UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 07-4704
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
DARRYL G. INGRAM, JR.,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia, at Richmond. James R. Spencer, Chief
District Judge. (3:06-cr-00376-JRS)
Submitted: May 30, 2008 Decided: June 11, 2008
Before WILKINSON and SHEDD, Circuit Judges, and HAMILTON, Senior
Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Edwin F. Brooks, EDWIN F. BROOKS, LLC, Richmond, Virginia, for
Appellant. Chuck Rosenberg, United States Attorney, Charles E.
James, Jr., Assistant United States Attorney, Richmond, Virginia,
for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Darryl G. Ingram, Jr., appeals his jury conviction and
sentence on charges of conspiracy to distribute cocaine base, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A)(iii), 846 (2000)
(Count One); conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2000) (Count Two); interference with
interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2000) (Count
Three); and use of a weapon in furtherance of a crime of violence,
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (2000) (Count Four).1 The
district court sentenced Ingram to a total of 444 months’
imprisonment, ten years total supervised release, and ordered him
to pay $598 in restitution. On appeal, Ingram challenges the
sufficiency of the indictments and the district court’s denial of
his motion for judgment of acquittal on the basis that the evidence
was insufficient to convict him of the offenses charged in the
superseding indictment. We affirm.
Ingram’s first claim of error is that the indictment was
insufficient because the indictment failed to specify the
particular dates on which he was alleged to have committed the
offenses charged. He challenges the district court’s denial of his
motion to dismiss Count One of the original indictment. While he
admits he only challenged the original indictment below, he raises
an additional challenge to the superseding indictment for the first
time on appeal. Ingram offers nothing on appeal to demonstrate how
1
Counts Two through Four related to Ingram’s involvement in a
January 22, 2004 robbery of Davinci’s Pizza Restaurant in Richmond,
Virginia.
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the alleged flaws prejudiced his ability to defend his interests or
to receive effective assistance of counsel. United States v.
Williams, 152 F.3d 294, 299 (4th Cir. 1998) (one principal purpose
of indictment is to provide sufficient information to allow
preparation of defense). We have reviewed de novo the district
court’s denial of Ingram’s pretrial motion to dismiss the original
indictment. United States v. Loayza, 107 F.3d 257, 260 (4th Cir.
1997). We find that the indictment is sufficient, and that the
district court did not err in denying Ingram’s motion to dismiss
the indictment. Nor do we find, in reviewing for plain error2
Ingram’s corollary claim, that the superseding indictment was
insufficient.
Ingram’s final claim of error is that the district court
erred in denying his Fed. R. Crim. P. 59 motion because the
evidence was insufficient to convict him of the drug distribution
conspiracy charged in Count One of the superseding indictment, or
the conspiracy and use of a firearm relating to the robbery charged
in Counts Two through Four. In evaluating the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting a criminal conviction on direct review, “[t]he
verdict of the jury must be sustained if there is substantial
evidence, taking the view most favorable to the Government, to
support it.” Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942).
Substantial evidence is evidence “that a reasonable finder of fact
2
See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 631 (2002)
(applying plain-error test to claim that indictment failed to
allege element of charged offense); United States v. Sutton, 961
F.2d 476, 479 (4th Cir. 1992).
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could accept as adequate and sufficient to support a conclusion of
a defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” United States v.
Burgos, 94 F.3d 849, 862 (4th Cir. 1996) (en banc). We consider
circumstantial and direct evidence, and allow the Government the
benefit of all reasonable inferences from the facts proven to those
sought to be established. Id. at 858; United States v. Tresvant,
677 F.2d 1018, 1021 (4th Cir. 1982). Our review of the record
discloses sufficient evidence presented at Ingram’s trial to
support the jury’s findings.
First, with regard to the drug conspiracy charge, Ingram
contends that the witnesses against him did not testify with any
specificity that there was any agreement among or between them and
Ingram, but rather that the evidence established that there were a
number of individuals, including Ingram, who were buying or selling
drugs “on their own in the same vicinity” on a competitive, rather
than cooperative basis. He also points to alleged inconsistencies
in the witnesses’ testimony and their motives, asserting that such
inconsistencies undermine the jury’s verdict.
The record reflects that the Government presented in
excess of twenty witnesses who testified about Ingram’s purchases
of distribution quantity drugs and sales of those drugs on an
ongoing basis. Aaron Kinchen testified that on two or three
occasions he gave crack cocaine to an individual he knew as “Fresh”
who then handed the drugs over to Ingram in Kinchen’s presence.
Melvin John testified that he saw Ingram four to five times a week,
and that he drove Ingram and Godwin Eni (together) for the purpose
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of conducting drug sales, five to ten per day. John testified that
Ingram dealt in three and a half and seven-gram quantities of
crack. He further attested that Ingram and Eni shared drugs and
profits. Other witnesses testified as to sharing drug sales with
Ingram. Andy Matthews testified that Eni introduced him to Ingram
as a source for the purchase of crack, and that he bought quarter
to one-half ounce quantities of crack from Ingram three times a
week for approximately a year. In addition, the Government
introduced evidence that, based on Ingram’s relationships with
other drug traffickers, he was allowed to sell his drugs in areas
not otherwise open to outsiders. Other witnesses testified to
seeing Ingram obtain or possess one to three-ounce quantities of
crack. Special Agent Danny Board testified that user quantities of
crack cocaine are between a tenth to two-tenths of a gram, with
three and a half gram and higher amounts being wholesale
distribution-level amounts.
As evidenced by the finding of guilt, the jury resolved
any conflicts in testimony in favor of the prosecution, determined
the Government’s witnesses to be sufficiently credible to support
their verdict of guilty, and otherwise found sufficient
circumstantial and direct evidence of guilt. We find the evidence
to be adequate and sufficient to support the jury’s conclusion
beyond a reasonable doubt that Ingram had an agreement with two or
more individuals to engage in conduct that violated a federal drug
law, that he knew of the agreement, and that he knowingly and
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voluntarily participated in the conspiracy. See United States v.
Strickland, 245 F.3d 368, 384-85 (4th Cir. 2001).
The evidence likewise is sufficient to support the jury’s
verdicts on Counts Two through Four. The record reflects that Keon
Booker testified that he, Ingram, and Michael Scarborough agreed
and worked together to rob Davinci’s Pizza restaurant on January
22, 2004, to obtain money to pay Booker’s cousin’s bond. Booker
attested that each of the three co-conspirators traveled to the
restaurant for the purpose of robbing it, each armed with a
firearm. He testified that Ingram held one of the restaurant
employees at gunpoint while Booker recovered the money. He further
testified that he, Ingram, and Scarborough took money from the
register, several food items, the employees’ wallets, and the
store’s telephone. Scarborough also testified as to his role in
the charged robbery, and implicated Ingram in the robbery,
attesting to Ingram’s role in the robbery and to Ingram’s receipt
of a portion of the robbery proceeds. Finally, Leonidas Brown, an
inmate housed with Ingram at the Piedmont Regional Jail, testified
that Ingram admitted to him that he robbed Davinci’s with another
individual. Ingram’s claims on appeal that the witnesses’
testimony was inconsistent or not credible, or that the witnesses’
self-interest outweighed their credibility, are insufficient to
support reversal of the jury’s verdicts, because in resolving
issues of substantial evidence, we do not weigh evidence or review
witness credibility. United States v. Lomax, 293 F.3d 701, 705
(4th Cir. 2002); Burgos, 94 F.3d at 863. Rather, it is the role of
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the jury to judge the credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts
in testimony, and weigh the evidence. United States v. Manbeck,
744 F.2d 360, 392 (4th Cir. 1984).
We find no merit to Ingram’s claims of insufficiency of
the evidence, finding that the jury’s verdict on each of the four
counts was amply supported by the evidence. The district court did
not err in denying Ingram’s Rule 59 motions.
Accordingly, we affirm Ingram’s conviction and sentence.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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