motion for summary judgment.
In Texas, a contract of insurance, like other contracts, “is
interpreted as a whole, and all writings that are a part of the
same transaction are interpreted together.” Restatement (Second)
of Contracts § 202(2) (1981); United American Insurance Company v.
Selby, 338 S.W.2d 160, 164 (Tex. 1960). While a broad reading of
“land transport vehicle” includes a four-wheel all-terrain vehicle,
when the contract is taken as a whole, “land transport vehicle”
takes on a more refined meaning.
A provision in an insurance contract should not be read so as
to render other insuring provisions ineffective or meaningless.
Martindale Lumber Co. v. Bituminous Casualty Corp., 625 F.2d 618,
623 (5th. Cir. 1980); Bright v. New York Life Insurance Co., 546
S.W.2d 145 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1977, writ ref’d n.r.e).
If we read “land transport vehicle” to include a four-wheel all-
terrain vehicle, as appellant urges, at least two other parts of
the contract become meaningless. First, the “Private
Passenger/Pedestrian Coverage” section is rendered superfluous. An
understanding of “land transport vehicle” which includes a four-
wheel all-terrain vehicle also includes a private passenger car--
both are vehicles which transport people across land. The “Private
Passenger/Pedestrian Coverage” section provides $100,000 for
injuries “suffered when getting into, out of, driving, riding in,
or being struck by a private passenger car”; the “Common Carrier
Coverage” section provides $200,000. The contract states that
“[i]f more than one Hazard applies to any one accident, only the
Hazard with the largest principal sum amount will be paid.” Thus
anyone with a $100,000 claim under the “Private
Passenger/Pedestrian Coverage” section would have a concomitant
$200,000 “Common Carrier Coverage” claim. The parties did not
intend such a reading.1
1
The “Twenty-Four Hour Accident Coverage” section admittedly
renders the “Private Passenger/Pedestrian Coverage” section
superfluous no matter how the “Common Carrier Coverage” section is
interpreted. Both provisions offer $100,000 in coverage, one for
accidents generally and the other for a subset of accidents. It
appears, though, that the schedule is designed to permit an agent
to fill in different coverage amounts for different clients,
“Twenty-Four Hour Accident Coverage” being the broadest category of
coverage and “Private Passenger/Pedestrian Coverage” and “Common
Carrier Coverage” being mutually exclusive subsets of that
Second, the title of the relevant section--“Common Carrier
Coverage”--would be an inaccurate description of the coverage
described in the section. Typically, a “‘[c]ommon carrier’
designates a person engaged in transporting people or things from
place to place for hire, and who holds himself out to the public to
do so for so long as he has room to carry the cargo tendered to
him.” Railroad Comm’n of Texas v. United Parcel Service, Inc., 614
S.W.2d 903, 910 (Tex. Civ. App.--Austin 1981, writ ref’d n.r.e)
(emphasis in original). Appellant urges us to disregard this
section title in favor of a general reading of the operative
language which ignores the public/private distinction connoted by
the term “Common Carrier.” But appellee included the term “Common
Carrier” in the section title precisely because it wanted to
describe the nature of the coverage offered in that section. We
therefore read the operative language of the “Common Carrier
Coverage” section in light of its title.
Finally, the term “land transport vehicle” itself can be read
in the manner urged by the title of the section and the structure
of the contract as a whole. While in its most common usage, the
noun “transport” means the act of “carry[ing], mov[ing], or
convey[ing] from one place to another,” The Random House College
Dictionary 1397 (Rev. ed. 1982), it is also defined as “a system of
public travel,” id. In the absence of other limiting language we
would probably be inclined to adhere to the more general
category.
definition. But given the section title and the effect of a broad
reading on the “Private Passenger/Pedestrian Coverage” section, the
latter definition is the more appropriate one.
Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.